Supplemental Guidance for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones (DPMS)

Supplemental Guidance for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones (DPMS)

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Last Updated: 06/03/2026

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MoET's DPMS Guidance in Nutshell

  • Applies to all UAE dealers in precious metals and stones (DPMS), covering metals above set purity thresholds, diamonds, coloured gemstones and pearls above defined weights.
  • The AED 55,000 threshold is the minimum legal trigger for treating a transaction as a covered transaction requiring full AML/CFT/CPF measures, not an exemption below it. DPMSR filing is a separate threshold-based reporting obligation with its own specific triggering circumstances. Related transactions, instalments, and cash equivalents must all be aggregated toward the threshold.
  • CDD and EDD must be applied on a risk-driven basis and are not limited to transactions at or above AED 55,000. Sanctions screening is a threshold-independent obligation; its depth and frequency must be proportionate to the risk profile. Ongoing monitoring applies to business relationships, with proportionate steps taken for occasional transactions. A five-year record retention rule applies across four specific triggering events.
  • Sub-sector risk varies: refineries and bullion traders face the highest ML risk, wholesalers are most exposed to TBML, and retail jewellers face placement and structuring risk.
  • Common gaps include mistreating the AED 55,000 threshold, missing DPMSR filings, and weak supply chain CDD, particularly in higher-risk subsectors.
  • MoET expects a documented, proportionate risk-based programme: strong governance, supply chain due diligence, TBML detection, red-flag training and an empowered MLRO.

What UAE Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones Need to Know About AML/CFT/CPF Compliance

Where a person or entity is regularly engaged in dealing in precious metals and stones in the UAE and carries out transactions meeting or exceeding the AED 55,000 covered transaction threshold, it falls within the DNFBP category under Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025, and must comply with the applicable AML/CFT/CPF obligations.

Entities whose business involves only incidental or infrequent dealings in PMS, where such transactions are not a regular component of the business, should assess carefully whether they qualify as a DPMS for these purposes.

MoET published sector-specific Supplemental Guidance for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones in March 2026 to set out sector-specific expectations, risk factors, and practical considerations. It should be read alongside the UAE AML/CFT/CPF legal framework, MoET’s broader DNFBP guidelines, and applicable EOCN guidance.

The 2024 UAE National Risk Assessment (NRA) identifies the DPMS sector as one with high inherent exposure to money laundering risks, yielding a residual risk rating of medium-high. The key drivers include high cash intensity, the portability of high-value goods, extensive cross-border trade, involvement of legal persons, and reliance on intermediaries.

The 2024 MoET Sectoral Risk Assessment (SRA) specifically flags bullion trading, refinery, and wholesale activities as higher-risk subsectors.

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Legal Status and Applicability of the MoET DPMS Supplemental Guidance

Who Does the Guidance Apply To?

  • Scope of Applicability
  • How to Read Mandatory vs Recommended Requirements
  • Relationship with EOCN Guidelines on TFS and CPF

Scope of Applicability


Unless otherwise stated, this guidance applies to all Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones, including their boards of directors, management, and employees, established and operating in the territory of the UAE and in Commercial Free Zones.

It applies whether they establish or maintain a business relationship with a customer or engage in the financial activities and transactions outlined in Articles 2 and 3 of Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025. The guidance applies equally to entities in the mainland UAE and in Commercial Free Zones without distinction.

How to Read Mandatory vs Recommended Requirements

The guidance draws a clear distinction between mandatory and recommended obligations. Requirements indicated by ‘shall’ or ‘must’ are compulsory. Requirements indicated by ‘should’ signify recommended practice, unless a recorded, risk-based justification supports an alternative approach that provides equal or greater control. In cases of any discrepancy between this guidance and the Federal Decree Law, Cabinet Resolutions, and directives from the Competent Authority, the legislation and directives take precedence.

Relationship with EOCN Guidelines on TFS and CPF

While this guidance provides high-level direction on Targeted Financial Sanctions (TFS) and Counter-Proliferation Financing (CPF), all operational, procedural, and implementation requirements in these areas remain governed by the applicable EOCN guidelines.

DPMS entities must refer separately to the full TFS guidelines issued by the Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) under Cabinet Decision No. 74 of 2020, which detail their obligations for screening, freezing, and reporting in relation to designated persons or entities.

The primary legislative basis for TFS and CPF obligations also sits in Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025, Part 5, and Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025, Chapter 6; Cabinet Decision No. 74 of 2020 provides the operative procedural framework for implementation.

DPMS should additionally refer to the EOCN Guidance on Counter Proliferation Financing and the Guidance on Proliferation Financing Institutional Risk Assessment to incorporate PF risk into their Business Risk Assessment.

Legal Status of This Guidance

What This Guidance Is and Is Not

The MoET Supplemental Guidance for DPMS is a practical compliance tool. It does not constitute additional legislation or regulation and is not intended to set legal, regulatory, or judicial precedent. It does not replace or supersede any legal or regulatory requirements or statutory obligations. Regulated entities should perform their own assessments of how to meet statutory obligations and should seek legal or other professional advice if they are unsure of the application of the legal or regulatory frameworks to their specific circumstances.

Nothing in this Supplemental Guidance should be interpreted as providing any explicit or implicit guarantee or assurance that supervisory or other Competent Authorities would defer, waive, or refrain from exercising their enforcement, judicial, or punitive powers in the event of a breach of the prevailing laws, regulations, or regulatory rulings. The guidance also notes that the lists and examples it provides are not exhaustive and do not set limitations on the measures regulated entities may need to take.

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Regulatory Definition of Precious Metals and Stones Under UAE AML Law

One of the most practically important sections of the MoET DPMS Guidance is the precise regulatory definition of what counts as a precious metal or stone for AML/CFT/CPF purposes. This definition determines whether and when your compliance obligations are triggered. These classifications align with UAE federal legislation governing the control, stamping, and identification of PMS, as well as with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for raw diamonds.

Precious Metals: Minimum Purity Thresholds

Which Metals Are Covered and at What Purity

The guidance sets out four precious metals and their minimum purity levels for the purposes of applying AML/CFT/CPF measures. Gold must have a minimum purity of 500 parts per 1,000. Silver must have a minimum purity of 800 parts per 1,000. Platinum must have a minimum purity of 850 parts per 1,000. Palladium must have a minimum purity of 500 parts per 1,000. These purity thresholds define the point at which the metals carry sufficient value and liquidity to pose material ML/TF/PF risks. Metal falling below these thresholds may fall outside the specific PMS definition for this purpose. However, DPMS should still consider whether the product’s value, the customer’s risk profile, or the transaction pattern calls for proportionate AML/CFT/CPF measures. See Other High-Value Materials That Carry Similar Risk below.

The 50% Rule for Composite Objects

Any object where at least 50% of its monetary value is derived from precious metals or precious stones must be treated as PMS for AML/CFT/CPF purposes, irrespective of its form or intended use.

Other High-Value Materials That Carry Similar Risk

The guidance further notes that DPMS may engage in transactions involving other types of metals and gemstones, which, while technically not classified as PMS, may nevertheless carry ML/TF/PF risks similar in nature to PMS. These include other high-value metals such as platinum-group or platinoid metals like rhodium, semi-precious gemstones such as amethysts, opals, and jade, and synthetic, treated, or artificial gemstones, including lab-grown diamonds, emeralds, rubies, sapphires, and pearls. DPMS should apply a risk-based approach to these materials, considering the nature, value, and risk indicators of each transaction.

Precious Stones and Pearls: Weight Thresholds

Diamonds: Rough and Polished

The guidance establishes separate weight thresholds for rough and polished diamonds. Rough diamonds of any weight in carats fall within the definition. Polished diamonds that are loose require a minimum weight of 0.3 carats per stone to fall within the definition. Polished diamonds that are mounted in a setting require a minimum weight of 0.5 carats per single stone, whether the setting contains one or more stones. The weight thresholds define the point at which polished diamonds typically acquire sufficient value and liquidity to pose material ML/TF/PF risks. The trade in rough diamonds is also specifically subject to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme requirements, which DPMS must verify and document.

Coloured Gemstones and Pearls

Coloured gemstones, specifically polished emeralds, rubies, and sapphires, must meet a minimum weight of 1 carat per stone if loose, or a minimum weight of 2 carats per single stone when mounted in a setting, to fall within the definition. Loose pearls require a minimum diameter of 3 millimetres per bead. Pearls that are strung or mounted in a setting require a minimum diameter of 10 millimetres per single bead. While pearls are not technically gemstones, they are included in the definition for the purpose of the DPMS guidance because they carry comparable value and liquidity characteristics.

Understanding the AED 55,000 Covered Transaction Threshold

The AED 55,000 threshold is the most commonly misunderstood aspect of UAE DPMS compliance. The MoET DPMS Guidance devotes significant space to clarifying exactly how it works and, critically, what it does not mean. Understanding this correctly is essential to passing a MoET supervisory inspection.

What the AED 55,000 Threshold Means

How Related Transactions Are Aggregated

The guidance makes clear that the threshold applies to single transactions or to a series of transactions that appear to be related. This includes one or more transactions involving the same business relationship or customer, whether related to a single item or set of items.

It also includes one or more transactions which, in the judgment of the dealer, appear to be structured so as to avoid the established threshold. The nature of the transaction, customer behaviour, and other relevant risk indicators should be considered when determining whether transactions are related or structured.

DPMS cannot treat separate invoices for the same visit as unrelated transactions simply because each individual invoice is below the threshold.

Cash Equivalents Count Toward the Threshold

A significant and frequently overlooked element of the threshold rules is that cash equivalents count toward the AED 55,000 limit in exactly the same way as cash. Cash equivalents are bearer negotiable instruments, including cashier’s cheques, money orders, postal orders, treasury bills, bearer bonds, and promissory notes. They are instruments that can be transferred without identifying the underlying owner, and they function as cash for the purposes of the AML/CFT/CPF framework. Trade-in items accepted as part payment are also treated as cash equivalents.

The guidance provides a specific worked example: a retail dealer who accepts a diamond ring valued at AED 10,000 as a trade-in toward an AED 60,000 pendant, resulting in a net cash transfer of only AED 50,000, is still conducting a covered transaction because the payment in kind is a cash equivalent.

Worked Examples from the Guidance

Separate Invoices Do Not Defeat the Threshold

The guidance provides a worked example of a customer who makes cash purchases of several different PMS items at the same time and requests separate invoices for each piece. No individual invoice meets the threshold of AED 55,000, but the total purchase price exceeds this amount. The guidance is explicit that these are covered transactions. This worked example directly addresses one of the most common structuring techniques observed in the DPMS sector and makes clear that separating a single visit or transaction into multiple invoices does not defeat the obligation.

Instalment Payments Are One Transaction

The guidance provides a worked example of a customer who wishes to purchase items with a total value meeting or exceeding AED 55,000 and places a 25% deposit in cash below the threshold, then pays further cash instalments over subsequent weeks. The guidance confirms that all of these transactions are related and are therefore covered transactions, even though each individual payment is below AED 55,000. The practical implication is that DPMS must assess the total transaction value when a customer agrees to purchase items, not merely the value of each individual cash payment.

The Refinery Services Example

The guidance provides a worked example specifically relevant to gold refineries: a retail jeweller brings 9 karat diamond-studded jewellery for refining to a gold refinery, requesting diamond separation and gold refining. The value of the lot of jewellery is AED 90,000, and the charges from the refinery paid in cash by the retailer are AED 2,500. This is a covered transaction even though the cash involved in the service fee is well below the threshold. The exchange of the material in the form of jewellery is above the threshold, and hence the transaction is a covered transaction. This clarifies that refineries must assess the value of the material they are processing, not merely the cash fee they charge for the service.

The DPMSR Reporting Obligation

The Three DPMSR Triggering Circumstances

Covered transaction classification and DPMSR filing are connected but legally distinct obligations. A transaction may trigger the full AML/CFT/CPF framework as a covered transaction under Section 2.2 of the guidance, while DPMSR filing must be assessed separately under the specific reporting circumstances in Section 1.4.1. Not every covered transaction automatically generates a DPMSR obligation, and the DPMSR triggering circumstances differ depending on whether the counterparty is an individual, a company or an entity.

Separate from the SAR/STR obligation, DPMS must file a Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones Report (DPMSR) in three specific circumstances.

  • First, when conducting a transaction with resident individuals for cash equal to or more than AED 55,000 or its equivalent in foreign currency.
  • Second, when conducting a transaction with non-resident individuals for cash equal to or more than AED 55,000 or its equivalent in foreign currency.
  • Third, when conducting transactions with companies or entities equal to or more than AED 55,000 or its equivalent in foreign currency, whether in cash or through wire transfer. Note that for company and entity transactions, the wire transfer trigger makes the obligation significantly broader than for individual transactions.

The DPMSR Is Not Risk-Dependent

The obligation to file a DPMSR is not risk-dependent and must be fulfilled even when CDD measures have been satisfactorily completed, and no red flags have been identified. This is a critical point that many DPMS entities get wrong. Entities cannot decide not to file a DPMSR on the basis that a customer is low risk or that the transaction appeared clean. The filing obligation exists independently of the risk assessment outcome. Failure to submit a DPMSR within the predefined parameters and timelines may undermine the effectiveness of the entity’s compliance framework and expose it to enforcement action.

When Both DPMSR and SAR/STR Must Be Filed Simultaneously

Where a transaction both exceeds the DPMSR threshold and raises reasonable grounds for suspicion, both the threshold-based reporting and suspicion-based reporting obligations must be met in accordance with their respective requirements. The two reporting obligations are entirely independent of each other. Filing a DPMSR does not discharge the obligation to file a SAR/STR, and filing a SAR/STR does not discharge the DPMSR obligation. Effective reporting relies on well-defined internal escalation mechanisms, clear allocation of responsibilities between business functions and the Compliance Officer, and ongoing staff training.

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Core AML/CFT/CPF Obligations for UAE Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones

Section 1.4 of the MoET DPMS Guidance sets out eight core compliance obligations under Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025. Together they form the basis of an effective risk-based AML/CFT/CPF programme designed to prevent sector misuse for ML, TF, or PF purposes.

Obligation 

What It Requires 

Compliance Administration 

Appoint a qualified CO/MLRO; staff training and screening mandates; subject the AML/CFT/CPF framework to independent audit; overall oversight by senior management; group-wide programmes where applicable. 

Risk Identification and Assessment 

Undertake a Business Risk Assessment proportionate to the nature, size, and complexity of activities, incorporating the 2024 NRA and MoET SRA findings. 

Policies, Procedures, and Internal Controls 

Establish, document, implement, and regularly update AML/CFT/CPF policies and procedures tailored to the entity’s specific business model and risk exposure. 

Customer Due Diligence and Ongoing Monitoring 

Identify and verify customers and beneficial owners; create and maintain customer risk profiles; apply EDD where higher risks are identified; risk-driven approach, not threshold-driven. 

Sanctions and PEP Compliance 

Screen against UNSCR lists; comply with TFS; apply EDD for PEPs; foreign corruption is a key ML threat per the 2024 NRA. 

SAR/STR Reporting 

Promptly report suspicious activities and transactions. Timeliness and quality of SAR/STR reporting are explicitly named as key supervisory focus areas for the DPMS sector. 

Record Keeping 

Retain all CDD, transactional, and correspondence records for at least five years from the triggering event. Records must support reconstruction of transactions and be available to competent authorities without undue delay. 

DPMSR Threshold Reporting 

File a DPMSR for cash transactions with resident and non-resident individuals of AED 55,000 or more, and for all transactions with companies or entities of AED 55,000 or more whether in cash or by cross-border wire transfer. The obligation is not risk-dependent. 

Key Points Across the Eight Obligations

Five-Year Record Retention and the Four Triggering Events

Records must be retained for at least five years from the latest of: the termination of a business relationship or closure of a customer account; the completion of an occasional transaction where no business relationship exists; the issuance of a final judgment by a competent judicial authority; or the dissolution, liquidation, or termination of a legal person or arrangement. All CDD and transactional records must be readily available to Competent Authorities upon request and without undue delay.

SAR/STR Quality as a Supervisory Focus Area

The guidance explicitly names the timeliness and quality of SAR/STR reporting as key supervisory focus areas for the DPMS sector, signalling that these are among the specific areas MoET examines during supervisory inspections. A SAR/STR that is filed late, filed without sufficient supporting detail, or not filed at all for a clearly suspicious transaction represents a distinct compliance weakness that can arise independently of other weaknesses in the entity’s programme.

PEP Exposure and Foreign Corruption as a Key ML Threat

The guidance specifically notes that entities must adopt an approach for dealing with Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) and must be cognisant that foreign corruption is identified as one of the key ML threats in the 2024 NRA. PEP exposure in the DPMS sector is therefore directly linked to an identified ML threat vector, not merely a generic DNFBP obligation.

“The weight and purity thresholds in the guidance are not arbitrary numbers. They define the point at which PMS acquire sufficient value and liquidity to pose material ML/TF/PF risks. The most common misunderstanding we see is entities treating these thresholds as an exemption below which no AML measures apply. They are not. They define the product scope. The AED 55,000 threshold governs the transaction trigger. The two are entirely separate concepts, and conflating them is one of the most common inspection failure points.”

Jyoti Maheshwari

Jyoti Maheshwari - Partner, NIYEAHMA Consultants LLP

DPMS Compliance Gap Analysis: Where UAE Entities Most Commonly Fall Short

This section provides a practitioner-level gap analysis, mapping each of the eight core obligations to the most common implementation failures observed across UAE DPMS entities during compliance reviews. These observations are drawn from practitioner experience and are consistent with the expectations set out in the MoET DPMS Guidance, but are not themselves derived from the guidance. Every gap listed represents a real inspection risk.

Obligation 

Most Common Gap Observed in Practice 

Supervisory Consequence 

Business Risk Assessment 

BRA was completed once at entity setup and never updated. Does not reference the 2024 NRA or MoET SRA findings. Senior management is not formally involved in the approval. 

MoET expects BRA to be updated periodically and whenever significant changes occur in business, risk, or regulatory environments. An outdated BRA is a core inspection failure point. 

AED 55,000 Threshold 

Treated as a hard on/off switch. CDD is applied only when the threshold is met. No risk-based measures applied to sub-threshold transactions regardless of risk indicators present. 

The guidance is explicit: the threshold is a minimum legal trigger, not an exemption. Sub-threshold transactions showing elevated risk indicators must still be assessed. This is a primary inspection finding for the DPMS sector. 

DPMSR Filing 

Not filed when CDD is clean. Not filed for cash equivalent transactions such as cashier’s cheques or trade-ins. Not recognised as applicable to wire transfers for company or entity transactions. 

The obligation is not risk-dependent. Failure to file within predefined parameters exposes the entity to enforcement action regardless of whether the transaction was otherwise clean. 

SAR/STR Quality 

Filed too late, filed with insufficient detail, or not filed at all for sub-threshold suspicious transactions. Internal escalation not connected to the STR process. 

Timeliness and quality of SAR/STR reporting are explicitly named as key supervisory focus areas for the DPMS sector. Poor quality reports and delayed filing are treated as independent compliance failures. 

Beneficial Ownership 

UBO verification relies entirely on customer self-declaration without corroboration from independent sources. Complex legal structures are not traced beyond the immediate counterparty. 

Sole reliance on customer representations where the overall risk profile warrants enhanced scrutiny is specifically identified as insufficient. Entities must refuse or exit relationships where UBO cannot be verified. 

Supply Chain CDD 

The origin of gold or diamonds is accepted on trust from the counterparty. KPCS documentation has not been checked for rough diamonds. Scrap gold claims are accepted without assessing plausibility relative to quantity. 

Where documentation is incomplete, inconsistent, or unverifiable, shipments are to be rejected. Bullion and refinery operations are specifically identified as higher-risk subsectors requiring demonstrably effective controls. 

Staff Training 

Generic AML training with no DPMS-specific content on typologies, red flags, or TBML. Front-line sales staff are not trained. No scenario-based exercises. 

MoET expects training programmes to address sector-specific risks, emerging typologies, and reporting obligations. Front-line staff who cannot identify DPMS-sector red flags represent a direct compliance gap. 

Record Keeping 

Records are fragmented across emails, physical files, and informal channels. No structured retrieval system. Five-year retention is not tracked or enforced. 

Records must be sufficient to reconstruct transactions, must be readily available to Competent Authorities upon request without undue delay, and must support investigations or be used as evidence in legal proceedings. 

Most Critical Gaps and Why They Matter

Threshold Treatment: The Most Pervasive Gap

Treating the AED 55,000 threshold as a hard on/off switch is the single most common gap observed across UAE DPMS entities. The guidance is explicit: the threshold is a minimum legal trigger, not an exemption. Entities that cannot demonstrate risk-based measures applied below the threshold are exposed during inspection, regardless of how clean their above-threshold records are.

Supply Chain CDD: The Gap Specific to Higher-Risk Subsectors

For bullion traders, refiners, and wholesale entities, supply chain CDD is the most consequential gap. The specific supervisory expectations, including origin plausibility assessment, weight/purity reconciliation, and the mandatory rejection of shipments with incomplete or unverifiable documentation, are set out in the Sub-Sector Specific Compliance Controls table under Gold Refinery / Bullion Trader.

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Sub-Sector Specific Compliance Controls for UAE Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones

Each sub-sector within the DPMS space has a distinct risk profile and correspondingly different control requirements. The table below maps each sub-sector to its primary risks and the specific controls required, derived entirely from the source document.

Sub-Sector 

Primary ML/TF/PF Risk 

Key Controls Required 

Gold Refinery / Bullion Trader 

Highest risk: refining and re-melting eliminates all origin identifiers, enabling commingling. Exposure to PF/sanctions evasion via incoming materials from high-risk regions. UAEFIU highlights ongoing responsible sourcing weaknesses. 

(1) Reject shipments with incomplete, inconsistent, or unverifiable documentation. (2) Compare the declared origin against the known production capability of the jurisdiction. (3) Reconcile weight, purity, and value against documentation. (4) Apply EDD to all scrap gold purchases. (5) Treat unverifiable scrap claims as high-risk by default. 

Wholesale PMS Trader 

TBML via over/under-invoicing, circular trading patterns, and use of intermediaries to obscure buyer/seller identity. Complex transactional structures and third-party payments without economic rationale. 

(1) Scrutinise price deviations from global benchmarks. (2) Check for mismatched weights, purity discrepancies, or document inconsistencies. (3) Detect circular trading patterns. (4) Validate third-party payments with documented economic rationale. (5) Identify trade routes for unusual detours or low-oversight jurisdictions. 

Retail Jeweller (Buy/Sell) 

Classic placement, layering, and integration risks. Structuring transactions across invoices. Use as a substitute currency. Resale through secondary channels. PEP and criminal association exposure. 

(1) Monitor transaction patterns and cumulative totals against the AED 55,000 threshold. (2) Apply risk-based CDD at all transaction values, not only at the threshold. (3) Verify source of funds for high-value cash purchases. (4) Record denomination and serial numbers when accepting cash and cash equivalents. (5) Reassess customer risk profile when patterns change suddenly. 

Diamond Dealer (Rough/Polished) 

Falsification of KPCS certificates. Conflict diamond commingling. Multi-jurisdictional obscuring of origin. Use as an alternative currency in drug trafficking and arms dealing. 

(1) Verify the KPCS certificate for all rough diamond shipments. (2) Reject shipments without valid KPCS documentation or where the certificate appears forged or has an unusually long validity period. (3) Verify the country of origin is a KPCS participant. (4) Apply the weight thresholds in Section 2.1 to determine AML/CFT/CPF applicability. 

Gold/Silver Scrap Dealer 

Stolen jewellery and conflict gold are entering formal supply chains via recycling. Inability to trace origin once re-melted. Deliberate use of scrap channel to introduce illicit gold into legitimate supply chains. 

(1) Evaluate the plausibility of scrap claims relative to the quantity supplied. (2) Where volumes indicate commercial-scale supply chains, apply enhanced scrutiny. (3) Identify and verify all suppliers, including small-scale collectors. (4) Document rationale for accepting each scrap consignment. (5) An individual or small-scale collector presenting volumes exceeding the stated operational capacity is a red flag. 

Free Zone PMS Entity 

Cross-border trade opacity, multiple jurisdictions, and use of general trading licences to conduct PMS activities without specific authorisation. Invoice-only gold trading as a layering mechanism. 

(1) Verify that the licensed activity is consistent with actual trading activity. (2) Escalate where material discrepancies exist between licensed activities and actual trade behaviour. (3) Flag frequent pro forma invoice requests with no corresponding physical delivery. (4) Scrutinise payment flows through multiple intermediaries across jurisdictions. 

Understanding the Risk Differences Across Sub-Sectors

Risk differs significantly by business model. Refineries and bullion traders carry the highest origin and responsible-sourcing risk because the beneficiation process eliminates traceability: once PMS is refined or re-melted, its origin cannot be recovered. Wholesale traders are most exposed to TBML through over/under-invoicing, false documentation, and multi-intermediary layering. Retail jewellers are primarily exposed to placement and structuring through repeated sub-threshold transactions. The table below maps each sub-sector to its specific risk profile and the controls MoET expects.

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DPMS AML/CFT/CPF Self-Assessment Diagnostic: Where Does Your Business Stand?

Use this diagnostic to assess your entity’s current compliance posture against the eight core obligations in the MoET DPMS Guidance. For each obligation, identify which description most accurately reflects your current position: GREEN (compliant), AMBER (partially compliant), or RED (non-compliant or not yet implemented). Every RED or AMBER finding represents a regulatory risk that should be addressed before your next MoET supervisory examination.

Obligation 

Diagnostic Question 

GREEN (Compliant) 

AMBER (Partial) 

RED (Non-Compliant) 

Business Risk Assessment 

Do you have a documented BRA updated within the last 12 months that references the 2024 NRA medium-high residual risk rating and MoET SRA subsector findings? 

✅ Documented, board-approved BRA updated within 12 months referencing NRA and SRA 

⚠ BRA exists but does not reference NRA/SRA or is over 12 months old 

❌ No BRA documented, or BRA covers generic risks only 

AED 55,000 Threshold 

Are CDD and risk-based measures applied to ALL transactions regardless of value, treating the threshold as a minimum trigger only? 

✅ Risk-based measures applied at all transaction values; threshold treated as minimum legal trigger 

⚠ CDD applied below threshold for flagged cases only; no systematic approach 

❌ CDD and measures are applied only when the threshold is met 

DPMSR Filing 

Is DPMSR filing integrated into operational workflows and filed for all three triggering circumstances regardless of risk outcome? 

✅ DPMSR filed for all qualifying transactions; process integrated into operations 

⚠ DPMSR filed inconsistently or only when red flags are present 

❌ DPMSR not filed, partially understood, or omitted when CDD is clean 

Beneficial Ownership 

Can you identify and verify the UBO of every legal person counterparty before executing a covered transaction using independent sources? 

✅ UBO verified through reliable independent sources for all legal persons 

⚠ UBO sought but relies mainly on customer self-declaration without corroboration 

❌ UBO not systematically verified; documentary ownership chain not established 

SAR/STR Quality 

Are suspicious transaction and activity reports filed promptly and with sufficient quality and completeness to satisfy supervisory expectations? 

✅ STRs filed promptly with full supporting detail; timeliness and quality reviewed internally 

⚠ STRs filed, but quality is inconsistent, or timing is frequently delayed 

❌ No STR programme in place or significant under-reporting observed 

Supply Chain CDD 

Do you verify the origin of gold, rough diamonds, and other PMS using export certificates, KPCS documentation, customs declarations, and shipment documents? 

✅ Full supply chain CDD applied; KPCS checked; origin compared against known production capability 

⚠ Origin documentation reviewed but not systematically verified against production capability 

❌ No supply chain CDD; origin taken on trust from counterparty 

Staff Training 

Have all staff, including front-line sales and senior management, received AML/CFT/CPF training covering DPMS-specific typologies and red flags? 

✅ Regular, documented, sector-specific training including TBML, structuring, PF red flags 

⚠ Basic generic training in place; no DPMS-specific content on typologies or red flags 

❌ No training programme or last training over 24 months ago 

Record Keeping 

Are all CDD, transactional, and correspondence records maintained in a format that allows reconstruction and is accessible to MoET on request without delay? 

✅ Structured record management system; records retrievable quickly; five-year retention met 

⚠ Records exist but are fragmented across emails, files, and systems 

❌ Records incomplete, inaccessible, or retention period not met 

How to Use Your Results

Interpreting RED Findings

Any RED finding requires immediate remediation. Red findings on BRA currency, threshold treatment, and DPMSR filing are the three most commonly identified in MoET DPMS supervisory examinations and are the first areas an inspector will test. A RED finding on beneficial ownership verification is particularly serious because the guidance specifies that entities must refuse or exit relationships where beneficial ownership cannot be reasonably verified. An entity that cannot demonstrate a systematic UBO verification process has a structural programme failure, not merely a documentation gap.

Interpreting AMBER Findings

AMBER findings indicate partial compliance. They typically indicate that a process exists but is inconsistently applied, insufficiently documented, or not yet embedded into operational workflows. AMBER findings on supply chain CDD, staff training, and SAR/STR quality are the most common. These must be strengthened with documented procedures, staff training records, and evidence of operational implementation before a supervisory examination. An AMBER finding that cannot be explained and evidenced during an inspection is likely to be treated as RED by the inspector.

Using the Diagnostic as a Pre-Inspection Tool

This diagnostic is designed to reflect the actual areas a MoET inspector evaluates during a DPMS supervisory examination. The most effective use is to run it at least six weeks before any anticipated inspection, identify all RED and AMBER findings, assign ownership and deadlines for remediation, and document the remediation steps taken. Entities that can demonstrate awareness of their own gaps and a structured remediation plan are better positioned during an inspection than entities that appear unaware of weaknesses that the inspector identifies.

“What MoET is saying in this guidance is something we see confirmed in client engagements regularly. The risk for IAA firms is not primarily that they will be caught in an obvious fraud. The risk is that a client with a complex ownership structure, a plausible business story, and a well-presented set of financials will slowly draw the firm into legitimising something that should have triggered a closer look three engagements ago. By the time the pattern becomes visible, the audit trail showing how the firm responded to each early warning sign becomes the story. Risk-based controls are not just a regulatory obligation; they are the firm’s own protection.”

Pathik Shah - CAMS, FCA, CISA | Founder and Principal Consultant, NIYEAHMA Consultants LLP

Sector and Risk Context: Why the DPMS Sector Is High Risk

Section 2 of the MoET DPMS Guidance explains the specific risk landscape of the DPMS sector. Understanding this context is essential for building a credible Business Risk Assessment and for demonstrating to a supervisor that your compliance programme is proportionate to the risks your entity actually faces

Why Precious Metals and Stones Are Attractive to Criminals

Intrinsic Value, Portability, and Anonymity

The guidance identifies several specific characteristics of PMS that make them attractive to criminals. PMS represent high intrinsic value in a relatively compact form, tends to maintain or even increase in value over time, and can be easily transported physically in many forms. PMS can be used both as a means to generate criminal proceeds through various predicate offences and as a vehicle to launder them. PMS can be used for illicit purposes, including ML/TF/PF, in a variety of ways, either directly through physical exchange as a form of currency or indirectly through exchange of value via various formal and informal financial systems, as well as via international trade.

Decentralised Markets and Cultural Factors

There are large, well-established, decentralised, and often cash-based markets for certain types of precious metals and stones, particularly for gold and diamonds, which often allow them to be traded or exchanged with relative anonymity. The difficulty in tracing specific items, combined with the global nature of PMS markets, makes it easier for criminals to exploit cross-border, multi-jurisdictional situations to obscure paper and money trails while rendering it more difficult for national law enforcement authorities to detect and investigate cases. The guidance also notes that in certain geographic regions, the buying and selling of PMS is a common cultural practice, making it difficult to distinguish between legitimate transactions and their illicit counterparts.

The ML Threats Identified for the DPMS Sector

The guidance identifies the key money laundering threats for the DPMS sector as trade-based money laundering (TBML), smuggling, laundering of proceeds from drug trafficking and foreign corruption, and activities of professional money laundering networks. While the 2024 NRA did not identify misuse of the sector for terrorism financing, the sector’s characteristics make it vulnerable to misuse for illicit value transfer, sanctions evasion, and proliferation financing, especially through trade-based activities that include degrees of opacity.

The PMS Supply Chain: Risk at Every Stage

Upstream vs Downstream Risk: A Critical Distinction

Upstream activities (extraction, raw minerals trading) carry heightened origin, traceability, and commingling risk. Downstream activities (wholesale and retail) are more exposed to placement, layering, and integration. MoET expects entities to understand their specific position in the chain and calibrate controls accordingly.

The Five Supply Chain Stages and Their Specific Risks

The guidance maps five supply chain stages, each with distinct risk profiles. The table below sets out the key risks and MoET’s control expectations at each stage.

Supply Chain Stage 

Key ML/TF/PF Risks 

MoET Control Expectation 

Extraction / Production 

Infiltration by criminal or terrorist groups, commingling, over/under invoicing, accounting fraud, theft, smuggling, bribery. 

Stronger emphasis on source of origin information, counterparty assessment, and any indicators of commingling or illicit sourcing. 

Trading in Raw Minerals 

Falsification of KPCS certificates, commingling of conflict minerals, cash transactions, smuggling, multi-jurisdictional opacity with multiple traders. 

Enhanced scrutiny of counterparties, payment methods, and trade documentation especially where multiple intermediaries or cross-border movements are involved. 

Beneficiation (Refining / Cutting) 

Loss of traceability through refining or smelting, TBML, cash transactions, commingling. Origin is very difficult to trace once PMS goes through the beneficiation process. 

Deploy adequate controls relating to source of origin information and consistency of purity, volumes, and valuation. 

Wholesale Trade 

TBML, commingling, placement/layering/integration typologies, complex transactional structures, third-party payments. Bullion and scrap: unverifiable scrap claims are high-risk. 

Sufficient awareness and capability to spot TBML typologies. Evidence origin plausibility, reconcile weight/purity vs documentation, treat unverifiable scrap claims as high-risk. 

Retail Trade 

Commingling, placement/layering/integration, fraud, theft, robbery, embezzlement. High-value and repeated transactions particularly vulnerable. 

Greater emphasis on monitoring customer behaviour, transaction patterns, and payment methods, especially where high-value or repeated transactions occur. 

Why MoET Expects You to Know Where You Fit

Supply chain stages do not necessarily proceed in sequence, and entities may operate across multiple stages simultaneously. A Business Risk Assessment must identify the entity’s specific supply chain position and calibrate controls to the cumulative risk exposure across every stage in which it participates.

Risk Factors to Consider When Building Your BRA

Customer and Counterparty Risk Factors

The guidance sets out a range of customer and counterparty risk factors that DPMS must consider. These include whether the counterparty is a physical person, legal person, or legal arrangement; if a legal person or arrangement, whether it is part of a larger or more complex group; and whether there is any association with a PEP. A particular focus is placed on whether the party appears to be acting on their own behalf or at the behest of a third party, and whether the party’s knowledge and experience in relation to the product or service type is appropriate for the transaction being proposed.

Geographic Risk Factors

Geographic risk is pivotal, particularly at upstream supply chain stages in relation to mining and initial sourcing operations. The guidance notes that gold mining can be vulnerable to terrorist financing if it occurs in remote locations with minimal governmental presence or infrastructure, and that in some areas gold mining can be dominated by armed non-governmental groups. Mining for jewels is largely small and informal, often carried on in areas of significant turmoil and conflict. The guidance encourages entities to develop their own country-risk model, drawing on publications issued by the NAMLCFTC, analytical reports and advisories issued by the UAE FIU, and the FATF lists of High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action and Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring.

Product and Transaction Risk Factors

Product and transaction risk factors include the type, nature, quantity, quality, purity, price, form, rarity, portability, and potential for anonymity of the products or services involved. The type, size, complexity, cost, and transparency of the transaction, including whether a physical or virtual exchange of merchandise is involved, and the means of payment or financing, are also relevant factors, particularly in relation to whether they appear consistent with the counterparty or customer’s socio-economic profile and the degree of expertise required. Novelty or unusual nature of the transaction, such as requirements to expedite beyond what is customary, unusual delivery requirements, or unusual requests for secrecy, are specific risk indicators that the guidance flags.

Does Your BRA Reflect Supply Chain Risk?

Update your risk assessment to reflect origin, counterparty, and transaction risks across your PMS supply chain.

Customer Due Diligence and Ongoing Monitoring for UAE Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones

MoET DPMS Guidance highlights additional CDD and monitoring points that are specific to DPMS and must be applied on top of the general DNFBP requirements. These points highlight typologies and risk indicators specific to the DPMS sector and are intended to support entities in implementing measures that are risk-based, proportionate, and effective.

Sanctions Screening: A Threshold-Independent Obligation

Maintain Threshold-Independent Sanctions Screening

Irrespective of the size of the transaction or the method of payment, DPMS must maintain a process for screening all existing and prospective business relationships and customers against Sanctions Lists. This applies even to transactions that fall well below the AED 55,000 threshold, and does not depend on the risk classification of the customer.

Depth and Frequency of Screening Must Match the Risk

The guidance notes that DPMS are expected to ensure that the depth and frequency of screening are commensurate with the associated risks. Screening should include adverse media checks to identify any potentially adverse information, including associations with PEPs or financial or other crimes. The guidance also requires background checks in addition to sanctions list screening.

Beneficial Ownership: The Core CDD Challenge

Third-Party Intermediaries as a Concealment Technique

The guidance identifies the attempt to conceal beneficial ownership through third-party intermediaries, proxies, or legal structures as a characteristic technique used in a variety of ML/TF/PF typologies. Such intermediaries may include family members, friends, business associates, other legal representatives, or other third persons. These arrangements can help to create distance between the source of the illicit funds and the transaction or activity in question. In the DPMS context, DPMS should be particularly attentive to establishing and verifying the identity of the true beneficial owner and corroborating the legitimacy of their source of funds through reliable independent sources, wherever ongoing business relationships are concerned or when high-risk situations are identified.

The Verification and Corroboration Process

The starting point in determining beneficial ownership of a legal entity or legal arrangement is to ask pertinent questions and obtain information directly from the business relationship or customer. The information thus obtained should be analysed for reasonableness and consistency and should be appropriately confirmed or corroborated with reference to reliable independent sources whenever possible. The guidance specifies that sole reliance on representations provided by customers where the overall risk profile warrants enhanced scrutiny is not sufficient. Reliable independent sources include (but are not limited to) bank references or bank account information provided by financial institutions or commercial credit reporting agencies, public registries, and federal or national tax identification numbers.

CDD Alerting Factors Specific to DPMS

The guidance identifies three specific CDD alerting factors for DPMS entities. First, compatibility of the customer’s profile, including their economic or financial resources, with the specifics, including nature, size, and frequency of the transaction or activities involved. Second, use of complex or opaque legal structures or arrangements such as trusts, foundations, personal investment companies, investment funds, or offshore companies, which may tend to conceal the identity of the true beneficial owner or source of funds. Third, possible association with politically exposed persons, especially in regard to foreign customers. These factors must be taken into account both at the time of establishing a business relationship and on an ongoing basis.

When to Refuse or Exit a Relationship

The guidance is explicit that DPMS must refuse or exit relationships where beneficial ownership or source of funds and origin cannot be reasonably verified, or where sanctions and PF risks cannot be mitigated. This is a mandatory obligation, not a discretionary one. An entity that continues a relationship with a customer or counterparty where beneficial ownership has not been verified is operating in breach of the guidance, regardless of how long the relationship has existed or how commercially important the customer may be.

Ongoing Monitoring: Practical Steps for DPMS

What Ongoing Monitoring Looks Like in the DPMS Context

The guidance acknowledges that ongoing monitoring in the DPMS sector is more complex than in sectors with continuous customer relationships. In retail and occasional transaction contexts, it may not always be possible to perform detailed ongoing monitoring of the entirety of business partners’ or customers’ activity. Nevertheless, DPMS must take reasonable steps to protect itself from misuse, particularly where high-risk customers have been identified. The guidance provides three specific monitoring examples: in covered transactions, maintaining careful records of certificate numbers and identifying characteristics of PMS including weight, purity, colour, shape, cut, inclusions, and other markings; in warehousing or safekeeping arrangements, monitoring the status of the merchandise throughout the transaction lifecycle to detect unusual changes or substitutions; and in contracted services such as refining, cutting, or polishing, ensuring that funds received come from known sources on which CDD has been performed.

Payment Method Consistency as a Monitoring Signal

The guidance emphasises that payment methods should be consistent with the customer’s profile and should not be methods that could disguise the origin of funds. Methods that raise monitoring concerns include cash, cashier’s cheques, traveller’s cheques, postal money orders, prepaid cards, third-party endorsed cheques, cryptocurrencies, IOUs, and promissory notes or other difficult-to-trace payment methods. Where it is necessary to accept such forms of payment, particularly cash, DPMS should record as much information as possible, such as the denomination and serial numbers of the banknotes or complete details regarding negotiable instruments. Anomalies identified through monitoring should be assessed and subjected to enhanced scrutiny and reporting where applicable.

Need a DPMS CDD and Ongoing Monitoring Framework?

Put beneficial ownership, source-of-funds checks, and risk-based monitoring into a practical workflow.

Practical Document Checklist for DPMS CDD by Customer and Supplier Type

MoET DPMS Guidance establishes the general principles for beneficial ownership verification and source of funds corroboration. The guidance identifies acceptable evidence, including bank statements, loan or financing agreements, proof of savings, income records, and documents relating to prior property sales. The table below translates these principles into a practical, role-specific checklist for front-line use. This checklist is derived from the obligations set out in the guidance and from practitioner experience of what MoET supervisors expect to see in a customer file during inspection.

Customer / Supplier Type 

Minimum CDD Documents 

EDD Trigger and Additional Documents Required 

Individual (UAE National) 

Emirates ID (verified); source of funds declaration; nature and purpose of transaction; sanctions screening record. 

Risk-Based EDD depending on the facts of the case. Add: PEP status check, adverse media review, enhanced source of funds documentation. 

Individual (Non-Resident / Foreign National) 

Passport (verified); country of residence confirmation; source of funds documentation; nature and purpose of transaction; sanctions screening. 

EDD is triggered by any high-risk jurisdiction link. Add: source of wealth documentation, independent corroboration of source of funds (bank reference, income records), adverse media review, and jurisdictional risk assessment. 

Corporate Entity (UAE) 

Trade licence; memorandum and articles of association; UBO declaration tracing to natural person owning or controlling 25%+; authorised signatory ID; source of funds; sanctions screening of entity and UBO. 

EDD triggered by offshore involvement, PEP shareholders, or a complex structure. Add: full ownership chain documentation, audited financial statements, and independent corroboration of UBO identity. 

Corporate Entity (Foreign / Offshore) 

Certificate of incorporation; constitutional documents; UBO declaration tracing to a natural person; authorised signatory ID; source of funds; sanctions screening. 

Foreign and offshore structures present elevated ML/TF risk and the guidance identifies them as requiring enhanced scrutiny in Section 2.3. Whether full EDD is applied depends on the entity’s risk assessment of the specific structure. At minimum, additional steps should include: full legal structure documentation across all jurisdictions; independent verification of UBO through public registries or commercial databases; source of wealth documentation; and, where nominee arrangements are involved, a legal opinion on the structure. Where the risk assessment identifies heightened opacity, layering indicators, or high-risk jurisdiction exposure, EDD measures should be applied. 

Politically Exposed Person (PEP) 

All documents applicable to individual or corporate types above, plus documented PEP identification and classification. 

EDD measures are required where the risk profile of the PEP relationship warrants them, which in practice will apply to most PEP relationships. The guidance requires entities to adopt a documented approach for dealing with PEPs. As a minimum, that approach should address: senior management approval before establishing or continuing the relationship; enhanced source of wealth verification; documented assessment of transaction purpose against the PEP profile; adverse media review; and ongoing enhanced monitoring throughout the relationship. The degree of EDD applied should be proportionate to the specific risk presented by the PEP’s role, jurisdiction, and business relationship. 

Supplier (Gold / Rough Diamonds) 

Business licence; UBO documentation; supply chain documentation; KPCS certificate for rough diamonds; customs declarations; export certificates. 

EDD triggered by high-risk jurisdiction origin, unverifiable documentation, or CAHRA exposure. Add: mine-of-origin verification compared against known production capability, independent assay or certification from an internationally recognised body, full chain of custody documentation. 

Supplier (Scrap / Recycled PMS) 

Business or individual identification; description and weight of material; stated source of the material. 

EDD triggered where quantity supplied exceeds plausible retail or personal source volumes. Add: documentary evidence supporting the plausibility of the scrap claim, independent assessment of origin where volumes exceed expected capacity. 

Intermediary / Third-Party Payer 

Identification of intermediary; documented commercial rationale for the involvement of the intermediary; CDD on the party on whose behalf the intermediary acts. 

EDD triggered where intermediary involvement has no clear economic rationale. Add: full CDD on the underlying principal, documented assessment of whether the intermediary arrangement indicates UBO concealment, confirmation that the intermediary is not being used to distance the beneficial owner. 

“The eight obligations in Section 1.4 form an interconnected system, not a checklist. The BRA informs the policies. The policies drive CDD. CDD drives monitoring. Monitoring drives SAR/STR quality. If any link is weak, the entire programme is exposed during a supervisory inspection. The most common failure pattern we observe is strong documentation at the policy level but poor operationalisation at the front-line level. MoET inspectors test the front line, not the policy document.”

Dipali Vora - Partner, NIYEAHMA Consultants LLP

Common Sectoral Challenges and Best Practices for UAE DPMS Entities

Section 4 of the MoET DPMS Guidance identifies the specific challenges that make DPMS compliance difficult in practice and sets out the best practices that MoET expects entities to adopt. Understanding these challenges and responses is essential for designing a compliance programme that is both effective and proportionate.

Challenges and MoET Expected Responses

Sectoral Challenge 

Why It Matters 

Best Practice / MoET Expected Response 

Fragmented supply chains and commingling 

Re-melting or re-cutting PMS removes origin identifiers, allowing illicit material to enter legitimate supply chains undetected. 

Identify all counterparties in the supply chain; verify PMS origin against production capabilities; reject incomplete or inconsistent documentation.  

High value in small quantities 

PMS can be moved or stored discreetly, enabling proceeds storage and transport outside formal financial channels. 

Apply risk-based CDD at all transaction values; treat PMS acquisition disproportionate to customer profile as a red flag.  

Cash dominance and structuring 

Cash and cash equivalents create traceability gaps; structuring enables criminals to stay below reporting thresholds. 

Maintain denomination recording; apply source-of-funds enquiries; monitor cumulative transaction totals; aggregate related transactions.  

Responsible sourcing weaknesses 

Smaller entities often accept documentation at face value, enabling conflict gold and sanctioned-network material to enter formal supply chains. 

Verify origin using KPCS certificates, customs declarations, and export documentation; compare against known jurisdiction production capacity; reject unverifiable shipments.  

TBML techniques 

Minor purity or weight manipulations justify large price variations; market volatility masks artificially inflated or deflated pricing. 

Scrutinise price deviations from global benchmarks; check document consistency across invoices, weights, and purity; detect circular trading and identify unusual trans-shipment routes.  

Low AML/CFT/CPF awareness among smaller DPMS 

Limited compliance capacity leads to inconsistent red flag identification and under-reporting, providing easy access points for criminals. 

Appoint a qualified CO/MLRO; ensure regular front-line training; implement independent audit; apply technology-assisted monitoring proportionate to business size and risk.  

Governance and risk-based framework 

Absence of documented, proportionate risk policies leaves entities unable to demonstrate compliance during supervisory examinations. 

Establish written policies and procedures aligned to the entity’s specific risk profile; subject to routine updates when business, risk, or regulatory environment changes significantly.  

Is Your Programme Inspection-Ready?

Run a self-assessment to spot RED and AMBER gaps before MoET does.

ML/TF/PF Typologies Used to Exploit UAE Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones

Section 5 of the MoET DPMS Guidance sets out the common typologies used to exploit the DPMS sector, drawing on FATF research and case analysis. Multiple typologies are often used in combination in a single transaction or series of transactions. Entities should incorporate the regular review of ML/TF/PF trends and typologies into their employment screening and compliance training programmes, as well as into their risk identification and assessment procedures.

Six Typologies Identified in the Guidance

Typology 

How PMS Is Exploited 

Key Detection Signals 

PMS as Alternative Currency 

Gold and diamonds used as payment for illicit goods and services (drugs, arms, trafficking), bypassing the formal financial system. 

PMS accepted or tendered in lieu of cash; no commercial rationale; correlation with known criminal networks. 

PMS as Stored Value 

PMS purchased to hold illicit value over time, transferred across borders, and later converted. Also used in PF/sanctions evasion to shift value into insurable, portable instruments. 

Purchase scale inconsistent with customer profile; weak commercial purpose; warehousing or insurance arrangements disproportionate to declared business. 

Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML) 

Over/under-invoicing, false documentation, VAT/customs fraud, and virtual trading used to move value. Proforma-only trades and settlement without physical movement are specific indicators. 

Repeated proforma requests without completion; frequent document revisions; price deviations from market benchmarks; settlement without physical delivery. 

Physical Smuggling 

High value-to-weight ratio makes PMS easy to conceal. Techniques include disguising gold or diamonds as ordinary low-value objects. UAE is identified as a primary wholesale supply market in FATF typologies. 

PMS sourced for subsequent export to high-risk jurisdictions; inconsistencies between declared weight/value and physical goods; routing through CAHRA countries. 

Intermediaries and Front / Shell Entities 

Layered ownership, nominee directors, unlicensed brokers, and shell companies used to separate sanctioned or criminal principals from visible transactions. 

Ambiguous or frequently changing ownership; authorised signatories inconsistent with declared profile; non-transparent trade documentation. 

Exploitation of High-Risk Subsectors 

Refining and re-melting eliminates origin identifiers, enabling commingling of illicit gold. Inadequate responsible sourcing controls at refineries and bullion traders create entry points for PF and sanctions evasion. 

Reluctance to provide origin documentation; supply chain custody gaps; economic justification absent or implausible; links to CAHRA or sanctioned counterparties. 

Does Your Team Know the Latest DPMS Typologies?

Train staff to recognise TBML, smuggling, sanctions evasion, and other sector red flags.

Red Flag Indicators for UAE Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones

Section 6 of the MoET DPMS Guidance provides an extensive catalogue of red flag indicators across five categories. The presence of one or more red flags does not automatically imply criminal activity. It indicates that enhanced due diligence or further investigation is warranted. The appointed Compliance Officer must carefully assess all circumstances to determine whether the activity or transaction is indeed suspicious.

Red Flag Summary Table

The table below consolidates the red flags from all five categories in Section 6 of the guidance for operational reference.

Category 

Red Flag Indicator 

Customer: Structuring 

Numerous small transactions over a short period below the CDD threshold, with a substantial cumulative total, are also known as smurfing 

Customer: Structuring 

Customer approaches different branches of the same DPMS in a short period to conduct sub-threshold transactions 

Customer: Structuring 

Payments restructured or split shortly after being informed of reporting or identification requirements 

Customer: Unusual Requests 

Sudden and unusual inquiries about refund policies, followed by requests for large refunds 

Customer: Unusual Requests 

Requests to alter or cancel a transaction after being asked for identity or supporting documents 

Customer: Unusual Requests 

Abnormal requests for precious metal conversions into ordinary objects to disguise PMS identification 

Customer: High-Risk Association 

Customer appears related to a high-risk country or entity associated with CAHRA origin gold trading or to a designated terrorist 

Customer: Transparency 

Customer fails to provide sufficient explanation or documentation for the source of funds 

Customer: Secrecy 

Requests that normal business records not be kept 

Customer: Secrecy 

Unusually concerned about reporting thresholds or the entity’s AML/CFT/CPF policies 

Transaction: Payment 

Unusual or complex payment arrangements without an apparent legitimate business or economic purpose 

Transaction: Third Parties 

Payments received from a third party who is not the owner of the funds, without a legitimate business purpose 

Transaction: Third Parties 

Introduction of third parties late in the transaction lifecycle without a documented commercial rationale 

Transaction: Profile 

Transactions beyond the customer’s means based on stated occupation, income, or industry experience 

Transaction: Refunds 

Overpayment and requests for refunds to a third party or in cash; payment in one form, refund requested in another 

Supplier: Documentation 

Contracts, invoices, or trade documents with vague or missing descriptions, appearing counterfeit, or frequently modified 

Supplier: Origin 

PMS originating directly or indirectly from CAHRA, including routing through intermediary countries to disguise the true origin 

Supplier: KPCS 

Rough diamonds not accompanied by a valid Kimberley Process certificate, or a certificate that appears forged or has unusually long validity 

Supplier: Origin 

Repeated changes in the declared country of origin across invoices, certificates, or shipping documents 

PF: Evasion 

PMS trade structures with unclear end-use, end-user, or ultimate destination of value 

PF: Evasion 

Inconsistencies in trade documents, financial flows, destinations, ports, or addresses 

Real-World Case Studies with UAE Control Mapping d

Section 7 of the MoET DPMS Guidance contains seven UAE-contextualised case studies and eight additional international case studies drawn from FATF research. The tables below summarise each case study, the key ML method used, and the primary UAE DPMS control it tests.

UAE-Contextualised Case Studies (CS 1–7)

Case Study 

Synopsis 

Key Red Flags 

Primary Control 

CS 1: PMS as Substitute Currency and Store of Value 

Drug trafficking network purchased gold and jewellery via split invoices to stay below the threshold; resold through wholesale channels. 

Sub-threshold structuring; repeated purchase-and-resale; no personal rationale. 

Aggregate related transactions; apply risk-based CDD regardless of individual invoice value. 

CS 2: Gold Smuggling / TBML 

Gold smuggled across borders; proceeds laundered through trade documentation misrepresentation and informal value transfer. 

Mismatched trade documents; informal payment channels; CAHRA origin gold. 

Verify customs documentation; screen against CAHRA; apply supply chain CDD. 

CS 3: Retail-Level Misuse for Drug Trafficking 

Criminal group accepted diamonds and jewellery as drug payment; converted incrementally to cash through retail outlets. 

Continual resale of personal jewellery; no interest in design or value; incremental cash conversion. 

Identify unusual resale patterns; apply CDD to walk-in customers showing repeated sub-threshold resale. 

CS 4: Gold as Substitute Currency and Laundering Vehicle 

Criminal syndicate used gold purchases from informal prospectors as remuneration and value storage; resold through unrelated dealers. 

Cash purchases from unregistered suppliers; rapid resale; gold used as remuneration; no business infrastructure. 

Apply EDD for cash-sourced gold from informal suppliers; assess plausibility of acquisition and resale trajectory. 

CS 5: Illicit Gold Trade through Wholesale Trading 

Wholesaler used large cash withdrawals to buy gold from undocumented ‘private individuals’; structured transactions below thresholds; used front company. 

Cash-only procurement at wholesale scale; generic supplier identification; structured tranches; implausible scrap volumes. 

Identify and verify all suppliers including beneficial ownership; assess plausibility of claimed scrap origins; escalate structuring patterns. 

CS 6: Jewellery Merchant as Narcotics Proceeds Conduit 

Diamond merchant received cash, money orders, and cashier’s cheques (structured across instruments) to purchase high-value diamonds for a criminal network. 

Payment via multiple instruments; incomplete records; third-party purchaser; no interest in jewellery characteristics. 

Identify true purchaser and payer; apply EDD for payments via multiple instruments; retain complete records. 

CS 7: Trade Documentation Used to Facilitate Cross-Border Laundering 

UAE free zone entity issued invoices for gold that never moved; illicit funds entered as payment for supposed bullion supply. 

Invoice-only trading; no physical gold movement; proforma requests without completion; mismatched licensed activity. 

Scrutinise invoice-only trades; verify physical delivery; escalate where trade pattern serves purely documentary purpose. 

International Case Studies (CS 8–15): FATF Research Mapped to UAE Controls

The following international case studies from Section 7.1 of the guidance are drawn from FATF research and mapped to the UAE DPMS controls they test.

Case Study 

Country 

Synopsis 

Primary Control 

CS 8: Scrap Gold Smuggling 

United States (HSI) 

Scrap gold declared at USD 6.4m on import; actual payments USD 24m. TBML via customs undervaluation. 

Scrutinise price deviations from global benchmarks; verify declared values, weights, and purity against customs documentation. 

CS 9: Fraudulent Gold Refinery 

Switzerland (MROS) 

STR filed by major refinery after adverse media linked customer to fraud, forgery, and ML. Turnover grew from EUR 150m to EUR 1,000m in three years. 

Evaluate commercial plausibility of supplier growth trajectories; sudden unexplained volume increases are a red flag. 

CS 11: Bangladesh Gold Smuggling 

Bangladesh 

Gold physically smuggled in soft drink bottles and soap bars. UAE, Oman, and Saudi Arabia identified as primary wholesale supply markets for the network. 

Assess whether gold is purchased for export to high-risk jurisdictions; physical smuggling can involve disguising PMS as ordinary objects. 

CS 12: SEZ Jewellery Substitution 

India (DRI) 

Gold jewellery imported into a Special Economic Zone then substituted with brass before export. USD 100–120m in fraudulent imports. 

Free zone entities face analogous risks; trade documentation must be scrutinised for substitution and false certification indicators. 

CS 15: Gold as Funds Justification 

Costa Rica 

Company offered above-market gold purchase prices to justify large cross-border fund transfers; funds withdrawn as cash immediately on arrival. 

Validate third-party payments and ensure plausible economic rationale; above-market purchase offers are a documented red flag. 

Frequently Asked Questions: MoET Supplemental Guidance for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones

What is the MoET DPMS Supplemental Guidance and is it legally binding?

It is not legislation and does not constitute legal advice, but it sets out the minimum expectations MoET uses as its benchmark during supervisory examinations. Where it conflicts with Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025 or Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025, the legislation prevails.

No. The threshold is a minimum legal trigger for mandatory full AML/CFT/CPF measures, not an exemption below it. Where a transaction below AED 55,000 presents elevated ML/TF/PF risk indicators, proportionate risk-based measures must still be applied.

The DPMSR must be filed for cash transactions with individuals of AED 55,000 or more, and for all transactions with companies or entities of AED 55,000 or more (cash or wire). The obligation is not risk-dependent; where a transaction also gives rise to suspicion, both the DPMSR and the SAR/STR must be filed independently.

Cash equivalents are bearer negotiable instruments (cashier’s cheques, money orders, postal orders, treasury bills, bearer bonds, promissory notes) that can be transferred without identifying the owner. Trade-in items accepted as part payment are also treated as cash equivalents and count toward the AED 55,000 threshold.

The 2024 MoET SRA identifies bullion trading, refinery, and wholesale activities as higher-risk because of supply chain opacity, reliance on intermediaries, and non-standard payment mechanisms. The UAEFIU report additionally highlights ongoing responsible sourcing weaknesses across the sector.

The KPCS is an international certification regime requiring that rough diamond shipments be conflict-free and accompanied by a valid certificate; DPMS must verify this documentation as part of CDD and supply chain controls. Absent, forged, or unusually long-validity KPCS certificates are red flags requiring escalation.

TBML involves disguising criminal proceeds through trade transactions, using techniques such as over/under-invoicing, false documentation, and layering through intermediaries. In DPMS, gold and diamonds are particularly susceptible because minor purity or weight manipulations can justify large price deviations; repeated proforma requests, document revisions, or settlement without physical delivery are specific high-risk indicators.

CAHRA (Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas) refers to regions affected by conflict, weak governance, sanctions exposure, or illegal mining. PMS originating from or routed through CAHRA requires enhanced scrutiny; DPMS must compare declared origin against known production capabilities and reject shipments with incomplete, inconsistent, or unverifiable documentation.

BRAs must be updated periodically and whenever significant changes occur in business, risk, or regulatory environments. The 2025 legislative changes (Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025) and the 2024 NRA and SRA findings are all qualifying trigger events; a BRA not updated to reflect these is unlikely to meet MoET’s minimum benchmark.

No fixed list is prescribed, but entities must assess the plausibility of scrap claims against the volume supplied. At minimum, collect supplier identification, a description and weight of material, and a stated source; where volumes suggest a commercial rather than personal origin, enhanced scrutiny and documented justification are required.

Conclusion: What Every UAE DPMS Entity Must Do Next

Step 1: Run the Self-Assessment Diagnostic

Use the RAG diagnostic table in Section 8 of this article to assess your current compliance posture across all eight obligations. Any RED finding requires immediate remediation. Document your results and assign ownership and timelines for remediation before your next supervisory examination.

Step 2: Confirm Your Sub-Sector Risk Classification

Identify which of the six sub-sectors in the sub-sector table applies to your operations and implement the corresponding controls. Bullion traders, refiners, and wholesale entities face the highest expectations and must apply origin verification, responsible sourcing documentation, and enhanced counterparty assessment as standard practice

Step 3: Update Your Business Risk Assessment

Incorporate the 2024 NRA medium-high residual risk rating and the MoET SRA findings on bullion, refinery, and wholesale subsectors into your BRA. Obtain formal senior management approval. Document the methodology used, the weights applied to risk factors, and the rationale for the risk ratings assigned to your customer and supplier base.

Step 4: Fix Your Threshold Treatment

If your entity currently applies CDD only at or above AED 55,000, revise your procedures immediately. Your policy must explicitly state that risk-based measures apply at all transaction values wherever risk indicators are present. Document the specific risk factors that trigger sub-threshold CDD in your sector context.

Step 5: Integrate DPMSR Filing into Operations

Confirm that your DPMSR filing process covers all three triggering circumstances, including the wire transfer trigger for company and entity transactions. Build the DPMSR trigger into your transaction processing workflow as an automatic step, not a compliance judgment call. Ensure filing is not conditional on the absence of red flags.

Step 6: Strengthen Supply Chain CDD

Map your position in the PMS supply chain and implement origin verification, KPCS checks, and counterparty due diligence proportionate to your stage and risk exposure. Specifically, compare declared origin against known production capabilities of the declared jurisdiction for every significant supply transaction. Document the comparison and retain the supporting documents.

Step 7: Embed Red Flags in Front-Line Training

Train all front-line staff on the Section 6 red flag indicators, specifically including TBML indicators, supplier behaviour flags, and proliferation financing red flags. Use scenario-based exercises that reflect the case studies in Section 7 of the guidance. Document all training delivered and record attendance.

Step 8: Appoint or Review Your MLRO

Ensure your Compliance Officer or MLRO has sector-specific DPMS knowledge, including familiarity with TBML typologies, KPCS requirements, responsible sourcing standards, and the UAE-specific reporting obligations for DPMSR, SAR, and STR. The guidance requires a qualified CO/MLRO with sector-specific knowledge and a sound understanding of regulatory obligations.

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About the Author

Pathik Shah

FCA, CAMS, CISA, CS, DISA (ICAI), FAFP (ICAI)

Pathik is an ACAMS-certified AML consultant specialising in governance, risk, and compliance for regulated entities in the UAE. He brings over 28 years of experience, with 1,000+ hours of AML training and 200+ advisory engagements across DNFBPs, VASPs, and FIs. He supports businesses in aligning with AML/CFT requirements from the CBUAE, DFSA, MoET, MoJ, VARA, CMA, FSRA, and FATF. Known for translating complex regulations into audit-ready procedures, Pathik enables operational clarity and compliance readiness.

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Supplemental Guidance for Trust and Company Service Providers (TCSPs)

Supplemental Guidance for Trust and Company Service Providers (TCSPs)

Blogs

Last Updated: 06/03/2026

Table of Contents

Protect your business with reliable and effective AML strategies with AML UAE.

MoET's Supplemental Guidance for TCSPs in a Nutshell

  • Issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy and Tourism in April 2026, anchored in Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025, supplementing the broader DNFBP Guidelines.
  • Applies equally to mainland and commercial free zone TCSPs, covering company formation, nominee services, trusts and foundations, registered office services, and cross-border structuring.
  • Sets out core obligations: Business Risk Assessments, risk-based CDD and EDD, beneficial ownership verification across every layer, source of funds and wealth checks, ongoing monitoring, STR reporting, and MLRO governance.
  • Maps five sector-specific risk areas with 21 case studies covering BO opacity, nominee abuse, shell entities, cross-border flows, governance failures, and trust or foundation misuse, alongside detailed red flags and a practical interpretation of the NRA’s Medium Risk rating.
  • Supervisors will test whether controls work in practice rather than on paper, exposing weaknesses to supervisory findings and required remedial actions within specified timeframes.

The UAE Ministry of Economy and Tourism (MoET) released its Supplemental Guidance for Trust and Company Service Providers in April 2026. It is sector-specific and detailed. While it does not create new legal obligations, it is a strong supervisory reference for how MoET expects TCSPs to implement their AML/CFT/CPF obligations in practice. If you operate as a TCSP in the UAE, whether as a formation agent, registered office provider, nominee service provider, trust administrator, or company secretarial firm, this guidance gives a clear indication of the areas supervisors are likely to assess during inspections and supervisory engagements.

This article unpacks the MoET Supplemental Guidance for TCSPs in plain language, adds professional context, and tells you what it actually means for your day-to-day operations. For ease of reference, we use ‘MLRO’ throughout to refer to the designated AML/CFT Compliance Officer or reporting officer responsible for internal escalation and FIU reporting under Article 22 of Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025.

What Is the MoET Supplemental Guidance for TCSPs and Why Does It Matter?

Key Points Under This Section

  • Issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy and Tourism in April 2026
  • Supplements the main DNFBP Guidelines with sector-specific depth
  • Anchored in Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025
  • Does not create new law but shapes what supervisors will test
  • Applies to mainland and commercial free zone TCSPs equally

The MoET Supplemental Guidance for Trust and Company Service Providers provides detailed guidance to TCSPs on exactly how the Ministry expects them to identify, assess, and mitigate money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing risks within their specific sector.

It sits alongside the broader DNFBP Guidelines rather than replacing them. It does not constitute additional legislation or regulation, does not set legal precedent, and does not replace or supersede statutory obligations under Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025, Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025, or any other binding instrument. Where any discrepancy arises between this guidance and prevailing law, the law prevails.

Think of the DNFBP Guidelines as the framework, and this guidance as the instruction manual for TCSPs within that framework. Where the two overlap, TCSPs should treat this supplemental guidance as the sector-specific reference point, while ensuring continued compliance with the broader DNFBP Guidelines and prevailing legal requirements.

Why This TCSP Guidance Needs Immediate Attention

During supervisory inspections, MoET will assess whether your AML/CFT/CPF controls are operating effectively in practice, not just whether policies exist on paper. The guidance explicitly states that deficiencies in risk assessment, beneficial ownership transparency, or ongoing monitoring may result in supervisory findings and required remedial actions within specified timeframes. The emphasis is on substance over form.

The legal anchor for this guidance is Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025, which came into effect on 14 October 2025, and its implementing regulations under Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025, which followed on 14 December 2025. These are the operative instruments for all UAE AML/CFT/CPF compliance work. References to the older 2018 or 2019 legislation are no longer sufficient.

Who Does the MoET Supplemental Guidance for TCSPs Apply To? Scope and Covered Activities

Key Points Under This Section

  • Five specific activities trigger DNFBP obligations for TCSPs
  • Applies to mainland and free zone TCSPs
  • Covers all boards, management, and employees of covered entities
  • Trust formation and administration carry distinct additional obligations

The MoET Supplemental Guidance for TCSPs applies to any entity conducting the following activities on behalf of a client in the UAE:

Covered Activity  What It Means in Practice 
Acting as an agent in the creation or establishment of legal persons  Company formation agents, business setup advisors, incorporation service providers 
Providing directors, secretaries, partners, or similar roles  Nominee director services, company secretary services, registered manager arrangements 
Providing a registered office, work address, or administrative address  Virtual office providers, registered address services, correspondence handling 
Acting as or equipping another person to act as trustee  Trust administration, fiduciary services, trust operators  
Acting as or equipping another person to act as a nominee shareholder  Nominee shareholding services, share custody arrangements 

The guidance applies to all such entities operating in the UAE, whether on the mainland or within commercial free zones, and covers board members, senior management, and employees. Section 1.3 of the guidance grounds this scope in Articles (2) and (3) of Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025 (the Executive Regulations of Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025).

Not sure whether your firm qualifies as a TCSP under UAE law?

Our team at AML UAE has helped several formation agents, registered office providers, and company secretarial firms determine their regulatory scope and build compliant frameworks from the ground up.

Core AML/CFT/CPF Obligations: What the MoET Supplemental Guidance for TCSPs Requires

Key Points Under This Section

  • Risk identification and assessment must be documented and updated regularly
  • Policies and procedures must cover all compliance dimensions, not just CDD
  • CDD and ongoing monitoring are core functions, not checkbox exercises
  • STR and SAR reporting obligations apply regardless of transaction value
  • Governance includes a qualified MLRO, senior oversight, and staff training
  • Record keeping must allow full reconstruction of decisions by authorities
  • Targeted financial sanctions compliance must include screening freezing action without delay, and reporting under Cabinet Decision No. 74 of 2020

The MoET Supplemental Guidance for TCSPs requires every TCSP to maintain a comprehensive, risk-based compliance framework. The seven core components are not aspirational. They are the minimum standard against which your firm will be assessed.

Each of these components carries a specific weight in supervisory assessments. However, the guidance places particular emphasis on the gap between policy and practice. Having a well-written CDD policy is not enough. Your MLRO needs to be able to demonstrate that it was actually applied, documented, and reviewed in individual client relationships.

On record keeping, the guidance sets a standard that many TCSPs currently fall short of. Records must be detailed enough that a competent authority can reconstruct the rationale and context of every relationship decision without needing oral explanations from your staff. That means documenting not just what you collected, but why you made the risk decisions you did and what alternative courses of action you considered. Under Article 25 of Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025, all CDD records, transaction records, and supporting documentation must be retained for a minimum of five years from the termination of the business relationship or the completion of the occasional transaction, and must be organised so that individual transactions can be reconstructed and made immediately available to competent authorities.

“The governance component is where many TCSPs struggle most. The guidance requires the MLRO to do more than sign off on onboarding forms. They need to be actively reviewing high-risk relationships, providing guidance on ambiguous cases, assessing escalations, and deciding whether reporting thresholds are triggered. That is a substantive role, and it needs to be properly resourced. Appointing an MLRO as a title without giving them the time, access, and authority to do the job is a control weakness that supervisors will identify quickly.”

Jyoti Maheshwari

Jyoti Maheshwari - Partner, NIYEAHMA Consultants LLP

Five Sector-Specific Risk Areas Every TCSP Must Understand

Key Points Under This Section

  • TCSPs should apply enhanced scrutiny during company formation to ensure transparency and to avoid the misuse of this structure to obscure ownership and facilitate illicit activity.
  • Nominee arrangements require enhanced governance regardless of perceived legitimacy
  • Trust and foundation services carry distinct risks from the separation of ownership and control
  • Registered office services carry low inherent risk but are frequently misused in practice
  • Cross-border structures demand a higher standard of scrutiny across all dimensions

The guidance does not treat all TCSP activities as equally risky. It identifies five service types that carry elevated ML/TF/PF exposure and sets out specific control expectations for each.

Company Formation and Legal Structuring

Company formation is the point of entry into the financial and corporate system. The guidance notes that risks are elevated where structures are established with multiple layers of ownership, incorporated across different jurisdictions, or created without a clear commercial purpose aligned to the customer’s economic profile.

The practical expectation is that TCSPs apply enhanced scrutiny at the point of formation itself. This means documenting the purpose of the structure, the rationale for the chosen legal form and jurisdictions, the roles of all parties, and how ownership and control actually work in practice. Higher-risk or more complex structures should go through internal review and approval, including MLRO escalation.

Nominee Shareholders and Directors

The guidance acknowledges that nominee arrangements serve legitimate purposes in some contexts. However, it is equally clear that they carry inherent ML/TF/PF risk because they can obscure the identity of the true beneficial owner and reduce transparency over control.

TCSPs providing nominee services must ensure full transparency over the underlying beneficial ownership structure. This means identifying and verifying the beneficial owners behind the arrangement, documenting the legal relationship between the nominee and the beneficial owner clearly, and understanding the precise scope of the nominee’s authority. Arrangements where the TCSP cannot obtain sufficient information about the beneficial owner must not be accepted.

Trust and Foundation Services

Trusts and foundations present distinct risks because they deliberately separate legal ownership from beneficial interest. The multiple parties involved, including settlors, trustees, beneficiaries, and protectors, make it harder to identify who actually controls and benefits from the arrangement.

The guidance requires TCSPs to identify and verify all relevant parties to the arrangement. Trust deeds must be reviewed in detail. Discretionary arrangements deserve particular attention, because control in these structures is not always immediately apparent. Ongoing monitoring needs to cover distributions, changes in beneficiaries, and amendments to the structure.

Provision of Registered Office and Administrative Services

Registered office services are often treated as low-risk administrative functions. The guidance pushes back on this assumption. When multiple entities are registered at the same address, or when a registered office is used to establish a presence without any substantive business operations, risk exposure increases significantly.

TCSPs providing these services must understand the nature and purpose of each registered entity, verify beneficial ownership and key controlling parties, and monitor for unusual patterns. Even where the TCSP has no broader relationship with the entity beyond address provision, minimum CDD requirements still apply.

Cross-Border Structures and Multi-Jurisdictional Arrangements

The guidance identifies cross-border structures as carrying elevated risk across all TCSP activities. The core concern is that multi-jurisdictional arrangements can fragment ownership, complicate beneficial ownership identification, and obscure the flow of funds in ways that no single service provider can fully see.

The expected approach includes understanding the role and purpose of each jurisdiction, assessing the regulatory environment in those jurisdictions, tracing the flow of funds and assets across borders, and verifying that the geographic footprint of the structure is consistent with the customer’s stated business activities. Cross-border structures should attract enhanced oversight and internal escalation procedures.

Key Risk Factors: Customers, Transactions, and Geographic Exposure

Key Points Under This Section

  • Customer risk is not static: it includes behavioural indicators throughout the relationship
  • Non-resident, offshore, and PEP-linked customers carry elevated inherent risk
  • Transactional risk must be assessed across the full lifecycle of the service
  • Frequent changes in ownership or control are a risk signal, not just an administrative matter
  • Geographic risk extends beyond the customer’s location to the full jurisdictional footprint of the structure

The MoET Supplemental Guidance for TCSPs breaks down risk factors across three dimensions: the nature and type of customers, the nature and type of transactions or services, and geographic exposure. Understanding these three dimensions is the foundation of any credible risk-based approach.

Customer Risk Factors

The guidance expects TCSPs to go beyond static customer characteristics when assessing risk. A customer who presents well at onboarding can still raise red flags during the relationship through inconsistent information, unexplained urgency, or evasiveness about the purpose of a structure.

Specific higher-risk customer types identified in the guidance include non-resident or offshore customers with no clear economic link to the UAE, customers introduced through intermediaries without a face-to-face component, and individuals with PEP connections or links to high-risk jurisdictions. In all these cases, the TCSP’s ability to independently verify information is reduced, and enhanced scrutiny is required.

Transactional and Service Risk Factors

The guidance explicitly frames transactional risk assessment as covering the full lifecycle of the service, not just individual transactions in isolation. A structure that looks low risk at formation can become high risk following changes in ownership, the introduction of new jurisdictions, or shifts in the nature of the underlying activity.

Higher-risk scenarios in this dimension include the establishment of multiple entities within a short timeframe with similar ownership profiles, frequent changes to directors or signatories without commercial justification, rapid transfer or restructuring of ownership across jurisdictions, and the provision of registered office or administrative services to entities without substantive operations.

Geographic Risk Factors

Geographic risk in the TCSP sector is multi-dimensional. The guidance requires TCSPs to assess geographic risk not only based on the customer’s location, but also in relation to the jurisdictions of incorporation of legal entities, the origin and destination of funds, and the location of underlying business activities.

Higher-risk scenarios arise where structures involve jurisdictions with weaker AML/CFT frameworks, limited beneficial ownership disclosure requirements, or known exposure to corruption or sanctions risks. The guidance states that using such jurisdictions is not inherently indicative of wrongdoing. However, it does require a higher level of scrutiny and a clear understanding of the commercial rationale.

Does your TCSP compliance framework cover all five risk areas?

Many UAE TCSPs have strong onboarding processes but significant gaps in nominee governance, cross-border scrutiny, and registered office CDD. Our AML consulting team can help you identify and close those gaps.

Customer Due Diligence, Beneficial Ownership, and Ongoing Monitoring: The TCSP Standard

Key Points Under This Section

  • CDD must go beyond identity verification to encompass purpose, structure, and economic rationale
  • Beneficial ownership identification must cover all layers of complex structures
  • Source of funds and source of wealth verification are distinct requirements
  • Ongoing monitoring must include trigger-based reassessments, not just periodic reviews
  • Record keeping must enable full reconstruction of relationship decisions
  • The MLRO plays a pivotal role beyond receiving and filing escalations

Customer Due Diligence in the TCSP sector carries a higher standard than in most other DNFBP categories. This is because TCSPs are directly involved in creating and administering legal structures, meaning they act as a critical control point before a structure becomes operational.

Establishing a Business Relationship

When a TCSP agrees to create, manage, or support a legal person or arrangement on behalf of a client, it establishes a business relationship that triggers full CDD obligations. At this point, the guidance expects the TCSP to develop a holistic understanding covering the purpose behind the structure, the roles and relationships of all involved parties, the jurisdictions and their risk levels, and the anticipated nature and scale of activities.

The guidance gives particular weight to situations where the structure appears unnecessarily complex, where there is reliance on intermediaries without a clear commercial role, or where the customer is reluctant to provide complete or consistent information. In these cases, the TCSP must not rely solely on formal compliance with documentation requirements. It must critically assess whether the overall arrangement is coherent, transparent, and credible.

TCSPs often receive customers through introducers, law firms, business setup agents, and overseas advisors. Article 20 of Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025 permits reliance on CDD performed by a third party only where the third party is itself subject to AML/CFT regulation and supervision, applies CDD measures consistent with the UAE framework, and provides immediate access to the underlying CDD information and documentation on request. Ultimate responsibility for CDD remains with the TCSP regardless of any reliance arrangement, and the guidance expects the TCSP to satisfy itself, on a documented basis, that these conditions are met before placing weight on a third party’s work.

Beneficial Ownership Identification and Verification

The guidance states that beneficial ownership identification is one of the most critical and complex aspects of CDD for TCSPs. The ability of legal persons and arrangements to separate legal ownership from actual control creates inherent vulnerabilities that can be exploited to conceal illicit activity.

The expected approach requires TCSPs to identify the natural persons who ultimately own or control the structure, whether through direct ownership interests, voting rights, or other forms of control. This includes indirect holdings and layered structures across multiple jurisdictions. The process must not stop at collecting declarations from the customer. The information must be corroborated using independent and reliable sources wherever feasible.

Enhanced scrutiny is required where ownership structures involve jurisdictions with limited transparency, where shares are held on behalf of others without clear documentation, where there are frequent or unexplained changes in ownership, or where the customer seeks to limit access to ownership information.

Source of Funds and Source of Wealth

The guidance distinguishes between the source of funds (the specific origin of the funds used in a transaction) and the source of wealth (the origin of the customer’s overall accumulated wealth). Both are relevant for TCSPs, particularly where structures are used to hold, manage, or transfer assets, or where there is exposure to higher-risk customers or jurisdictions.

The practical expectation is that TCSPs assess whether the customer’s financial profile is consistent with the nature and scale of the structure being established or managed. Particular care is required where the origin of funds links to high-risk activities or jurisdictions, where there is a mismatch between the customer’s known profile and the scale of the transaction, where funds pass through multiple intermediaries without a clear rationale, or where payment methods obscure traceability.

Ongoing Monitoring

The guidance is explicit that ongoing monitoring in the TCSP sector must be dynamic, not periodic. Risks in this sector often materialise through gradual changes rather than discrete suspicious transactions. A risk-calibrated approach to monitoring must include reviewing changes in ownership, control, or governance arrangements, tracking amendments to legal structures, assessing whether the structure continues to be used consistently with its stated purpose, and reassessing risk levels following trigger events.

The guidance identifies specific trigger events that should prompt an immediate reassessment: changes in shareholders, directors, or authorised signatories; introduction of new entities or jurisdictions; significant changes in the nature or scale of activities; and requests for services outside the originally stated purpose.

Where CDD cannot be completed, or where beneficial ownership transparency cannot be achieved to the standard required, Article 14 of Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025 prohibits the TCSP from establishing or continuing the business relationship and from carrying out the requested transaction. The TCSP must also consider whether the underlying facts give rise to a suspicion that warrants an STR or SAR filing through goAML under Article 18 of Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025. Exit and refusal decisions, and the reasoning supporting them, must be documented to the same standard as onboarding decisions.

What This Means in Practice

If you are running annual CDD reviews as your only monitoring mechanism, you are not meeting the standard set by this guidance. The guidance requires trigger-based reassessment as the primary monitoring mechanism, supported by periodic reviews. Your compliance framework needs to define what constitutes a trigger event for each service type and ensure that frontline staff can identify and escalate these promptly.

Is your CDD framework aligned with the 2025 UAE law and this guidance?

Outdated CDD templates, missing source of wealth processes, and weak trigger-based monitoring are among the most common findings in UAE TCSP supervisory reviews. Our team can conduct a targeted AML health check on your CDD framework.

Common Sectoral Challenges and Best Practices: What Good Looks Like

Key Points Under This Section

  • Beneficial ownership transparency across multi-layered structures is the most persistent challenge
  • Over-reliance on customer-provided information without independent corroboration is a recurring weakness
  • Limited visibility in administrative-only relationships creates monitoring blind spots
  • Inconsistent application of the risk-based approach leads to uneven control quality
  • Best practice includes systematic ownership mapping and trigger-based monitoring
  • Integration of CDD, monitoring, and governance functions distinguishes strong frameworks

The guidance dedicates a full section to common challenges and best practices within the TCSP sector. This is unusual in regulatory guidance and reflects MoET’s recognition that the sector faces structural challenges that go beyond a failure to follow rules.

Challenges the Guidance Identifies

The most persistent challenge is beneficial ownership transparency in multi-layered structures. TCSPs encounter ownership chains that include foreign holding companies, trusts, or foundations in jurisdictions with limited public disclosure requirements. Verification beyond the first or second layer is genuinely difficult, particularly where documentation is incomplete or inconsistent across sources.

A second challenge is over-reliance on customer-provided information at onboarding. The guidance notes that information declared by a client may contradict publicly available data or adverse media. Without independent corroboration, these discrepancies remain undetected.

A third challenge is limited visibility in administrative-only relationships. Where a TCSP only provides a registered office or administrative support without involvement in financial transactions, detecting unusual activity becomes significantly harder.

What Best Practice Looks Like

The guidance describes best practices for TCSPs, which include systematically mapping and documenting ownership and control structures using visual or diagrammatic representations rather than narrative descriptions alone. They cross-check customer-provided information against official registries, regulatory filings, and third-party intelligence tools. They implement trigger-based monitoring mechanisms rather than relying solely on fixed review cycles. And they maintain strong documentation and audit trail practices that clearly record not just what information was collected, but why key decisions were made.

The guidance also describes mature TCSPs as forward-looking: using internal data, typologies, and supervisory feedback to continuously refine controls, updating risk indicators, and incorporating lessons from past cases into staff training and internal guidance.

How TCSPs Are Misused: Typologies from the MoET Guidance

Key Points Under This Section

  • Layered corporate structures are the most common vehicle for ML via TCSPs
  • Nominee arrangements are used to create a formal separation between legal and beneficial ownership
  • Company formation services are misused to create entities with no substantive activity
  • Multi-jurisdictional structures exploit regulatory gaps and fragment oversight
  • Trusts and foundations can be used to distance beneficial ownership from assets
  • Registered office and administrative services can create a veneer of legitimacy
  • Fiduciary roles are misused to enhance the perceived legitimacy of illicit structures

The guidance describes eight distinct typologies through which TCSP services may be misused for ML/TF/PF. Understanding these is not an academic exercise. Each one maps directly to a control expectation in your compliance framework.

Typology  How It Works  Key Control Response 
Layered corporate structures  Multiple entities across jurisdictions create distance between beneficial owner and assets  Full ownership chain mapping; verify UBO across all layers 
Nominee arrangements  Nominees provide formal separation from beneficial owner; act on instructions without independent judgement  Document legal relationship; verify UBO behind nominee; ongoing monitoring of use 
Shell entity formation  Legal entities with no substantive activity used to hold funds, conduct transactions, or create legitimacy  Verify actual business activity; assess economic substance at formation and ongoing 
Multi-jurisdictional structures  Jurisdictional diversity fragments oversight and exploits regulatory gaps  Assess each jurisdiction’s risk; verify commercial rationale for jurisdictional choices 
Trust and foundation misuse  Discretionary beneficiaries, broad classes, and cross-border elements obscure beneficial interests  Identify all parties; review trust deeds; monitor distributions and amendments 
Fiduciary role exploitation  Regulated professional involvement used to enhance legitimacy of illicit structure  Exercise independent judgement; maintain oversight of entity activities 
Administrative service misuse  Registered office used to create presence without substantive operations  Assess economic substance; verify business activities; monitor financial flows 
Client account structuring  Client accounts used to move funds between entities or jurisdictions with reduced transparency  Understand purpose of client account use; monitor for structuring patterns 

All 21 MoET Case Studies: Grouped, Interpreted, and Rated

Customer Behaviour: Individual Clients

  • The guidance contains 21 case studies covering the full spectrum of TCSP risk scenarios
  • Most involve a pattern of individually reasonable changes that become suspicious in aggregate
  • Supervisory expectations consistently focus on holistic assessment, not transaction-by-transaction review
  • Several case studies test the MLRO’s obligation to escalate even where each step appears procedurally compliant
  • Our ratings reflect the complexity of detection, not the severity of the underlying risk

The 21 case studies in the MoET Supplemental Guidance are one of its most valuable features. They show you exactly how MoET expects TCSPs to apply professional judgement in real scenarios. Here we group them by typology, add an AML UAE interpretation, and rate each one by detection difficulty.

How to Read Our Case Study Ratings

Detection Difficulty: Low = clear red flags from the outset | Medium = patterns emerge over time | High = individually reasonable, suspicious only in aggregate

The ratings reflect how challenging detection is in practice, not the severity of the underlying risk. These scenarios should prompt risk reassessment and appropriate escalation. Depending on the facts, the response may include enhanced due diligence, enhanced monitoring, MLRO review, refusal or exit, and, where suspicion is formed, an STR or SAR filing.

Group A: Beneficial Ownership Opacity Through Structural Complexity

Case Study  Core Scenario  AML UAE Interpretation  Detection Difficulty 
CS1: Layered Corporate Structure with Frequent Ownership Changes  UAE holding company with offshore shareholders undergoes repeated incremental ownership changes over nine months, each framed as capital restructuring  The nine-month horizon is the point. No single change triggers suspicion. The obligation is to assess the pattern. Most TCSPs process change requests individually and never see the aggregate picture. You need a relationship-level view of structural changes over time.  Medium 
CS6: Gradual Obscuring Through Corporate Restructuring  Long-standing client repeatedly amends company structure, ownership progressively diluted across multiple jurisdictions, each change individually documented  This is the boiling-frog scenario. Each change comes with documentation. Each change has an explanation. But commercial activity does not grow in proportion to structural complexity. The mismatch between operational reality and structural elaboration is the signal.  High 
CS13: Parallel Structures with Similar Ownership Patterns  Multiple companies under different client names share identical nominee arrangements, overlapping addresses, and similar governance frameworks  This requires cross-client visibility that most TCSPs do not build into their monitoring systems. The guidance expects you to identify patterns across your portfolio, not just within individual relationships.  High 
CS19: Client Seeking Limited Transparency in Corporate Records  Client repeatedly asks to minimise ownership information in corporate records and questions documentation requirements  The client’s consistent focus on reducing transparency, even where the structure remains technically legal, is the red flag. Legitimate clients generally accept documentation requirements. Clients who resist them repeatedly warrant enhanced scrutiny.  Medium 

Group B: Nominee and Intermediary Abuse

Case Study Core Scenario AML UAE Interpretation Detection Difficulty 
CS2: Nominee Director with Operational Disconnect TCSP provides nominee director for a company engaged in high-value consultancy; financial control rests with informal parties not in the corporate structure The nominee director arrangement is legitimate on paper. The red flag is the disconnect between formal governance and actual control. Where instructions consistently come from parties outside the corporate structure, the TCSP must investigate the actual control arrangement and escalate to the MLRO. Medium 
CS7: Use of Professional Intermediaries to Distance Control Foreign client routes all communications through a legal advisor who acts for multiple entities with near-identical structures, all linked to different clients The use of a well-documented professional intermediary is precisely the kind of scenario where TCSPs lower their guard. But the guidance expects independent verification of beneficial ownership and purpose, regardless of how credible the intermediary appears. Pattern recognition across multiple engagements is key here. High 
CS9: Repeated Nominee Arrangements Across Unrelated Entities CSP provides nominee director services to multiple companies with similar ownership patterns, later finding the same individuals indirectly linked across structures This demands portfolio-level analysis. Individual onboarding files look clean. The risk only becomes visible when you map connections across your client base. The guidance explicitly expects this cross-client analysis. High 
CS21: Unusual Reliance on Powers of Attorney for Corporate Control Company formally owned and managed by identifiable individuals; operational control exercised via powers of attorney to third parties not in the ownership structure Powers of attorney used as the primary mechanism for operational control are a significant red flag. The guidance requires TCSPs to identify who actually exercises control, not just who appears on the corporate register. Medium 

Group C: Shell Entity and Economic Substance Issues

Case Study Core Scenario AML UAE Interpretation Detection Difficulty 
CS4: Misuse of Registered Office and Administrative Services (Portfolio) TCSP provides registered office to multiple entities with overlapping management, all engaging in cross-border consultancy, licensing, and procurement flows This tests the portfolio-level risk assessment requirement. Individually, each entity may look acceptable. The shared characteristics, the overlapping management, and the transaction patterns across the portfolio are what warrant investigation. Medium 
CS8: Inconsistent Business Activity vs Declared Purpose Company incorporated for general trading shows no identifiable trading activity but repeatedly amends its licensed activities to unrelated sectors The mismatch between declared purpose and actual activity is the clearest red flag in this group. Periodic reviews should include a check on whether the entity has actually conducted the business it claims to conduct. Low 
CS15: Shelf Company for Perceived Credibility Client acquires older shelf company to present as an established business to counterparties, then remains operationally inactive This is a misrepresentation risk as much as an ML risk. The TCSP is being used to facilitate a false impression of legitimacy. The guidance requires the compliance officer to assess the intended use and whether the structure creates a misleading impression. Low 
CS18: Registered Office Without Genuine Presence Client uses registered office without any physical presence or operations, periodically requesting official letters confirming UAE presence for use with overseas counterparties The combination of no operational substance and repeated requests for presence confirmation letters is the key pattern here. TCSPs providing administrative services must assess whether their services are being used to manufacture a perceived footprint. Low 

Group D: Cross-Border Complexity and Financial Flows

Case Study  Core Scenario  AML UAE Interpretation  Detection Difficulty 
CS3: Cross-Border Structuring with Circular Investment Flows  UAE holding company with multi-jurisdictional subsidiaries executes intercompany loans, equity injections, and service agreements that circulate the same pool of funds  Circular fund flows are the defining characteristic of layering. The internal agreements may be formally documented, but economic substance is absent. TCSPs need to assess the economic purpose of transactions, not just their procedural compliance.  Medium 
CS5: Misuse of Registered Office and Administrative Services  Low-risk general trading client over time introduces offshore ownership, new counterparties, and complex payment arrangements explained as tax efficiency measures  This is the long-term relationship risk. TCSPs often apply less scrutiny to clients they have known for years. The guidance is clear: initial risk assessments do not hold indefinitely. Cumulative changes must trigger reassessment.  High 
CS12: High-Risk Jurisdiction Entity Post Incorporation  UAE company with local shareholders later introduces a foreign corporate shareholder from a limited-transparency jurisdiction, framed as strategic investment, with no commercial follow-through  The post-incorporation introduction of a high-risk jurisdiction entity without any corresponding commercial activity is a classic escalation trigger. The risk rating of the entire relationship must be reassessed, not just the new shareholder.  Low 
CS16: Multi-Jurisdictional Structure with Unclear Decision-Making Authority  UAE company administered by TCSP receives instructions from multiple individuals in different jurisdictions with no single authority identified; client claims decisions are made collectively at group level  The absence of a clear decision-making authority in a multi-jurisdictional structure is itself a control concern. TCSPs must be able to identify who exercises ultimate control and document it. Vague governance arrangements warrant escalation.  Medium 

Group E: Governance and Process Failures

Case Study  Core Scenario  AML UAE Interpretation  Detection Difficulty 
CS10: Frequent Changes in Authorised Signatories  UAE company undergoes repeated changes in authorised signatories within a short timeframe; each change is procedurally documented but individuals have limited connection to the business  Procedural compliance and risk compliance are different things. Each signatory change passes the formal test. But the pattern of frequent rotation without operational justification suggests an attempt to manage accountability rather than run a business.  Medium 
CS14: Delayed Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership Changes  Client discloses beneficial ownership changes after regulatory deadlines; subsequent review shows changes occurred significantly earlier than declared  Intentional delay in ownership disclosure is the clearest form of transparency failure. The guidance expects TCSPs to enforce timely disclosure requirements actively and to treat repeated delays as an escalation trigger.  Low 
CS17: Frequent Changes in Business Activities Without Clear Direction  Company with consultancy licence repeatedly amends activities to unrelated sectors while showing no commercial development in any of them  Activity amendments without commercial development in any direction indicate the entity is being positioned for a purpose other than its stated one. The TCSP’s compliance officer should assess the cumulative picture.  Low 
CS20: Use of Multiple CSPs for Fragmented Service Provision  Client distributes services across multiple CSPs, each receiving limited visibility; client coordinates between them, providing only partial information to each  This is a deliberate fragmentation strategy designed to prevent any single TCSP from having full visibility. The guidance makes clear that the TCSP’s obligation to understand the full structure does not diminish because other providers are involved.  High 

Group F: Foundation and Trust Misuse

Case Study  Core Scenario  AML UAE Interpretation  Detection Difficulty 
CS11: Foundation Without Clear Purpose  Client requests establishment of a foundation citing wealth preservation, with complex multi-jurisdictional governance but no identifiable assets, activities, or defined purpose  Wealth preservation is a legitimate purpose for a foundation. But the inability to identify any assets, activities, or defined mechanism for that preservation means the stated purpose cannot be verified. The guidance expects TCSPs to decline where clarity is not achieved.  Low 

Do your staff know how to respond to these 21 scenarios in practice?

Understanding what a risk looks like on paper is very different from identifying and escalating it in the middle of a client relationship. Our AML consulting team provides TCSP-specific training and scenario-based assessments.

How TCSPs Should Interpret the NRA's Medium Risk Classification in Practice

Key Points Under This Section

  • The 2024 UAE NRA classifies the TCSP sector as Medium Risk for ML
  • Medium Risk at the national level does not mean Medium Risk at the entity or customer level

The 2024 UAE National Risk Assessment categorises the TCSP sector as Medium Risk for money laundering. This rating has a direct influence on how TCSPs calibrate their internal risk appetite and how they justify the level of resources they allocate to compliance.

The MoET guidance describes a sector characterised by elevated inherent risks from company formation and nominee services, a gatekeeper role that directly influences access to the financial system, consistent identification in national risk assessments as a key vulnerability linked to the misuse of legal persons and arrangements, 21 detailed case studies illustrating complex and hard-to-detect risk patterns, and a red flag framework covering individual behaviour, entity behaviour, transaction behaviour, and additional indicators.

Rather than treating the NRA’s Medium Risk rating as a reason for standardised controls across all TCSP relationships, firms should use it as a sector-level reference point. The guidance makes clear that certain TCSP activities, including nominee arrangements, complex ownership chains, cross-border structuring, and trust or foundation services, may require enhanced scrutiny.

The AML UAE Perspective on the Medium Risk Classification

The Medium Risk classification reflects the NRA’s assessment of the sector as a whole relative to other sectors in the UAE economy. It does not mean that individual TCSPs, client relationships, or transaction types within the sector are medium risk. The guidance itself is explicit that certain activities within the TCSP sector, including nominee arrangements, cross-border structuring, and trust services, carry elevated risk that requires enhanced controls.

The practical implication is this: if your internal risk framework defaults to medium-risk treatment across your TCSP business simply because the NRA says the sector is Medium Risk, you are almost certainly miscalibrating your controls. The guidance expects TCSPs to apply the NRA findings in a nuanced and operationalised way, not as a sector-wide risk floor.

We recommend that TCSPs treat the Medium Risk NRA classification as the baseline for their lowest-risk, highest-transparency clients with no elevated customer, transaction, or geographic risk factors. For every scenario involving nominee arrangements, cross-border elements, or complex ownership structures, the internal risk assessment should reflect elevated risk regardless of the sector-level NRA classification.

Red Flag Indicators from the MoET Supplemental Guidance for TCSPs: A Practical Reference

Key Points Under This Section

  • Red flags are grouped across individual customer behaviour, entity and arrangement behaviour, and transaction behaviour
  • The presence of one red flag does not automatically confirm suspicious activity
  • Multiple concurrent red flags warrant escalation to the MLRO regardless of transaction value
  • The MLRO must assess, document, and determine whether circumstances give rise to suspicion
  • Declining to report because no transaction occurred does not extinguish the reporting obligation

The guidance contains an extensive and well-structured set of red flag indicators. These are not a checklist to be completed at onboarding and filed away. They are a living reference that should inform monitoring, trigger reassessment when observed during the relationship, and feed into the MLRO’s STR and SAR decision-making process. Some of these red flags are as follows:

Individual Customer Behaviour Red Flags

  • Refuses to provide personal, business, or financial information
  • Provides inconsistent or incomplete information across different interactions
  • Avoids personal contact or in-person meetings without justification
  • Does not maintain contact after the initial establishment of a legal entity
  • Refuses to disclose the identity of the beneficial owner, source of wealth, or nature of business dealings
  • Withdraws, becomes unresponsive, or terminates the relationship following EDD requests
  • Applies pressure to expedite incorporation or documentation while discouraging due diligence
  • Is under investigation, has criminal connections, or appears in adverse media
  • Is a PEP or has associations with a PEP inconsistent with their official duties
  • Appears unfamiliar with the details of the transaction they are requesting

Legal Entity and Arrangement Red Flags

  • Cannot demonstrate actual business activity or provide evidence of operations
  • Uses an address linked to multiple unrelated companies
  • Has dormant status that suddenly becomes active without explanation
  • Uses overly complicated ownership or management structures without justification
  • Uses nominee agreements, shelf companies, or offshore trusts to obscure beneficial ownership
  • Requests use of foreign private foundations in secrecy jurisdictions
  • Engages in rapid changes to company ownership, management, or structure shortly after establishment
  • Is registered in a tax haven or jurisdiction with weak AML regulations
  • Has directors or shareholders who are difficult to contact or appear uninvolved
  • Uses the same individuals as directors or shareholders across multiple companies
  • Requests to backdate incorporation documents, share transfers, or directorship appointments

Transaction Behaviour Red Flags

  • Conducts high-value transactions inconsistent with their profile or financial history
  • Uses multiple accounts or funding sources without a clear rationale
  • Requests transactions with excessive secrecy or through anonymous instruments
  • Engages in frequent or high-value intercompany loans with no clear economic purpose
  • Sends or receives funds to and from high-risk jurisdictions without justification
  • Uses cash as collateral for loans from foreign institutions
  • Makes significant capital contributions inconsistent with company size or industry norms
  • Breaks down transactions into smaller parts to avoid reporting requirements
  • Receives payments from unrelated third parties with no apparent connection
  • Prefers unusual payment methods such as virtual assets or precious metals

“In our experience reviewing TCSP compliance programmes, the registered office risk area is consistently underestimated. Firms set up good onboarding processes for company formation clients but apply almost no CDD to entities that only use their address. The guidance is clear: even if your only service to an entity is providing its registered address, you still have minimum CDD obligations. And if you have fifty entities at the same address with overlapping management and no discernible business activity, that portfolio-level pattern is itself a red flag that requires investigation at the group level, not just entity by entity.”

Dipali Vora - Partner, NIYEAHMA Consultants LLP

Common Challenges in the IAA Sector: What the SRA Found

TCSP Compliance Gap Scorecard: Where Does Your Firm Stand?

  • Use this scorecard to identify gaps between your current controls and the MoET Supplemental Guidance for TCSPs expectations
  • Score each item honestly: Yes (2 points), Partial (1 point), No (0 points)
  • A score below 70% indicates significant remediation priorities
  • Share this assessment with your MLRO and senior management

The following scorecard is an AML UAE practical self-assessment tool derived from the guidance. It is not an MoET scoring methodology and does not represent an official supervisory assessment framework.

Rate each item: Yes (2 points) | Partial (1 point) | No (0 points). Total possible score: 60 points.

Control Area Assessment Question Your Score (0/1/2) 
Risk Framework Is your Business Risk Assessment aligned with the UAE NRA and the TCSP Sectoral Risk Assessment, and updated at least annually?  
Risk Framework Does your risk assessment specifically address the five sector-specific risk areas in the MoET Supplemental Guidance for TCSPs?  
Policies and Procedures Do your policies cover all seven core obligations including sanctions compliance and reporting?  
Policies and Procedures Were your policies updated following the UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 and its implementing regulation under Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025?   
Customer Due Diligence Does your CDD process go beyond identity verification to assess purpose, structure, and economic rationale?  
Customer Due Diligence Do you have a documented source of wealth process for higher-risk customers, distinct from source of funds?  
Beneficial Ownership Can you demonstrate that beneficial ownership has been identified and verified across all layers, not just the first?  
Beneficial Ownership Do you independently corroborate beneficial ownership information using sources beyond the customer’s own declarations?  
Nominee Services Do you have a specific policy and enhanced oversight process for nominee director and shareholder arrangements?  
Ongoing Monitoring Does your monitoring framework include trigger-based reassessments, not just annual reviews?  
Ongoing Monitoring Do you have a process to identify and escalate the trigger events listed in the guidance?  
STR and SAR Reporting Does your internal escalation process ensure that suspicions reach the MLRO without delay?  
MLRO and Governance Does your MLRO have the time, authority, and access to actively review high-risk relationships?  
Record Keeping Can your records allow a competent authority to reconstruct the rationale for every risk decision without oral explanation?  
Cross-Border Structures Do you apply a higher standard of scrutiny and enhanced internal review to cross-border and multi-jurisdictional structures?  
Staff Training Have your frontline staff been trained on the TCSP-specific risk scenarios and red flags in this guidance?  
Registered Office Do you apply CDD requirements to entities using your registered office address even if they use no other services?  
Portfolio Monitoring Do you have a process to identify risk patterns across your client portfolio, not just within individual relationships?  
Sanctions Compliance Do you screen all beneficial owners and related parties, not just primary customers, against sanctions lists?  
Cross-Client Analysis Do you have a process to identify when the same individuals appear across multiple client structures?  

Interpreting Your Score

50 to 60 points (83% to 100%): Your framework is broadly aligned with the guidance. Focus on documentation quality and continuous improvement.

35 to 49 points (58% to 82%): Material gaps exist. Prioritise beneficial ownership, ongoing monitoring, and governance.

Below 35 points (under 58%): Significant remediation required. Consider an external AML health check before your next supervisory engagement.

Scored below 70% on the compliance gap scorecard?

Do not wait for a supervisory inspection to surface the gaps. Our team at AML UAE provides targeted remediation support for UAE TCSPs across all compliance dimensions covered by this guidance.

TCSP Compliance Obligations Timeline: What Triggers What

Key Points Under This Section

  • Compliance obligations in the TCSP sector are event-driven as well as time-driven
  • Formation or onboarding triggers the full CDD cycle before the relationship commences
  • Ongoing triggers include structural changes, ownership changes, and behavioural shifts
  • Suspicious activity triggers an STR or SAR obligation regardless of transaction value or completion
  • Periodic reviews serve as a backstop but do not replace trigger-based monitoring

The guidance does not present TCSP compliance obligations in a linear way. In practice, obligations are activated by specific events across the lifecycle of a client relationship.

Frequently Asked Questions About the MoET Supplemental Guidance for TCSPs

Is this guidance legally binding on UAE TCSPs?

The guidance itself clarifies that it does not constitute additional legislation or regulation. However, it sets out how MoET will assess compliance with Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025, which are legally binding. In a supervisory inspection, failure to meet the standards set out in the guidance will likely be treated as evidence of non-compliance with those binding instruments. Treat the guidance as an important supervisory reference for demonstrating compliance with the binding AML/CFT/CPF framework.

Yes. The guidance explicitly states that providing a registered office, work address, correspondence address, or administrative address for a legal person or legal arrangement is one of the five activities that trigger TCSP obligations under the UAE AML/CFT framework. You are required to apply minimum CDD requirements to all entities using your address, even if you have no other relationship with them.

It means identifying the natural person who ultimately owns or controls the legal structure, whether directly or through a chain of companies, trusts, or other arrangements. You cannot stop at the first company layer and record that company as the beneficial owner. You must follow the ownership chain until you reach a natural person. For complex multi-jurisdictional structures, this may require reviewing corporate registries in multiple jurisdictions, obtaining certified documentation, and using third-party intelligence tools.

An STR (Suspicious Transaction Report) is filed where a specific transaction is the basis of suspicion. A SAR (Suspicious Activity Report) is filed where the suspicion arises from activity, behaviour, or circumstances rather than a specific transaction. Both apply to TCSPs. The guidance explicitly notes that suspicion may arise from the formation, administration, or restructuring of legal persons, from customer behaviour, from inconsistencies in information, or from the absence of a clear economic rationale. None of these requires a specific transaction to have occurred.

The guidance is cautious on this point. While reliance on third-party CDD is permitted under the UAE framework in certain circumstances, the TCSP retains ultimate responsibility for the adequacy of the information obtained. Where an intermediary is used, the TCSP must ensure it can independently verify the accuracy and completeness of the information, particularly for beneficial ownership. The guidance specifically flags heavy reliance on intermediaries without direct engagement with the beneficial owner as a red flag in Case Study 7.

No. The guidance states that TCSPs must integrate NRA findings into their internal risk assessment frameworks. The Medium Risk classification is a sector-level average, not a floor for individual customer or transaction risk. The guidance explicitly expects TCSPs to apply enhanced scrutiny to nominee arrangements, cross-border structures, and complex ownership chains regardless of the sector-level NRA rating. Your internal risk appetite must reflect the actual risk of each client relationship and each service type, not a sector average.

TCSPs are strictly prohibited from disclosing to a customer or any third party that an STR or SAR has been filed, that one is intended to be filed, or that an investigation is underway. This prohibition extends to any information that could reasonably lead the customer to become aware of such reporting. Importantly, the guidance clarifies that taking steps to delay a transaction, decline a service, or request additional information for legitimate compliance purposes does not constitute tipping-off, provided these actions are conducted without revealing the existence of a report or suspicion.

The guidance requires the Business Risk Assessment to be documented, regularly updated, and aligned with national and sectoral risk findings, including the NRA and relevant Sectoral Risk Assessments. It does not specify a fixed frequency. In practice, an annual review is a prudent minimum, with earlier updates triggered by changes in the NRA, SRA, supervisory guidance, business model, client base, or emerging typologies.

Not on its own. The guidance requires TCSPs to clearly document the legal and contractual relationship between the nominee and the beneficial owner, understand the scope and limitations of the nominee’s authority, and maintain ongoing awareness of how the entity is being used. A standard form agreement may cover the contractual dimension, but it does not satisfy the ongoing monitoring, beneficial ownership verification, and governance oversight requirements. Nominee services require enhanced procedures, not just standard documentation.

The guidance is clear: where material uncertainties remain unresolved, the TCSP should decline to establish the relationship or exit an existing one, and should consider whether the circumstances warrant internal escalation or external reporting. A client’s withdrawal, unresponsiveness, or termination of the relationship following EDD requests is itself listed as a red flag indicator. Document everything. Escalate to the MLRO. If the circumstances meet the reporting threshold, file an STR or SAR with the FIU.

Conclusion: From Guidance to Action

The MoET Supplemental Guidance for Trust and Company Service Providers is one of the most detailed sector-specific AML/CFT/CPF documents the UAE has produced. As AML UAE’s analysis demonstrates, it reflects a regulatory environment that has moved decisively beyond tick-box compliance and toward genuine, evidence-based supervision.

The message running through every section is consistent: the quality of your professional judgement matters as much as the completeness of your documentation. Supervisors will assess whether your controls work in practice, not just whether they exist on paper.

For TCSP operators, the practical priorities are clear. Revisit your scope and ensure you have correctly identified all the activities that trigger your obligations. Stress-test your beneficial ownership processes against complex, multi-layered structures. Build trigger-based monitoring into your operational workflows. Invest in your MLRO’s capacity to do the role properly. And use the 21 case studies in the guidance as a training resource for your frontline teams.

If the compliance gap scorecard in this article surfaced significant gaps, the time to address them is now, before a supervisory engagement does it for you.

AML UAE: Your Specialist Partner for TCSP Compliance in the UAE

Our team of qualified AML professionals, led by CAMS-certified consultants with deep UAE DNFBP experience, helps TCSPs build, test, and remediate their AML/CFT/CPF compliance frameworks. From Business Risk Assessments to MLRO support to staff training, we cover the full spectrum of TCSP compliance needs.

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About the Author

Pathik Shah

FCA, CAMS, CISA, CS, DISA (ICAI), FAFP (ICAI)

Pathik is an ACAMS-certified AML consultant specialising in governance, risk, and compliance for regulated entities in the UAE. He brings over 28 years of experience, with 1,000+ hours of AML training and 200+ advisory engagements across DNFBPs, VASPs, and FIs. He supports businesses in aligning with AML/CFT requirements from the CBUAE, DFSA, MoET, MoJ, VARA, CMA, FSRA, and FATF. Known for translating complex regulations into audit-ready procedures, Pathik enables operational clarity and compliance readiness.

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Supplemental Guidance for Independent Accountants and Auditors

Supplemental Guidance for Independent Accountants and Auditors

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Last Updated: 06/02/2026

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Protect your business with reliable and effective AML strategies with AML UAE.

In April 2026, the Ministry of Economy and Tourism (MoET) released its Supplemental Guidance for Independent Accountants and Auditors (IAA), sitting alongside the broader MoET Guidelines for Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs). This MoET IAA Guideline is not a standalone document; it is a sector-specific layer that builds on the foundational DNFBP guidelines and speaks directly to the unique risk environment in which accounting and audit professionals operate.

If you are an independent accountant, auditor, sole practitioner, or a partner or employee of a firm providing audit, accounting, assurance, or related professional services that fall within the IAA sector in the UAE, this guidance is relevant to you. It sets out what MoET expects, what the law requires, and where the real risks lie in your day-to-day work.

This article is written for practitioners who want to understand their obligations, for compliance officers in IAA firms, and for DNFBPs who engage accountants as service providers, and for anyone who wants to understand why the UAE’s AML regime treats this sector as a critical gatekeeper.

What Is the MoET Supplemental Guidance for IAA, and Why Does It Exist?

The MoET IAA Guideline was developed by the Ministry of Economy and Tourism under its supervisory mandate over DNFBPs, and it references the findings of two key assessments: the 2024 UAE National Risk Assessment (NRA) and the MoET’s own 2024 Sectoral Risk Assessment (SRA) for accountants.

Both assessments reached a consistent conclusion: the IAA sector carries a medium level of inherent ML risk, with a Medium-Low residual risk profile. That may sound reassuring, but the SRA was candid about where the vulnerabilities lie. The sector’s unique position inside a client’s financial governance structure, its access to beneficial ownership information, internal controls, financial records, and cross-border transactions, means that when professional services are misused, the consequences can be significant and hard to detect.

The guidance should be treated as an essential supervisory reference for IAA firms.

Legal Status of This Guidance: The MoET Supplemental Guidance for Independent Accountants and Auditors is a practical tool to assist regulated entities in implementing AML/CFT/CPF measures.

It does not constitute additional legislation or regulation, is not intended to set legal, regulatory, or judicial precedent, and should not be construed as legal advice or legal interpretation.

The guidance does not replace or supersede any legal or regulatory requirements. In the event of any discrepancy between this guidance and the applicable legal or regulatory framework, the latter prevails.

Firms should perform their own assessments and seek professional advice if they are unsure of the application of the legal or regulatory framework to their specific circumstances.

Where the document uses the word “shall” or “must”, the requirement is compulsory under the applicable law and regulations. Where it uses “should”, it signals recommended best practice that can only be departed from with a documented, risk-based justification that provides an equal or greater level of control. Departure from best practice without that documentation is a supervisory risk.

Who Is Covered by the MoET Guidelines for Auditors and Accountants?

The MoET Guidelines for Accountants apply to all regulated entities within the IAA sector, including:

  • Sole practitioners providing audit, accounting, and related services. Wider services such as tax advisory, corporate restructuring, insolvency, forensic accounting, and corporate structuring may create AML/CFT/CPF exposure depending on the nature of the engagement and whether they fall within the professional activities outlined in Articles 2 and 3 of Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025.
  • Partners and employees of firms engaged primarily in audit and accounting-related services.
  • Entities operating in both the mainland UAE and the Commercial Free Zones.

The guidance is explicit that it covers professionals acting independently, whether as sole practitioners or as part of larger organisations. Internal auditors employed within a corporate entity are not covered; this guidance is for independent practitioners only.

Key Legal Anchors

Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 on Combating Money Laundering, Terrorism Financing, and Proliferation Financing

Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025: Executive Regulations of Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025

Federal Law No. 12 of 2014 on the Regulation of the Auditing Profession

MoET Supplemental Guidance for Independent Accountants and Auditors, April 2026

EOCN Guidelines on Targeted Financial Sanctions and Counter-Proliferation Financing

FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for the Accounting Profession (2019)

Understanding the Sector Risk Context: Why Accountants Are Gatekeepers

The language of gatekeeping appears throughout both the MoET Guideline for Accountants and the broader FATF guidance on the accounting profession. It is not merely a professional label; it reflects a responsibility to recognise when professional services may be used to create an appearance of legitimacy.

Accountants and auditors sit at the intersection of a client’s financial reporting, governance, ownership, and transactional activity. That position gives them visibility that most other service providers simply do not have.

When that visibility is used well, it is a powerful tool for detecting and deterring financial crime. When it is ignored, overlooked under commercial pressure, or deliberately avoided, it becomes a channel through which illicit wealth can be legitimised.

The Two Perspectives the IAA Sector Must Hold Simultaneously

The MoET IAA Guideline makes an important structural observation about how IAA entities need to approach risk identification. There are two distinct perspectives that must be maintained at the same time:

  • The entity’s own business risk, including the services it provides, the clients it works with, the geographies it is exposed to, and how it is compensated for its services.
  • The customer’s risk, including situations where the professional services provided to that customer may be misused by them to facilitate money laundering, terrorism financing, or proliferation financing.

This dual-lens approach is more demanding than what many smaller IAA firms currently apply. Most have some form of client onboarding process. Far fewer have systematically mapped the ML/TF/PF risk profile of each type of service they provide and calibrated their controls accordingly.

Where an IAA entity reviews, assesses, or tests a customer’s internal controls, risk management framework, or AML/CFT/CPF programme as part of an engagement, the guidance expects the IAA to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of the customer’s risk identification and assessment framework. This means looking at whether the customer has documented risk methodology, appropriate risk differentiation, involvement of internal stakeholders, and a process for periodic review. A customer whose own AML/CFT/CPF framework is inadequate or ineffective is itself a risk indicator that the IAA entity must factor into its customer risk profile.

Sector-Specific Vulnerabilities Identified by MoET's SRA

The SRA identified two primary vulnerability drivers that are particularly relevant to the IAA sector:

Complex Ownership Structures

The IAA sector serves a predominantly corporate client base. Corporate clients often operate through offshore entities, nominees, holding companies, and trusts. These structures can obscure the ultimate beneficial owner, and the IAA firm is frequently the professional with the most direct view of those structures. When a foreign jurisdiction with weak AML controls or limited public registries is involved, verification becomes harder, and the risk of inadvertent complicity in concealment becomes real.

Exposure to High-Risk Jurisdictions and Professional Services Misuse

The guidance notes that IAA firms may inadvertently authenticate financial statements used to disguise illicit funds, support entity incorporation, or assist with documentation used for international ML networks, sanctions evasion, or tax evasion. The word “inadvertently” is significant. The guidance focuses on the risk of professional services being misused, including unknowingly, rather than suggesting sector-wide intentional misconduct. Misuse can happen through the ordinary provision of professional services when risk awareness and controls are insufficient.

“What MoET is saying in this guidance is something we see confirmed in client engagements regularly. The risk for IAA firms is not primarily that they will be caught in an obvious fraud. The risk is that a client with a complex ownership structure, a plausible business story, and a well-presented set of financials will slowly draw the firm into legitimising something that should have triggered a closer look three engagements ago. By the time the pattern becomes visible, the audit trail showing how the firm responded to each early warning sign becomes the story. Risk-based controls are not just a regulatory obligation; they are the firm’s own protection.”

Pathik Shah - CAMS, FCA, CISA | Founder and Principal Consultant, NIYEAHMA Consultants LLP

The Full Scope of AML/CFT/CPF Obligations for IAA Firms

Under Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025, IAA entities must implement a comprehensive, risk-based AML/CFT/CPF programme. The MoET Guideline for Accountants summarises these obligations into seven core areas. These obligation areas form the core of the AML/CFT/CPF framework expected from IAA entities, with implementation calibrated to the firm’s size, nature, complexity, and risk exposure.

Obligation Area  What It Requires  Key Supervisory Focus 
Compliance Administration  Appoint a qualified CO/MLRO. Implement staff training and screening. Subject the AML/CFT/CPF framework to an independent audit. When part of a group, implement group-wide programmes.  CO/MLRO qualifications and sector knowledge. Training records. Independent audit completion. 
Risk Identification and Assessment  Conduct a Business Risk Assessment (BRA) proportionate to the entity’s nature, size, and complexity. Document findings and review regularly.  Quality and currency of the BRA. Whether controls are genuinely calibrated to the risk identified. 
Policies, Procedures, and Internal Controls  Establish, document, implement, and regularly update AML/CFT/CPF policies and procedures tailored to the entity’s specific risk exposure.  Whether procedures are operational and tailored, not generic. Whether they reflect the entity’s actual service mix. 
Customer Due Diligence and Ongoing Monitoring  Identify and verify customers and beneficial owners. Understand the purpose and nature of business relationships. Create and maintain customer risk profiles. Apply EDD where higher risks are identified. Handle PEPs appropriately.  Beneficial ownership verification quality. Evidence of risk-driven (not threshold-driven) CDD. PEP management. 
Sanctions Compliance  Screen against the applicable UAE sanctions framework, including UNSC lists and the UAE Local Terrorist List, in line with EOCN requirements under Cabinet Decision No. 74 of 2020. Depending on the firm’s client base, jurisdictions, banking relationships, and risk exposure, firms may also consider other sanctions lists such as OFAC and HMT as part of a broader risk-based screening framework.  Screening process design and frequency. EOCN guidelines compliance. CPF risk incorporation in the BRA. 
Suspicious Activity / Transaction Reporting (SAR/STR)  Identify and promptly report suspicion to the FIU. The threshold is reasonable suspicion, not certainty. Timely, high-quality reports are a key supervisory focus.  Timeliness of reports. Quality of narrative and supporting detail. Evidence of internal escalation processes. 
Record-Keeping  Maintain comprehensive records covering all transactions, CDD documentation, business correspondence, and risk assessment processes. Retain for a minimum of five years.  Record organisation and accessibility. Ability to reconstruct transactions. Readiness for FIU or supervisory access. 

One point from the guidance deserves special attention in relation to CDD, MoET explicitly states that entities must apply a risk-driven CDD and EDD measure as opposed to a threshold-driven measure. Relying on transaction value alone to determine the level of due diligence is not acceptable under this framework. Risk indicators must drive the intensity of controls, not the size of the fee invoice.

Is Your AML Framework Truly Risk-Driven?

Assess whether your AML controls, risk assessment, and monitoring processes align with MoET expectations for IAA firms.

Risk Identification and Assessment: What the MoET IAA Guideline Actually Expects

Section 2 of the MoET IAA Guideline is one of the most practically detailed sections of the document. It provides an extensive list of risk factors across five categories that IAA entities must consider when undertaking their ML/TF/PF risk assessment. This is not a generic checklist; it is a sector-calibrated framework that reflects how financial crime risk actually materialises in accounting and audit engagements.

Customer Risk Factors

The guidance lists a wide range of customer-level risk indicators. These are the factors that should be feeding directly into your client risk profiling process:

  • Customers operating in sectors identified as higher risk in the UAE NRA or other sectoral risk assessments
  • PEPs or persons closely associated with PEPs, noting that foreign corruption is a key ML threat in the 2024 NRA
  • Complex or opaque ownership structures, including multi-layered legal entities, offshore arrangements, and nominee shareholders or directors without a clear economic rationale
  • Customers where beneficial ownership cannot be readily identified or verified, or where there are attempts to obscure ownership, control, or the nature of business activities
  • Customers acting on behalf of undisclosed third parties or whose instructions appear inconsistent with their stated profile
  • Customers with funds obviously and inexplicably disproportionate to their known circumstances, including age, income, occupation, or wealth
  • Frequent or unexplained changes in professional advisers or members of management
  • Customers reluctant to provide information, or where information provided appears inconsistent, insufficient, or unreliable

Geographic Risk Factors

  • Customers, beneficial owners, or transactions linked to jurisdictions subject to sanctions or with weak AML/CFT controls
  • Customers operating across multiple jurisdictions without a clear economic or commercial rationale
  • Transfer of corporate structures or activities to jurisdictions without genuine business activity

Business and Industry Risk Factors

  • Cash-intensive businesses or businesses dealing in cash equivalents
  • Customers involved in emerging or high-growth sectors where regulatory oversight may be evolving, including virtual asset-related activities
  • Non-profit or charitable organisations where transactions lack a clear economic purpose or alignment with stated activities

Transaction and Behavioural Risk Factors

  • Transactions or arrangements inconsistent with the customer’s known business profile or economic purpose
  • Sudden changes in transaction patterns, including activity from dormant entities
  • Last-minute or unexplained changes in transaction instructions, payment methods, or counterparties
  • Use of virtual assets or other methods intended to obscure the origin of funds

Control and Governance Risk Factors

  • Weaknesses in the customer’s AML/CFT/CPF framework, including a lack of oversight, inadequate policies, or ineffective implementation
  • Indicators of falsification or manipulation of financial records, including false invoices, fictitious loans, or misleading accounting entries
  • Customers offering unusually high fees without a clear commercial rationale
  • Indicators that the customer is attempting to avoid regulatory approvals or reporting requirements

Advisory Note: The BRA Is Not a One-Off Exercise

The MoET IAA Guideline is explicit that the Business Risk Assessment must be proportionate to the nature, size, and complexity of the entity’s activities. It must be periodically reviewed and updated, particularly when significant changes occur in the business, risk, or regulatory environment. Many IAA firms complete an initial BRA and treat it as done. The guidance expects it to be a living document, reviewed periodically and updated whenever significant changes occur in the client base, services offered, delivery channels, geographic exposure, payment arrangements, sanctions or proliferation financing exposure, or the broader regulatory environment.

Customer Due Diligence: What the MoET Guideline for Accountants Expects in Practice

Section 3 of the MoET Supplemental Guidance for Independent Accountants is where the practical expectations get most specific. CDD for IAA firms is not simply a matter of collecting identity documents at onboarding. It is a continuous, risk-informed process that runs through the entire client lifecycle.

Beneficial Ownership: The Starting Point That Many Firms Mishandle

The guidance is direct about beneficial ownership verification. The starting point is to ask pertinent questions and obtain information directly from the client. But that information cannot simply be accepted at face value in higher-risk situations. It must be analysed for reasonableness and consistency and corroborated with reference to reliable independent sources.

Reliable independent sources include bank references or bank account information, commercial registries, and federal or national tax identification numbers. Where those sources are unavailable, the IAA entity must consider reliable alternatives appropriate to the risk level identified.

The guidance specifically flags situations where clients appear unable or unwilling to divulge relevant ownership information or to grant permissions to third parties to provide that information. These are not neutral circumstances; they are red flags that indicate heightened risk and should trigger additional scrutiny or, where the risk cannot be mitigated, refusal or exit.

Screening: Continuous, Risk-Based, and Not Optional

The MoET IAA Guideline requires IAA entities to implement appropriate processes for screening customers, prospective customers, beneficial owners, and persons exercising management control against applicable sanctions lists and adverse media. These processes must be:

  • Ongoing and risk-based, not just conducted at onboarding
  • Inclusive of detection for links to financial crime, PEPs, and other higher-risk indicators
  • Implemented on a continuous basis at onboarding, during material changes, and periodically throughout the relationship
  • Proportionate in depth and frequency to the risks associated with each client

The guidance references publicly accessible government and intergovernmental sanctions lists, commercially available customer intelligence databases, and internet search techniques as tools for this process. IAA entities are expected to be familiar with these tools and use them appropriately.

Apply Enhanced Due Diligence

EDD is not limited to formal PEP designations or sanctions matches. The MoET Guideline for Accountants identifies a range of circumstances that should trigger enhanced scrutiny:

  • Clients associated with high-risk jurisdictions
  • Clients where beneficial ownership involves nominees, trusts, offshore entities, or multi-layered structures
  • Non-resident clients or intermediaries where the role is unclear, and there is no discernible economic rationale
  • Clients with complex cross-border arrangements or ownership structures that do not align with their declared business profile
  • Any situation where the overall risk profile warrants more than standard inquiry

Document Authenticity: A Specific IAA Concern

The guidance dedicates specific attention to a risk that is particularly relevant for accounting and audit engagements: the use of fraudulent or forged documents. When IAA entities are involved in approving or opining on acquisitions, dispositions, transfers, or financing of legal entities, they must pay particular attention to the authenticity of documents and financial instruments involved. This includes securities, bonds, title deeds, loan or mortgage documents, and promissory notes.

This expectation is not about becoming a forensic document examiner. It is about exercising professional scepticism and escalating when something does not look right, rather than treating inconsistencies as clerical errors to be corrected.

Refusing and Exiting Relationships

One of the clearest statements in the MoET IAA Guideline is this: IAA entities must refuse or exit relationships where beneficial ownership or the source of funds cannot be reasonably verified, or where sanctions or proliferation financing risks cannot be mitigated. This is not discretionary. Where the risk cannot be managed, the relationship must not proceed.

“In practice, one of the most common gaps we see in IAA firm compliance is in the area of ongoing monitoring. There is often reasonable rigour at the onboarding stage, with identity documents collected and some form of sanctions check conducted. But the monitoring process then becomes static. The client profile does not get updated when ownership changes, when the nature of instructions shifts, or when the volume or type of transactions starts to diverge from what was expected at onboarding. The MoET guidance is very clear that monitoring must be continuous and proportionate to the risk. For higher-risk clients, that means active review, not periodic reminders.”

Dipali Vora - Partner, NIYEAHMA Consultants LLP

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Ongoing Monitoring: Practical Expectations for IAA Firms

The MoET Guideline for Accountants acknowledges a practical reality that distinguishes IAA entities from licensed financial institutions: the nature of accounting and audit work means it is not always possible to conduct detailed ongoing monitoring of the entirety of client activity in the same manner as a bank or exchange house would. An engagement to audit a specific aspect of internal controls does not give the auditor the same continuous transactional visibility that a bank has over its account holders.

However, the guidance is clear that this limitation does not reduce the obligation to take reasonable steps to protect against misuse. IAA entities must not become unwitting accomplices to ML/TF/PF through the sources and methods by which they are compensated, to the extent that those sources and methods are visible through fee arrangements, engagement documentation, or information obtained in the ordinary course of providing services.

Practical Monitoring Steps the Guidance Identifies

The MoET IAA Guideline provides concrete examples of monitoring steps appropriate to the sector:

  • Examining information in commercial registries or held by registered agents to detect unexpected changes, amendments, or transfers
  • Monitoring changes in ownership, dividend payments, additional capital contributions, lending and borrowing activity, powers of attorney, and similar indicators of true beneficial ownership and control
  • Reviewing accounting records, audit evidence, or information provided during engagements to monitor the frequency and size of transactions against the expected business profile
  • When collecting professional fees, ensure that funds come from known sources on which CDD has been performed, not from third parties, foreign accounts, or other unknown sources
  • Ensuring payment methods are consistent with the client’s profile and are not methods designed to obscure the origin of funds, including cash, cashier’s cheques, postal money orders, prepaid cards, third-party endorsed cheques, or cryptocurrencies

Reporting Obligations: What IAA Firms Must Know About SARs and STRs

The reporting obligations for IAA entities are clearly framed in the MoET Supplemental Guidance for Independent Accountants and Auditors. They are triggered by reasonable suspicion, not by certainty, and they apply regardless of whether a transaction has been completed, attempted, or discontinued.

The Threshold Is Reasonable Suspicion

The obligation to file a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) or Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) with the UAE Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) arises when an IAA entity has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds, transactions, or related activities are linked to ML/TF/PF or the proceeds of crime. The guidance is emphatic: this obligation applies regardless of transaction value. A low-value transaction with clear red flag indicators must be reported. A high-value transaction with no suspicious indicators does not, simply by virtue of its size, require a report.

Reporting Extends to Attempted Activity

The reporting obligation extends to attempted activities, including situations where an IAA entity declines to establish or continue a business relationship because of concerns identified during CDD or ongoing monitoring. Where the decision to exit or refuse a relationship arises from reasonable grounds for suspicion, the matter should be assessed for SAR/STR filing. Not every refusal or exit is automatically reportable, but where attempted suspicious activity is the basis for that decision, the reporting framework applies.

Tipping Off: A Strict Prohibition

IAA entities are strictly prohibited from disclosing, directly or indirectly, to the client or any third party, the fact that an STR or SAR has been filed, is intended to be filed, or that an investigation is being or may be conducted. This prohibition is absolute and extends to any information that could reasonably lead the client to become aware of such reporting.

Breaches of the tipping-off provisions carry legal and administrative sanctions. The guidance clarifies, however, that declining a transaction, delaying the provision of services, or requesting additional information for legitimate compliance purposes does not constitute tipping-off, provided those actions do not reveal the existence of a report or suspicion.

SAR/STR Quality Is a Key Supervisory Focus

The guidance is unusually direct in identifying the timeliness and quality of SAR/STR reporting as key supervisory focus areas for the IAA sector. This is not incidental language. It indicates that MoET expects firms to strengthen the timeliness, quality, and internal governance of suspicious activity reporting. Reports should be comprehensive, accurate, and supported by sufficient detail to enable the FIU to understand the nature of the suspicion, the parties involved, and the underlying activity. The focus must be on clearly articulating the basis for suspicion, rather than providing definitive conclusions.

On Reporting Gaps

The SRA’s observation that SAR/STR timeliness and quality are supervisory focus areas is significant. In our experience, many IAA firms do not have a clearly documented internal escalation process that connects an engagement team member’s concern to the Compliance Officer and then to the FIU within a defined timeline. The guidance requires that internal processes enable timely identification, escalation, and assessment of suspicions. Without that process being written down, trained on, and tested, the firm is exposed.

ML/TF/PF Typologies Most Relevant to the IAA Sector

Section 5 of the MoET IAA Guideline provides a detailed typology analysis specific to the accounting and audit profession. Understanding these typologies is not just about passing a compliance training module; it is about building the professional judgement to recognise when a client engagement is moving into territory that warrants closer scrutiny.

Use of Corporate Vehicles and Complex Legal Structures

This is the typology most frequently associated with the IAA sector. It involves the formation or use of corporate vehicles, shell companies, and complex legal structures such as trusts, foundations, and special-purpose vehicles. While there are numerous legitimate reasons for such structures, they may also be exploited for the placement and layering of proceeds of crime, the obscuring of beneficial ownership, and the provision of an appearance of legitimacy through professional intermediaries.

This typology is directly relevant to IAA entities providing financial reporting, tax advisory, or corporate structuring services, where visibility into ownership and control structures is inherent to the engagement.

Misuse of Professional Services to Create an Appearance of Legitimacy

The professional outputs of IAA entities, including audit reports, financial statements, assurance opinions, and accounting certifications, carry significant weight with third parties, including banks, investors, and other professional service providers. This weight can be exploited. The guidance identifies several examples:

  • Preparation or presentation of financial statements that obscure the true source or nature of funds
  • Creation or support of accounting entries, intercompany transactions, loans, royalty arrangements, or consultancy fees lacking genuine economic substance
  • Use of audit, assurance, or accounting outputs to create comfort for counterparties or financial institutions in circumstances where the underlying activity is suspicious

Real Estate-Related Laundering Through Corporate or Financial Structures

Real estate remains one of the most commonly used vehicles for the laundering of illicit proceeds in the UAE. The IAA sector intersects with this typology through accounting, tax structuring, and advisory work. Specific methods include the use of corporate vehicles to acquire or hold property, manipulation of property valuations, and the use of complex lending or mortgage arrangements.

Trade-Based Money Laundering and Commercial Documentation Misuse

From an accounting, audit, advisory, or forensic review perspective, the most relevant TBML methods include the manipulation of invoices (over-, under-, or fictitious invoicing), fraudulent shipments involving misrepresented goods, and customs, excise, or VAT fraud. Accounting records are frequently the primary evidence through which these methods are concealed or detected.

Sanctions Evasion and Proliferation Financing

The guidance identifies a specific category of typologies relating to sanctions evasion and PF. IAA entities may be misused to support these activities through the use of front companies to disguise links to sanctioned persons or jurisdictions, manipulation of accounting or commercial records to conceal the nature of goods, services, or counterparties, and the use of complex ownership or payment chains to obscure the ultimate beneficiary.

Misuse of Payment Flows and Settlement Arrangements

In situations where IAA entities have visibility into payment instructions, client money, or third-party settlements, for example, through insolvency, liquidation, or restructuring work, those arrangements may be exploited. Specific examples include unexplained transfers to or from unrelated third parties, cancellation of transactions followed by instructions to redirect funds, and the use of loans, advances, or professional fee arrangements to disguise the movement of value.

Other Related Typologies

The MoET IAA Guideline identifies additional typologies that IAA professionals should be aware of. These include: the use of licence or royalty payment arrangements to move value between related parties without genuine economic substance; private loan or credit agreements used to explain the movement of funds between entities or individuals; fraudulent consultancy agreements or advisory fee arrangements used to justify payments with no corresponding service; fraudulent investment agreements used to legitimise the transfer of funds across jurisdictions; and the misuse of charities or non-profit entities to channel funds. These typologies may be less obvious than the principal categories above but appear with regularity in complex cross-border and multi-entity engagements.

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Red Flag Indicators: A Practical Reference for IAA Professionals

Section 6 of the MoET IAA Guideline contains one of the most comprehensive and operationally useful sections of the document: a detailed list of red flag indicators organised by customer type and transaction behaviour. These are not triggers for automatic refusal or reporting; they are signals that warrant enhanced scrutiny and careful assessment by the Compliance Officer. The presence of multiple indicators in combination should increase the urgency of that assessment.

Customer Behaviour: Individual Clients

Concealment of Beneficial Ownership

  • Use of companies, trusts, or bearer shares to obscure beneficial ownership
  • Use of professional intermediaries, trustees, or nominee shareholders to provide an appearance of legitimacy
  • Creation or use of multi-jurisdictional structures to disguise beneficial ownership or facilitate a predicate offence
  • Ownership by or affiliation with a legal entity incorporated in a jurisdiction that does not require beneficial owner reporting
  • Acquisition or use of shelf companies or pre-constituted shell companies without updating ownership information
  • Becoming defensive, evasive, or hostile when questioned about the source of funds, tax history, or beneficial ownership

Suspicious Behaviour or Lack of Transparency

  • Refusal to co-operate or provide information, data, and documents usually required to facilitate an audit
  • Inability or refusal to explain the business activity, corporate history, identity of beneficial owners, or source of wealth
  • Active avoidance of personal contact without sufficient justification
  • Requests that the accountant or auditor simplify explanations, accept management representations without evidence, or exclude certain accounts, transactions, or jurisdictions from scope
  • Claims of being tax-exempt or not required to file without a credible legal or jurisdictional justification
  • Inability or unwillingness to provide tax returns, tax residency certificates, or proof of tax payments

Unusual Customers and High-Risk or Criminal Associations

  • Customer under investigation, with known criminal connections, or subject to adverse information in reliable public sources
  • Customer is a PEP or has familial or professional associations with a PEP
  • Customer or UBO appearing on applicable UAE or UN sanctions lists, or identified in other credible watchlists or adverse intelligence sources relevant to the firm’s risk assessment
  • Funds originating from or transiting through high-tax-secrecy jurisdictions or those exhibiting weak tax enforcement

Customer Behaviour: Entity Clients

  • Cannot demonstrate a history or provide evidence of real operational activity
  • Suddenly becomes active after a long period of dormancy without a logical explanation
  • Cannot be found on the internet, social business network platforms, or in the public domain
  • Registered at an address that does not match the company’s profile or is listed against numerous other companies, indicating a mailbox service
  • Has directors or controlling shareholders who cannot be located or contacted, or who do not appear to have an active role
  • Is not normally cash-intensive but appears to have substantial unexplained cash
  • Provides falsified records or counterfeit documentation
  • Transfers its registration from another jurisdiction without evidence of genuine economic activity in the country of origin
  • Requests shortcuts or unusually fast completion of work, prepared to pay substantially higher fees in exchange
  • Preferred payment method is unusual, including precious metals, virtual currencies, or other unconventional methods
  • Individuals managing multiple entities that transfer funds among themselves without corresponding commercial activity

Transaction Behaviour

  • Unexplained last-minute changes involving the identity of parties, transaction details, or payment methods
  • Involvement of cash or negotiable instruments that do not state the true payer
  • Transactions financed by a non-financial institution third party, with no logical explanation or commercial justification
  • Funds sent to or received from a foreign country with no apparent connection to the client
  • Significant increase in capital or successive capital contributions over a short period for a recently incorporated company
  • Personal funds funnelled through corporate accounts, followed by personal expenditures or asset acquisitions
  • Complicated transaction routings or multi-jurisdictional corporate structures without sufficient explanation or trade records
  • Customer claims to export technical equipment without any manufacturing capacity
  • Financial statements reflecting payments to unknown suppliers in high-risk jurisdictions
  • Customer refuses to provide end-use or end-user information, customs documentation, or supply chain details

Case Studies: Learning from the MoET Guidance Scenarios

The MoET IAA Guideline includes seven illustrative case studies. This article summarises five of them below; firms are encouraged to review all seven in the full guidance document, as each contains supervisory expectations directly applicable to audit, advisory, and accounting engagements.

They are illustrative supervisory learning scenarios, intended to help IAA firms identify relevant red flags and understand the expected supervisory response, rather than verified historical cases.

Each case study concludes with supervisory expectations that are directly applicable to IAA engagement work.

Case Study 1: PEP Using Corporate and Trust Structures to Conceal Corruption Proceeds

A PEP used a group of corporate entities, trust arrangements, and intermediaries across multiple jurisdictions to conceal ownership of high-value assets acquired through corruption. Assets were held through previously incorporated entities with nominee control. Forged company accounts, false incorporation documents, and misleading ownership records were produced to create an appearance of legitimacy.

IAA Relevance: This case illustrates how corporate structures, financial records, and ownership documentation may be misused to conceal beneficial ownership. The supervisory expectation is to apply professional scepticism to company accounts, incorporation records, and trust documents, particularly when they are central to the verification of legitimacy. Where the declared wealth is inconsistent with the scale of assets or structures, enhanced scrutiny is required.

Case Study 2: Shell Companies and Procurement Manipulation to Launder Corruption Proceeds

An infrastructure project’s bidding process was rigged by a project manager in conspiracy with contractors. A web of shell corporations submitted coordinated bids, creating a false appearance of competition. Excessive payments were made and subsequently layered through affiliated parties, consulting contracts, and subcontracting arrangements, supported by invoices and financial records that appeared authentic.

IAA Relevance: Invoices and financial records that support sham transactions are often the primary tools in procurement fraud. Professional scepticism must be applied when reviewing consultancy agreements, subcontracting arrangements, and payments to related entities, particularly where multiple companies in a tender process appear to share ownership, management, or financial arrangements.

Case Study 3: Front Company and Structured Real Estate Transaction

A person using a false identity formed a company, received funds from overseas third parties, acquired a property through the company, then liquidated the company and reacquired the asset at an inflated price. This created an appearance of a legitimate capital gain while channelling illicit money through the financial system.

IAA Relevance: Rapid asset acquisition and disposal, company liquidation shortly after a significant transaction, and inflated valuations without market rationale are all patterns that should trigger closer scrutiny when observed in accounting or advisory work.

Case Study 4: Misuse of Professional Customer Account and Corporate Structure

A company used a notary’s customer account to purchase property, with funds routed through multiple cheques and transfers that appeared legitimate. However, the structure concealed the connection between the individual and the company, and the funds were later linked to a known drug dealer through the company’s ownership. This enabled illicit money to be laundered through real estate investments using layered financial transactions.

IAA Relevance: Use of intermediary accounts, indirect funding structures, unclear beneficial ownership, and transaction patterns inconsistent with normal professional activities are key indicators that require enhanced scrutiny during accounting and advisory engagements.

Case Study 5: Front Company and Cash Structuring for Tax Fraud Proceeds

A criminal group channelled tax evasion proceeds through a company with no real operations, using multiple individuals to deposit cash in smaller amounts before pooling into the corporate account. The company then made unjustified VAT refund claims linked to property transactions, generating apparently legitimate income.

IAA Relevance: Structured cash deposits, asset acquisitions inconsistent with a company’s declared business, and disproportionate VAT refund requests are all indicators that should be escalated during accounting or tax advisory work.

Sectoral Best Practices: What MoET Expects IAA Firms to Do

Section 4.2 of the MoET IAA Guideline is one of the most forward-looking sections of the document. It sets out best practices that MoET expects firms to work towards, beyond the minimum mandatory requirements. These best practices provide a useful benchmark for firms assessing the maturity of their compliance framework.

Risk-Based Approach as the Foundation of Everything

The guidance calls for a documented and proportionate risk-based approach that guides all aspects of compliance from client onboarding through to monitoring and escalation. This includes periodic business-wide risk assessments covering client profile, ownership opacity, geographic exposure, service type, delivery channel, fee and payment arrangements, and sanctions or PF exposure. Risk scoring methodologies must be structured, documented, approved by senior management, and consistently applied.

Strong Governance Framework

The guidance emphasises a strong governance framework appropriate to the firm’s size and risk exposure. This means:

  • A qualified CO/MLRO with sector-specific knowledge and a sound understanding of regulatory obligations
  • Written policies and procedures aligned with regulatory requirements and best practices
  • Regular AML/CFT/CPF training for all employees, including frontline staff and senior management
  • Group-wide AML/CFT/CPF frameworks where the firm has multiple branches or affiliates
  • Regular escalation of AML/CFT/CPF issues to senior management, with documented decisions on higher-risk clients or engagements

Service-Based Risk Calibration

The guidance specifically recommends that firms take a service-based approach to risk identification and mitigation. Services associated with higher risk, including company structuring, complex cross-border arrangements, liquidation or insolvency work linked to unexplained wealth, and non-routine financial transactions, should receive enhanced scrutiny and management oversight. The calibration of controls must extend beyond the client profile to the type of service being provided.

Document Scrutiny and Consistency Checking

The guidance recommends that firms apply an appropriate level of scrutiny to documents, justifications, and transaction narratives provided by clients. Best practice includes ensuring consistency of documents across different sources, verifying reconciliation of figures, dates, counterparties, and ownership information, and escalating where records appear backdated, fabricated, commercially inconsistent, or unsupported by the firm’s understanding of the client’s business.

Clear Internal Escalation Procedures

The guidance calls for clear and documented internal escalation procedures, with employees trained to identify red flags specific to the accounting profession. These include ownership opacity, unjustified cross-border structures, false invoicing, false loans, abuse of corporate vehicles, sanctions evasion indicators, and attempts to pressure the firm to reduce scrutiny or overlook gaps that may arise.

“The MoET Supplemental Guidance for IAA is one of the most operationally detailed pieces of sector guidance MoET has issued for this sector. What stands out is the combination of specificity and balance. It does not treat every accounting firm as a high-risk entity; it explicitly acknowledges that smaller firms with domestic, low-complexity clients operate at a different risk level from firms with cross-border, multi-jurisdictional, corporate-heavy client bases. What it does require, for all firms at every scale, is that the risk assessment, the controls, the monitoring, and the reporting are proportionate to the actual risk. The firms that will struggle are not necessarily the ones with the highest risk profiles; they are the ones that have not clearly documented why their current controls are appropriate for their specific risk exposure.”

Jyoti Maheshwari

Jyoti Maheshwari - Partner, NIYEAHMA Consultants LLP

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Common Challenges in the IAA Sector: What the SRA Found

The MoET Sectoral Risk Assessment was candid about the compliance challenges it observed across the IAA sector. Understanding these challenges helps firms identify where their own frameworks may have gaps, not to criticise, but to focus remediation efforts where they are most needed.

Challenge Identified  What This Means in Practice 
Uneven compliance maturity across firms  Smaller practices often have limited dedicated compliance resources, resulting in inconsistent risk assessments, weak documentation of decisions, and under-identification of suspicious activity. 
Gaps in escalation to senior management  AML/CFT issues are not being escalated to senior management regularly. Decisions on higher-risk clients or engagements are often not documented or reviewed at the partner level. 
Insufficient tailored AML/CFT/CPF training  Training is often generic rather than tailored to the specific risks of the accounting profession. Staff may be unaware of sector-specific red flags or typologies. 
Over-reliance on manual processes  Manual screening and monitoring processes create inconsistency and are prone to gaps. Firms relying solely on manual checks are likely to miss indicators that a systematic process would catch. 
Commercial pressures are creating blind spots  Where a client is commercially important or insistent on speed, there is implicit pressure to treat gaps in documentation or opacity in ownership as routine. FATF guidance specifically highlights this as a risk factor. 
Cross-border complexity  Foreign client bases and cross-border operations create challenges for due diligence, transparency, sanctions checks, and document consistency that domestic-only clients do not present. 

Frequently Asked Questions on the MoET IAA Guideline

Does the MoET Supplemental Guidance for IAA apply to all accounting and audit firms in the UAE?

Yes. The guidance applies to all regulated entities within the IAA sector, including sole practitioners, partners, and employees of firms providing audit and accounting-related services, across both the mainland UAE and relevant Commercial Free Zones. It does not apply to internal auditors employed within an organisation, who are not acting independently.

The MoET DNFBP Guidelines provide the general framework for all designated non-financial businesses and professions. The MoET IAA Guideline is a sector-specific supplement that adds practical detail relevant to the unique risk environment and service profile of independent accountants and auditors. Both must be read and applied together. The supplemental guidance does not replace the general guidelines; it adds to them.

IAA entities must file an STR or SAR with the FIU when they have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds, transactions, or related activities are linked to ML/TF/PF or the proceeds of crime. The threshold is reasonable suspicion, not certainty or proof. The obligation applies regardless of transaction value, and it extends to attempted activities, including situations where an IAA entity declines to establish or continue a business relationship due to compliance concerns.

Risk-driven CDD means that the intensity and depth of due diligence applied to a client are determined by the assessed risk profile of that client and the nature of the services being provided, not by transaction value thresholds alone. A low-value engagement for a client with complex offshore ownership, cross-border transactions, and links to a high-risk jurisdiction should attract more rigorous due diligence than a high-value engagement for a well-known, domestically focused corporate with transparent ownership.

Yes. IAA entities must incorporate PF risk into their Business Risk Assessment. They must refer to the EOCN Guidance on Counter-Proliferation Financing for detailed obligations, including requirements for screening against UNSCR lists, freezing obligations, and reporting in relation to designated persons or entities. The MoET IAA Guideline provides high-level guidance on CPF obligations, but the operational requirements are governed by EOCN guidelines.

IAA entities must maintain comprehensive records covering all transactions, CDD documentation, business correspondence, and outcomes of any analysis performed. Records must include documentation generated as part of the entity’s ML/TF/PF risk assessment and mitigation processes. Records must be retained for a minimum of five years from the latest of the following events: termination of the business relationship, completion of an occasional transaction, issuance of a final judgment by a competent authority, or dissolution of a legal person or arrangement.

The MoET IAA Guideline is clear that the obligation to report is triggered by reasonable suspicion, not certainty. If reasonable grounds for suspicion exist based on available information, professional judgement, and the assessment of risk indicators, the matter must be escalated internally to the Compliance Officer, assessed, and if not resolved, reported to the FIU. The Compliance Officer should document the reasoning process and the outcome, whether a report is filed or not.

Yes. Taking steps to decline a transaction, delay the provision of services, or request additional information for legitimate compliance purposes does not constitute tipping-off, provided those actions are conducted in a manner that does not reveal the existence of a report or a suspicion. The prohibition on tipping-off relates specifically to disclosing that a report has been or may be filed, or that an investigation is underway.

The MLRO or Compliance Officer must be a qualified professional with sector-specific knowledge and a sound understanding of regulatory obligations. The guidance does not prescribe a specific seniority level, but it does require senior management oversight of the AML/CFT/CPF framework and places responsibility for AML/CFT/CPF compliance on senior management. In practice, the MLRO should have sufficient seniority to escalate concerns to partners and, in larger firms, to the board, without facing commercial pressure to suppress those concerns.

The BRA must be reviewed and updated regularly. The guidance specifies that it must be updated, particularly when significant changes occur in the business, risk, or regulatory environment. In practice, this means reviewing the BRA periodically and updating it whenever there is a material change in the firm’s client base, services offered, delivery channels, geographic exposure, sanctions or proliferation financing exposure, or the broader regulatory or risk environment. Many firms adopt an annual review cycle as a governance practice, but the guidance does not prescribe a fixed minimum frequency; the trigger is material change, not the calendar.

Closing Observations: What This Guidance Signals for the IAA Sector

The MoET Supplemental Guidance for Independent Accountants and Auditors is one of the most detailed and operationally specific pieces of sector guidance that MoET has issued to date. It is built on a clear empirical foundation in the 2024 NRA and SRA, it is calibrated to the actual risk environment of the sector, and it provides a more practical and sector-specific articulation of MoET’s expectations for IAA firms.

Several themes run through the entire document and are worth holding in mind as a firm works through its compliance framework against this guidance:

  • Proportionality is non-negotiable. The guidance is explicit that a sole practitioner with a domestic, low-complexity client base operates differently from a mid-sized firm with a cross-border, corporate-heavy client portfolio. Controls must be proportionate to the actual risk, but that proportionality must be documented and justified, not assumed.
  • Professional judgement is expected, not optional. The case studies and typologies section of the guidance is essentially a training manual in professional scepticism. Recognising when a client’s ownership structure is needlessly complex, when financial records do not add up, or when instructions are being given by someone who should not have the authority to give them is a core professional competency under this framework.
  • Documentation is the difference between compliance and exposure. Whether it is the BRA, the CDD file, the escalation decision, or the rationale for not filing a report, documentation is what allows a firm to demonstrate to a regulator that it applied a risk-based approach. Without documentation, even good processes become invisible.
  • The reporting threshold is reasonable suspicion, not certainty or proof. Firms should review their internal escalation and reporting processes against the guidance expectations and satisfy themselves that concerns are being identified, documented, assessed, and where appropriate reported promptly. MoET’s identification of SAR/STR quality and timeliness as key supervisory focus areas signals that reporting maturity across the sector needs attention.
  • The firms that will navigate this regulatory environment well are those that treat the MoET IAA Guideline not as a checklist to be ticked once a year, but as a framework that should be embedded in how they onboard clients, structure engagements, review financial records, and make decisions about difficult client relationships.

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AML UAE is part of the NIYEAHMA AMLVerse, a global AML compliance ecosystem connecting consulting, regulatory knowledge, professionals, implementation frameworks, and technology.

Our team includes CAMS-certified professionals with hands-on experience across the UAE DNFBP sectors, financial institutions, VASPs, and capital market participants. We have delivered AML health checks, Business Risk Assessments, policy documentation, training programmes, and managed KYC services across the mainland UAE and financial free zones.

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About the Author

Pathik Shah

FCA, CAMS, CISA, CS, DISA (ICAI), FAFP (ICAI)

Pathik is an ACAMS-certified AML consultant specialising in governance, risk, and compliance for regulated entities in the UAE. He brings over 28 years of experience, with 1,000+ hours of AML training and 200+ advisory engagements across DNFBPs, VASPs, and FIs. He supports businesses in aligning with AML/CFT requirements from the CBUAE, DFSA, MoET, MoJ, VARA, CMA, FSRA, and FATF. Known for translating complex regulations into audit-ready procedures, Pathik enables operational clarity and compliance readiness.

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Supplemental Guidance for Real Estate Agents and Brokers – March 2026

Supplemental Guidance for Real Estate Agents and Brokers

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Last Updated: 06/01/2026

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MoET's REAB Guidance in a Nutshell

  • Issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy and Tourism (MoET), the REAB Guidance sets out AML/CFT/CPF expectations and obligations for real estate agents and brokers as DNFBPs under Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025.
  • Defines eight core obligations: business risk assessment, internal controls, customer due diligence, suspicious transaction reporting, governance, record keeping, targeted financial sanctions, and training.
  • Highlights five sector-critical priorities: beneficial ownership transparency, source of funds and wealth verification, risk-based monitoring across the transaction lifecycle, embedding compliance in daily operations, and cooperation with competent authorities.
  • Mandates Real Estate Activity Reports (REAR) for freehold purchase or sale transactions where: cash payments reach AED 55,000 or more; payment is made using virtual assets; or funds were converted from or to virtual assets at any point in the funding chain. REAR obligations apply in addition to STRs where suspicion arises.
  • Flags common gaps in UAE brokerages: weak beneficial ownership tracing, inconsistent risk-based measures, deferred compliance under commercial pressure, and record keeping shortfalls.
  • Uses ten case studies and key red-flag indicators to show how layered ownership, PEP exposure, virtual assets, and third-party funding can signal ML/TF/PF risk in real estate deals.

In March 2026, the UAE Ministry of Economy and Tourism (MoET) published its Supplemental Guidance for Real Estate Agents and Brokers (REAB), a landmark sector-specific document that sits alongside the broader AML/CFT/CPF Guidelines for Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs). This guidance is not a standalone document. It is grounded in Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025, the operative legal instruments governing anti-money laundering, counter-terrorism financing, and counter-proliferation financing compliance in the UAE today.

For real estate agents, brokers, and brokerage firms operating across the UAE mainland and free zones, this guidance is an important supervisory benchmark MoET may use when assessing whether a real estate firm has met its obligations. It sets out what MoET expects, what risks the sector must manage, and what practical steps must be in place. Whether you run a one-person brokerage in Dubai or a multi-branch firm across the emirates, these obligations apply to you.

This article provides a comprehensive, plain-language breakdown of the MoET REAB Guidance. It is written for real estate professionals, compliance officers within brokerage firms, and senior management who need to understand what the guidance actually requires in practice, not just what it says on paper.

Note

This article is based on the MoET Supplemental Guidance for Real Estate Agents and Brokers published in March 2026. It is intended as a practical commentary and does not constitute legal advice. Regulated entities should read the full guidance document and consult their Compliance Officer or a qualified AML advisory firm for entity-specific implementation.

What Is the MoET REAB Guidance and Why Does It Exist?

The Legal Foundation

The MoET Guidelines for Real Estate Agents and Brokers are formally grounded in Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 on Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons, as well as its executive regulations under Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025. These instruments replaced the prior 2018 legislation (Federal Decree-Law No. 20 of 2018, repealed by Article 41 of FDL 10/2025) and came into effect on 14 October 2025 and 14 December 2025, respectively, per the entry-into-force provisions of the respective instruments. All compliance frameworks, policies, and procedures for UAE real estate DNFBPs must be anchored to these updated laws.

The guidance itself does not create new law. It interprets and operationalises existing legal obligations in a sector-specific way. When there is any conflict between the guidance and the law, the law prevails. That said, supervisory authorities will use this guidance as a benchmark when assessing whether a real estate firm has met its obligations.

Why Real Estate Carries a High Inherent Risk

The UAE National Risk Assessment (NRA) and Sectoral Risk Assessment (SRA) have both identified the real estate sector as carrying a High inherent ML/TF/PF risk. This is not an arbitrary designation. It reflects specific structural characteristics of the sector:

  • Transaction values are significantly high, making real estate an attractive vehicle for integrating large volumes of illicit funds in a single deal.
  • The sector regularly involves cross-border clients, non-resident investors, and foreign legal structures, many of which introduce opacity into the ownership and funding chain.
  • Intermediaries such as agents, brokers, legal representatives, and notaries can be used knowingly or unknowingly to distance a beneficial owner from the transaction.
  • Complex ownership structures involving holding companies, trusts, foundations, and offshore vehicles are common in the sector and can be deliberately constructed to conceal the ultimate beneficial owner.
  • Cash transactions and virtual asset payments are present in the sector, both of which reduce financial transparency.

These risk factors are not theoretical. They reflect patterns that supervisory authorities and financial intelligence units have identified in real transactions. The guidance asks brokers and agents to internalise these risks and build controls that address them directly.

Who Is Covered

The MoET REAB Guidance applies to all real estate agents and brokers, and to the boards, management, and employees of those entities, operating anywhere in the UAE, including the mainland and Commercial Free Zones (CFZs).

A firm falls within scope as a DNFBP when it concludes or facilitates transactions on behalf of its customers relating to the purchase or sale of real estate. This includes marketing properties, negotiating sale and purchase terms, coordinating payment arrangements, handling deposits, and acting as an intermediary between buyers, sellers, developers, and financial institutions.

The most common misconception we encounter when working with real estate firms is the belief that AML compliance is only relevant when something suspicious happens. The MoET guidance makes clear that compliance is a continuous, embedded obligation, not a reactive process. The question is not whether your firm will encounter risk; it is whether your systems are built to recognise and respond to it when it does.

Pathik Shah - CAMS, FCA, CISA, CS, DISA (ICAI), FAFP (ICAI)

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The Eight Core Obligations Every Real Estate DNFBP Must Fulfil

Business Risk Assessment

Every real estate DNFBP must conduct a formal, entity-wide Business Risk Assessment (BRA) that identifies and evaluates the ML/TF/PF risks specific to its business model, client base, transaction types, and geographical exposure. This is not a one-time exercise. The BRA must be reviewed and updated to reflect changes in the business, the regulatory environment, and emerging sector risks.

In practice, we observe that many smaller brokerages either lack a BRA entirely or have adopted a template that does not reflect their actual risk profile. The guidance expects your BRA to genuinely build your policies and procedures.

Policies, Procedures, and Internal Controls

Your policies and procedures must address every stage of the client and transaction lifecycle: customer onboarding, identity verification, beneficial ownership identification, ongoing monitoring, suspicious transaction reporting, staff training, record keeping, and the appointment of a Compliance Officer. These must be documented, accessible to relevant staff, and reviewed regularly to remain current.

IN PRACTICE

One of the most common gaps we observe across the sector is the disconnect between written policies and operational practice. A policy that says ‘enhanced due diligence will be applied to all PEP-connected clients’ is meaningless unless your staff know what a PEP is, how to identify indirect PEP exposure, and what additional steps to take. Policy quality is tested at the transaction level, not the document level.

Customer Due Diligence and Ongoing Monitoring

CDD is the cornerstone of your compliance framework. It covers three levels of intensity: standard CDD, Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD), and Simplified Due Diligence (SDD), each applied based on the assessed risk level of the customer and transaction. EDD is mandatory for higher-risk scenarios, including PEPs, cross-border transactions presenting elevated ML/TF/PF risk, complex structures, and significant cash payments. SDD may only be applied where risk is demonstrably low and must be documented.

Ongoing monitoring is also required throughout the relationship and transaction lifecycle, not just at onboarding. This is a practical challenge in the real estate sector, where many engagements are transactional rather than ongoing, and the guidance acknowledges this. The focus, therefore, shifts to ensuring that CDD at the outset is thorough, complete, and proportionate to the risk.

Suspicious Transaction and Activity Reporting

When a real estate agent or broker has reasonable grounds to suspect that a transaction or activity involves money laundering, terrorist financing, or proliferation financing, they are legally required to submit a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) or Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) to the UAE Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). Critically, tipping off the customer, alerting them that a report has been or may be filed, is itself a criminal offence.

Governance and Oversight

A qualified, dedicated, and independent Compliance Officer (CO) must be appointed. This individual is responsible for the implementation of and adherence to the AML/CFT/CPF framework. Senior management holds ultimate accountability. The CO must have clear lines of reporting to senior management and must not be subordinate to commercial or business development functions that could create conflicts of interest.

Record Keeping

All records relating to customer identification, beneficial ownership verification, source of funds and wealth evidence, transaction details, CDD measures, risk assessments, internal escalations, and compliance decisions must be maintained for the period prescribed by UAE law. Records must be organised in a way that allows transactions to be fully reconstructed and made available to supervisory authorities on request.

Targeted Financial Sanctions (TFS) Compliance

Real estate firms must screen all customers, beneficial owners, and relevant counterparties against the UAE Terrorist Lists and the UN Security Council Consolidated Sanctions List before establishing a business relationship or executing any transaction. Screening must also be applied on an ongoing basis.

Where a confirmed or potential sanctions match is identified, the firm must follow applicable EOCN procedures, including internal escalation, freezing where required, and reporting to the Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN). Operational TFS procedures, including screening, freezing, and reporting timelines, are governed by Cabinet Decision No. (74) of 2020.

Firms should also refer to the EOCN Guidance on Counter Proliferation Financing for FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs, and the EOCN Guidance on Proliferation Financing Institutional Risk Assessment, to understand CPF obligations and incorporate proliferation financing risk into their Business Risk Assessment.

IMPORTANT

TFS compliance is not risk-based. It is absolute. The obligation to screen, freeze, and report applies regardless of the risk rating of the customer or transaction. Failure to screen is not merely an administrative weakness. It may expose the firm to serious regulatory, administrative, and legal consequences.

Training and Awareness

Relevant staff must receive regular, role-specific AML/CFT/CPF training. Generic once-a-year awareness sessions are not sufficient. Training programmes must be tailored to the real estate sector, cover emerging typologies, internal procedures, and reporting obligations, and be updated as the regulatory environment evolves. Front-line staff who interact with clients carry particular responsibility and must be equipped to recognise risk indicators in practice.

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The Five Sector-Critical Compliance Priorities

Ownership Transparency and Beneficial Ownership Verification

The MoET REAB Guidance stresses that agents and brokers must identify and verify the natural persons who ultimately own or control the property transaction, not just the entity or individual who appears at the front of the deal. Where a corporate vehicle, trust, foundation, or nominee arrangement is involved, the firm must look through the structure to identify the Ultimate Beneficial Owner (UBO).

In practice, this means obtaining corporate documents, including certificates of incorporation, shareholder registers, and director identification, and where structures are layered or multi-jurisdictional, applying enhanced scrutiny to understand the commercial rationale and verify control arrangements. Particular attention must be paid to nominee shareholders and directors, where a third party holds ownership or directorship on behalf of another person. Their presence is not inherently suspicious, but their role must be understood and documented.

In our experience reviewing client files across the sector, UBO documentation is often the weakest link. Firms collect the trading licence and the passport, and they stop there. But the MoET guidance asks for something more substantive: a genuine understanding of who controls the transaction, who benefits from it, and whether the structure around it makes commercial sense. That requires asking harder questions, and training your team to ask them.

Jyoti Maheshwari

Jyoti Maheshwari - Partner, NIYEAHMA Consultants LLP

Source of Funds and Source of Wealth Verification

For every real estate transaction, the MoET REAB Guidance requires the agent or broker to verify not only the immediate source of funds used in the deal, but also, in higher-risk scenarios, the broader source of the customer’s accumulated wealth. These are two distinct concepts that serve different purposes.

  • Source of Funds (SoF) refers to the specific funds being used in this transaction. Acceptable evidence includes bank statements, loan or finance agreements, proof of sale proceeds from a prior property, or income records.
  • Source of Wealth (SoW) refers to how the customer built their overall financial standing over time. This is required for higher-risk clients, including foreign PEPs, customers from high-risk jurisdictions, and those using complex structures.

Real estate agents and brokers should obtain sufficient documentation to form a credible and reasonable view of the funds’ legitimacy, and apply enhanced scrutiny where the explanation provided does not align with the customer’s known profile or the transaction value.

Risk-Based Monitoring Throughout the Transaction Lifecycle

One of the most practically significant aspects of the MoET REAB Guidance is its insistence that AML compliance does not end at onboarding. Agents and brokers are expected to monitor transactions and customer behaviour throughout the lifecycle of the deal, from initial engagement to completion and beyond, where a longer-term relationship exists.

Practical monitoring measures include reviewing payment arrangements for changes from what was originally agreed, monitoring for the introduction of third-party funders or unexplained new parties, checking for rapid resales or sudden changes in transaction value, and updating customer risk assessments when material new information emerges.

COMMON GAP WE OBSERVE

A transaction begins with a UAE-resident individual buyer paying by bank transfer. Three months later, closer to completion, the funds start arriving from a different account held by an offshore entity. This change in funding source is a material red flag. However, we regularly see cases where this shift goes unnoticed because the firm did not have a monitoring process in place post-onboarding. The guidance expects you to catch this.

Compliance Integration into Daily Operations

The MoET guidance is explicit that AML/CFT/CPF compliance must be embedded into the daily operations of the real estate business. It must not be treated as a separate, administrative burden that sits outside the commercial process. This means compliance checkpoints at every key stage of the transaction, clear escalation paths when a red flag is identified, and a Compliance Officer who is empowered to pause or decline a transaction when warranted.

The commercial pressure in real estate is real and intense. Agents are focused on closing deals, and that is understandable. But the guidance makes clear that commercial urgency cannot override compliance obligations. A client who withdraws the moment you ask for source of funds documentation is not a lost deal; they are a risk signal. Your team needs to be confident enough to act on that signal, and your governance structure needs to support them when they do.

Dipali Vora - Partner, NIYEAHMA Consultants LLP

Cooperation with Competent Authorities

Real estate agents and brokers play a direct role in supporting national efforts to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. The guidance identifies this as a distinct sector-critical obligation, not a passive by-product of other compliance work.

In practice, it requires maintaining clear, accessible, and accurate records that enable competent authorities to reconstruct transactions and trace ownership and funds when required.

It also requires timely and accurate filing of suspicious transaction reports to the UAE Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in accordance with applicable legal and regulatory requirements, and full cooperation with MoET and other supervisory or investigative authorities when information is requested.

Firms that treat record keeping and reporting as internal administrative tasks, rather than as obligations that serve an external investigative function, are likely to fall short of this expectation.

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Understanding Customer Due Diligence in Real Estate Practice

When the Business Relationship Is Established

In real estate, the business relationship is established at the earliest point of professional engagement. This includes signing a brokerage contract or listing agreement, receiving instructions to act on behalf of a client, beginning to arrange a purchase, sale, or lease, or receiving fees or commissions for a service. CDD must be completed before or at the time this relationship begins, and before any transaction is executed.

This is a critical point in practice. Many brokers wait until a deal is near completion before collecting CDD documentation. By that stage, commercial pressure is high, and incomplete documentation is far more likely to be overlooked. The MoET guidance expects CDD to be front-loaded, not deferred.

Standard CDD Requirements

For a standard-risk customer, CDD must include:

  1. Identification and verification of the customer using reliable and independent sources.
  2. Identification and verification of the Ultimate Beneficial Owner (UBO) of any corporate or legal entity involved in the transaction.
  3. Understanding the nature and purpose of the transaction.
  4. Verification of the source of funds for the transaction.
  5. Sanctions screening against the UAE Terrorist Lists and the UN Consolidated Sanctions List.
  6. PEP screening and, where appropriate, adverse media and open-source checks.

When Enhanced Due Diligence Is Mandatory

EDD is required, not optional, in the following scenarios:

  • The customer is a Politically Exposed Person (PEP) or has a close association with one.
  • The customer is connected to a high-risk jurisdiction as identified by FATF, the UAE NRA, or other authoritative sources.
  • The transaction involves a significant cash payment.
  • The transaction involves virtual assets or cryptocurrency.
  • Complex or layered ownership structures are present.
  • The source of funds or wealth is not clearly explained or documented.
  • Third-party payments are involved.
  • The transaction value is inconsistent with the customer’s known financial profile.

EDD involves obtaining additional information, deeper verification, and enhanced monitoring. It also requires senior management approval before proceeding with the relationship or transaction in many of these scenarios.

When Simplified Due Diligence May Apply

SDD may be applied only where the ML/TF/PF risk has been assessed and documented as demonstrably low. This is a narrow exception and must be supported by a clear rationale recorded in the customer file. It does not mean skipping CDD; it means applying it at a reduced level of intensity and documentation depth. SDD should not be applied where higher-risk indicators are present, including PEP exposure, high-risk jurisdiction links, significant cash payments, virtual asset involvement, complex ownership structures, or unclear source of funds or source of wealth.

Transaction Risk Matrix: A Practical Reference Guide

The following matrix is a practical reference tool developed by the AML UAE advisory team. It is not part of the official MoET guidance but reflects the risk-based approach the guidance requires. Firms should adapt this to their own risk appetite and documented policies.

Transaction / Customer Type ML/TF/PF Risk Level Minimum CDD Level Key Action Required
UAE resident individual, bank transfer, residential property below AED 2M Low to Medium Standard CDD Identity verification, source of funds confirmation
UAE resident individual, off-plan purchase, bank transfer Medium Standard CDD Identity, SOF, ongoing monitoring at payment milestones
Foreign national, residential property, bank transfer Medium to High Enhanced CDD Identity, SOF, SOW, purpose of purchase, country risk check
Corporate buyer, UAE-registered company, straightforward structure Medium Standard CDD + UBO UBO verification, corporate documents, SOF
Corporate buyer, offshore holding company, multi-jurisdictional structure High Enhanced CDD (EDD) Full UBO trace, legal structure map, SOF + SOW, senior approval
Politically Exposed Person (direct or indirect) High EDD mandatory Senior management sign-off, enhanced SOW, ongoing monitoring
Cash payment of AED 55,000 or more High EDD + REAR filing REAR mandatory, SOF evidence, cash justification
Virtual asset payment or conversion High EDD + REAR filing REAR mandatory, VA traceability, wallet ownership verification
Third-party payment (funds from account not in buyer’s name) High EDD Third-party relationship evidence, SOF for third party, escalation to CO
Rapid resale within 12 months of purchase High Enhanced monitoring Economic rationale, relationship check, STR consideration

NOTE

This matrix is a practical advisory tool developed by the AML UAE team based on the MoET REAB Guidance and our field experience. It is not a substitute for your firm’s own documented risk assessment methodology. Your Compliance Officer should tailor risk thresholds and CDD requirements to reflect your specific business model and client base.

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Red Flags in Real Estate: What to Watch For

The MoET REAB Guidance sets out an extensive list of red flag indicators across three categories: customer behaviour, transaction behaviour, and geographical risks. The guidance is explicit that a single red flag does not automatically mean a transaction is suspicious. This means that enhanced professional judgement and additional inquiry are required. Where multiple indicators are present, or where a red flag cannot be satisfactorily explained, escalation and potential STR filing are expected.

Customer Behaviour Red Flags

Identity and Ownership Concealment

  • The beneficial owner is obscured, or the client is reluctant to disclose true ownership.
  • Insistence on using intermediaries for all interactions without a legitimate explanation.
  • Refusal to provide identification documentation or requests to defer UBO verification until late in the process.
  • Use of shell companies, foreign entities, or complex structures that serve no apparent commercial purpose.
  • Attempts to bypass sanctions screening through frequent ownership changes or layered corporate structures.

Suspicious Behaviour and Lack of Transparency

  • Client refuses to cooperate with the source of funds enquiries.
  • Client avoids in-person meetings or direct interaction without a legitimate reason.
  • Sudden introduction of unknown third parties, especially lawyers or financial institutions, where such involvement is not typical for the transaction.
  • Repeated changes in the declared beneficial owner during the transaction lifecycle.
  • Client shows no interest in the property’s characteristics or is unconcerned with negotiating a fair price.
  • Client insists on completing a high-value transaction entirely in cash with no clear source of funds.

High-Risk Client Profiles

  • Foreign national with no established economic ties to the UAE and no clear legitimate purpose for the transaction.
  • The transaction is inconsistent with the client’s professional, educational, or socio-economic background.
  • Client or beneficial owner is a PEP or is linked to someone in a prominent public position.
  • Client or known associates appear on any targeted financial sanctions list.
  • Clients linked to sectors associated with dual-use goods, sensitive technologies, or sanctioned trade.

Transaction Behaviour Red Flags

Concealing the Source of Funds

  • Client cannot explain the source of funds, or the explanation is implausible or unsupported.
  • Transaction involves significant cash, bank drafts, cashier’s cheques, bearer instruments, or third-party cheques.
  • Part or all of the settlement is made in foreign currency with no valid business reason.
  • Escrow account is to be funded by a third party with no connection to the buyer.
  • Payments made to developers from accounts not held in the buyer’s name.

Unusual Transaction Patterns

  • Payments are intentionally split into smaller amounts to avoid detection, a practice known as structuring.
  • Multiple properties being bought, sold, or exchanged consecutively within a short period.
  • Purchase of multiple off-plan properties followed by early resale or assignment shortly after booking.
  • Rapid resale of a property within a short timeframe, particularly at a significantly different price.
  • Transaction value is materially higher or lower than market value without a credible explanation.
  • Repeated cancellations of off-plan purchases with refund requests to different accounts.
  • Requests to backdate contracts or alter transaction dates to predate sanctions designations.

Emerging Risks: Virtual Assets and Non-Traditional Payments

  • Client wishes to use cryptocurrency or digital assets to complete the transaction, particularly where the origin of the assets cannot be explained.
  • Property transactions conducted via blockchain or distributed ledger technology where counterparties, fund trails, or sources of funds are insufficiently verified.
  • Transactions where digital asset ownership is not supported by documentation and has no clear link to a legitimate source.
  • Client insists on alternative payment methods such as digital wallets, peer-to-peer platforms, or offshore transfers that are difficult to trace.

Geographical Risk Indicators

  • Funds received from a foreign country with no apparent connection to the client.
  • Funds originating from a low-tax offshore jurisdiction or a country identified as high-risk by FATF or UAE authorities.
  • Client requests that sale proceeds be sent to a high-risk jurisdiction or to a third party unconnected to the transaction.
  • Use of third parties or overseas accounts in high-risk jurisdictions to channel funds.

What to Do When You Identify a Red Flag

The guidance is clear about the expected response to red flags. The appointed Compliance Officer must assess the circumstances to determine whether the transaction is suspicious. The following steps reflect that expectation:

  • Document the red flag or combination of indicators in the client file.
  • Seek additional information or clarification from the client in a manner that does not constitute tipping off.
  • Escalate to the Compliance Officer for assessment and decision.
  • If suspicion cannot be resolved, submit an STR or SAR to the FIU without delay.
  • Do not inform the client that a report has been or may be filed.
  • Maintain all records of the assessment and decision taken.

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Real Estate Activity Reports (REAR): The Threshold-Based Reporting Obligation

One of the most practically significant and least well-understood obligations in the MoET REAB Guidance is the Real Estate Activity Report (REAR). This is a UAE-specific, mandatory threshold-based reporting mechanism. It is separate from, and additional to, the obligation to submit STRs or SARs when suspicion arises.

What Is a REAR and Why Does It Exist?

A REAR is a sector-specific report that real estate agents and brokers must file to declare relevant transactions and activities. Its purpose is to provide supervisory and financial intelligence authorities with visibility over significant real estate transactions that may not give rise to suspicion individually but warrant monitoring due to their value, payment method, or funding characteristics.

KEY POINT

REAR filing is not risk-dependent. You must file a REAR even where your CDD has been completed satisfactorily and no red flags have been identified. The obligation is triggered by the nature and value of the transaction, not by suspicion.

The Three REAR Triggers

A REAR must be filed for any of the following:

  • Purchase or sale of freehold property or real estate where the method of payment includes cash and the amount is AED 55,000 or more, whether in a single payment or across multiple payments.
  • Purchase or sale of freehold property or real estate where the method of payment is a virtual asset, for any portion or the entire property value.
  • Purchase or sale of freehold property or real estate where the funds used to carry out the transaction were converted from or to a virtual asset, for any portion or the entire property value.

What the AED 55,000 Cash Threshold Means in Practice

The threshold of AED 55,000 in cash payments applies in aggregate, not per payment. This means that if a client makes multiple cash payments across the course of a transaction that together reach or exceed AED 55,000, a REAR must be filed. Attempts to structure payments below the threshold to avoid filing constitute a red flag in themselves and may indicate deliberate evasion.

It is important to note that the REAR obligation covers freehold transactions. Agents and brokers should confirm the property type and payment structure at the point of onboarding and build REAR filing into their transaction processing workflow as a standard step, not an exception.

Virtual Assets and REAR

The inclusion of virtual asset transactions in the REAR trigger list reflects the UAE’s recognition that cryptocurrency and digital assets are increasingly present in real estate transactions. Where a client pays using virtual assets, or where the funds used have been converted to or from virtual assets at any point in the funding chain, a REAR must be filed regardless of the amount. This is a zero-threshold obligation for virtual asset involvement.

From a practical standpoint, this means that firms should ask, as part of their standard CDD process, whether any portion of the transaction funding involves or has involved virtual assets. The answer to that question determines both the REAR obligation and the appropriate level of due diligence.

When Both REAR and STR Are Required

Where a transaction meets the REAR threshold, and the agent or broker also has reasonable grounds for suspicion, both reporting obligations must be fulfilled. The REAR does not discharge the STR obligation, and the STR does not substitute for the REAR. Both must be filed through their respective channels in accordance with the applicable timelines and procedures.

Need Help with STR and REAR Filing Procedures?

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Common Compliance Gaps We Observe in UAE Real Estate Brokerages

The MoET REAB Guidance dedicates a specific section to common sectoral challenges. Based on our advisory work with real estate DNFBPs across the UAE, we recognise every one of them. The following reflects both what the guidance says and what we observe on the ground.

Fragmented Information Across Transaction Parties

Real estate transactions involve multiple parties, buyers, sellers, developers, agents, legal representatives, and financial institutions, each holding different pieces of information. No single party has the full picture. This fragmentation makes it difficult to consolidate and verify all the information needed for a complete CDD file. The solution is a structured onboarding framework that defines what information must be collected, from whom, and at what stage of the transaction.

Inadequate Beneficial Ownership Tracing

Collecting a trading licence and a passport is not the same as verifying beneficial ownership. For corporate clients, firms must trace the ownership chain to identify the ultimate natural persons who own or control the entity. Where structures are multi-layered or offshore, this requires obtaining corporate documents from each layer of the structure and understanding the rationale for the arrangement.

BEST PRACTICE

Implement a UBO declaration form as a standard part of your onboarding pack for all corporate clients. This form asks the client to declare the ownership and control structure and to identify the ultimate beneficial owners. Pair this with independent verification through public registries, corporate registrar searches, or third-party due diligence providers. Documentation of both the declaration and your verification steps must be retained in the client file.

Inconsistent Application of Risk-Based Measures

In firms with multiple agents, CDD quality often varies significantly from one agent to another. Some apply enhanced due diligence rigorously; others treat it as a box-ticking exercise. This inconsistency is a systemic risk. The solution is a standardised, documented risk assessment methodology applied at the entity level, supported by regular file reviews and internal testing to ensure consistent application.

Commercial Pressure and Deferred Compliance

Time-sensitive deals create pressure to defer or expedite compliance steps. A client who is keen to close quickly, or who hints that they will take their business elsewhere if the process is too slow, may not be simply impatient. The guidance notes this pattern explicitly. Firms whose compliance culture does not empower agents to hold the line on CDD requirements are vulnerable to exactly the kind of risk the guidance is designed to prevent.

Record Keeping Gaps

Incomplete records, documents stored in email threads, WhatsApp messages, or personal drives, and an inability to reconstruct the rationale for compliance decisions are common findings during supervisory inspections. Firms should maintain a centralised, structured client file for every transaction that includes all CDD documents, risk assessments, screening results, and any internal escalations or decisions taken. Digital document management tools need not be expensive; they need to be consistent.

Misunderstanding of REAR Obligations

Many real estate firms are not aware of the REAR filing obligation, or believe it only applies to high-value or suspicious transactions. As the guidance emphasises, it is a threshold-based obligation that applies regardless of risk. Building REAR filing into your transaction completion checklist, alongside contract signing and commission processing, is the most reliable way to ensure compliance.

Ten Case Studies: ML/TF/PF Risk in Real Estate Transactions

The MoET guidance includes ten illustrative case studies drawn from the UAE real estate sector. We summarise each below, along with the key compliance lesson from our perspective as AML practitioners.

Case Study 1: Layered Offshore Ownership

A UAE holding company owned by two foreign entities in separate jurisdictions purchases a high-value residential property. Minor ownership changes occur close to completion, explained as internal restructuring. The lack of a clear link between the corporate structure and the specific property, combined with last-minute changes and pressure to complete quickly, is the key red flag. The lesson: UBO verification must go beyond the UAE entity and trace through the offshore layers. Changes in ownership structure during a transaction must be treated as a new CDD event.

Case Study 2: Indirect PEP Exposure

A locally registered company purchases multiple off-plan properties. A silent shareholder is later identified as a close relative of a senior public official in a high-risk foreign jurisdiction. The client downplays the relevance. The lesson: PEP exposure is not limited to direct PEPs. Close associates and family members of PEPs require EDD. The attempt to minimise the connection is itself a risk indicator.

Case Study 3: Virtual Asset Conversion

A foreign resident purchases a luxury villa using funds converted from virtual assets at a UAE exchange house. Documentation is fragmented and relies on screenshots. The lesson: Virtual asset-sourced funds require enhanced scrutiny and independent verification. Fragmented documentation is not sufficient. REAR filing is mandatory, and STR consideration is required where the audit trail cannot be adequately established.

Case Study 4: Repeated Property Flipping

A property is bought and sold multiple times between apparently unrelated parties within a short period, with prices fluctuating without market justification. Shared contact details and advisors are noticed over time. The lesson: Transaction patterns must be assessed holistically, not in isolation. Repeated involvement of the same intermediaries across different deals, even under different buyer or seller names, is a significant indicator of potential layering.

Case Study 5: Third-Party Family Funding

A UAE resident declares personal savings as the source of funds, but escrow payments are later made by a family-owned company based abroad. Governance arrangements are informal. The lesson: Third-party funding, even from family entities, requires verification of the relationship between the buyer and the payer, and evidence of the funding source at the level of the third party, not just the declared buyer.

Case Study 6: Sanctions Exposure through Jurisdictional Links

A luxury property sale involves a buyer who proposes splitting payments across multiple jurisdictions and a seller whose representative requests proceeds be sent to different accounts in tranches. The agreed price is above market value. The lesson: Structuring of payments on both sides of a transaction, combined with multi-jurisdictional flows and above-market pricing, creates a strong indicator of layering. Each element may be individually explicable; taken together, they require escalation.

Case Study 7: Successive Transactions on the Same Property

A villa is sold within 12 months of acquisition and then sold again shortly after at a higher value, with the same service provider introducing each new buyer through different legal entities. No significant renovations occurred between sales. The lesson: Economic rationale for successive transactions must be established. The same intermediary appearing across multiple deals involving the same property is a pattern that warrants holistic assessment and enhanced monitoring.

Case Study 8: Sequential Transactions Involving Legal Representatives

A high-net-worth individual purchases a luxury waterfront property through a legal representative holding a broad power of attorney. Shortly before completion, the purchasing entity is substituted with a new offshore company, and the funding source shifts to a foreign account. Post-completion, the property is pledged as collateral in a private lending arrangement. The lesson: Late substitution of purchasing entities and changes in funding source during a transaction must trigger immediate reassessment. Post-transaction use of property as collateral in opaque arrangements is also a monitoring concern.

Case Study 9: Gradual Change in Buyer Profile

A UAE trading company purchases multiple off-plan units. Over the course of construction, ownership amendments are requested, and payments begin arriving from related entities and overseas accounts. The client says ownership will be regularised after handover. The lesson: Gradual changes across a long transaction lifecycle can collectively indicate concealment, even when each individual change appears commercially reasonable. Ongoing monitoring must capture the cumulative picture.

Case Study 10: Informal Third-Party Funding

A foreign national purchases a high-value property using multiple third-party transfers from different jurisdictions, described as family loans or personal arrangements. Formal documentation is refused as unnecessary. The purchase is followed immediately by a long-term residency application. The lesson: Informal funding arrangements, particularly across multiple jurisdictions, cannot be accepted without adequate documentation. The link between property purchase and residency incentives is an additional risk indicator that must be considered.

Want Scenario-Based AML Training Using Real UAE Case Studies?

Our training programmes for real estate teams use UAE-specific case studies, including the typologies in the MoET guidance, to build practical risk recognition skills.

The AML UAE Practical Compliance Checklist for Real Estate DNFBPs

The following compliance checklist has been developed by the AML UAE advisory team as a practical reference tool for real estate DNFBPs. It reflects the obligations set out in the MoET REAB Guidance and is organised by compliance area. It is not a substitute for your firm’s own documented AML/CFT/CPF programme.

# Compliance Requirement
1 Business Risk Assessment (BRA) completed, documented, and approved by senior management.
2 BRA reviewed and updated at least annually or when significant business changes occur.
3 AML/CFT/CPF Policy document in place, referencing Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025.
4 Dedicated, qualified, and independent Compliance Officer appointed with a formal mandate.
5 CO has clear reporting lines to senior management and is empowered to pause or decline transactions.
6 Customer onboarding process includes a documented risk assessment for every client and transaction.
7 Standard CDD checklist in place covering identity verification, UBO identification, SOF confirmation, and sanctions screening.
8 EDD procedure documented and applied to all high-risk clients including PEPs, high-risk jurisdiction clients, complex structures, and cash or virtual asset transactions.
9 UBO declaration form used for all corporate, trust, or foundation clients.
10 Sanctions screening conducted against UAE Terrorist Lists and UNSC Consolidated Sanctions List before onboarding and on an ongoing basis.
11 Adverse media and PEP screening conducted at onboarding and periodically throughout the relationship.
12 Ongoing monitoring process in place to detect changes in funding source, ownership, or transaction structure post-onboarding.
13 Internal escalation pathway defined: who to escalate to, when, and how.
14 STR/SAR filing process documented and all staff aware of the obligation and the tipping-off prohibition.
15 REAR filing process embedded into the transaction completion workflow, triggered by cash payments of AED 55,000 or more or any virtual asset involvement.
16 Records retention policy in place covering all CDD documents, transaction records, risk assessments, and compliance decisions.
17 Records stored in a centralised, structured, and retrievable format.
18 Annual AML/CFT/CPF training programme in place for all relevant staff, with role-specific content for front-line agents.
19 Training records maintained showing completion dates and content covered.
20 Internal compliance review or file testing conducted at least annually to assess policy adherence in practice.

FAQs on REAB Guidance

Who does the MoET Supplemental Guidance for Real Estate Agents and Brokers apply to?

It applies to all real estate agents and brokers, and to the management and employees of those entities, operating anywhere in the UAE including the mainland, Comprehensive Free Zones, and Financial Free Zones. It covers any agent or broker who concludes or facilitates transactions relating to the purchase or sale of real estate on behalf of a customer.

An STR (Suspicious Transaction Report) or SAR (Suspicious Activity Report) is filed when you have reasonable grounds to suspect that a transaction involves money laundering, terrorist financing, or proliferation financing. It is suspicion-based. A REAR (Real Estate Activity Report) is filed when a transaction meets specific thresholds, namely cash payments of AED 55,000 or more or any virtual asset involvement, regardless of whether suspicion exists. Both may be required for the same transaction.

Yes. Even smaller firms and sole-proprietor brokerages must allocate responsibility for the compliance function to a competent person. In a small entity, this may be the owner or a senior person, provided the role is clearly documented, conflicts of interest are identified and managed, and the person is genuinely empowered to act on compliance concerns. External advisory support is permitted and can supplement the internal function.

Potentially, but only where you have conducted and documented a risk assessment that clearly supports a low ML/TF/PF risk conclusion. Even for low-risk clients, basic identity verification and source of funds confirmation are still required. SDD reduces the depth and intensity of verification, not the obligation to verify. Any SDD decision must be documented in the client file.

At a minimum, a standard CDD file should include: a copy of the customer’s valid government-issued photo ID; for corporate clients, incorporation documents, shareholder register, and UBO declaration; source of funds confirmation with supporting documentation; a completed sanctions and PEP screening record; a documented risk assessment for the client and transaction; and a record of any ongoing monitoring actions taken.

A client’s refusal or inability to explain the source of their funds is itself a significant red flag. You should not proceed with the transaction and should escalate to your Compliance Officer. Depending on the circumstances, an STR may need to be filed with the FIU. You must not inform the client that you are considering or have filed a report. The client’s withdrawal from the transaction following your enquiry should also be documented.

No. The REAR obligation as set out in the MoET REAB Guidance applies specifically to the purchase and sale of freehold property where cash payments of AED 55,000 or more are involved, or where virtual assets are used. Rental transactions are not currently within the REAR trigger scope, though agents and brokers must still apply appropriate CDD and STR obligations to all their activities as DNFBPs.

The obligation to report applies regardless of whether a transaction is completed, attempted, or discontinued. If you identify reasonable grounds for suspicion after completion, you are still required to file an STR or SAR with the FIU. You should document the basis for your suspicion, the timeline of your discovery, and all steps taken. Retrospective reporting does not protect a firm from regulatory scrutiny if the indicators were or should have been apparent during the transaction.

Ready to Build a Fully Compliant AML Programme for Your Real Estate Business?

AML UAE offers end-to-end AML/CFT/CPF compliance support for real estate agents and brokers across the UAE. From Business Risk Assessments and CDD policy design to Compliance Officer support and staff training, we are with you at every step.

Conclusion: What the MoET REAB Guidance Means for Your Business

The MoET Supplemental Guidance for Real Estate Agents and Brokers is not a theoretical document. It is a detailed, practical framework that reflects the UAE’s commitment to maintaining a transparent, well-governed real estate market that cannot be exploited for financial crime. The legal obligations explained through the guidance, from BRA and CDD through to REAR filing and ongoing monitoring, are enforceable under the UAE AML/CFT/CPF framework, and supervisory authorities are likely to assess implementation with reference to this guidance.

For real estate firms, the guidance presents an opportunity as much as an obligation. A well-structured AML/CFT/CPF programme protects your business from regulatory action, strengthens your professional reputation, and enables you to engage with institutional clients, developers, and international investors who expect strong compliance standards from their counterparties.

The key messages from the guidance, and from our experience working with real estate DNFBPs across the UAE, are straightforward:

  • Know your client fully, not just at the surface level.
  • Trace beneficial ownership beyond the entity you are dealing with directly.
  • Verify source of funds and, where required, source of wealth with proper documentation.
  • Build monitoring into your transaction process, not just your onboarding.
  • File your REARs. They are mandatory, not discretionary.
  • Empower your Compliance Officer. Give them the mandate, the resources, and the support of senior management.
  • Train your team regularly, with content that reflects real scenarios from the UAE real estate sector.
  • Document everything. Your compliance posture is only as strong as your paper trail.

The UAE’s real estate sector is a world-class investment destination. Protecting its integrity is a shared responsibility, and real estate agents and brokers sit at the heart of that effort.

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About the Author

Pathik Shah

FCA, CAMS, CISA, CS, DISA (ICAI), FAFP (ICAI)

Pathik is an ACAMS-certified AML consultant specialising in governance, risk, and compliance for regulated entities in the UAE. He brings over 28 years of experience, with 1,000+ hours of AML training and 200+ advisory engagements across DNFBPs, VASPs, and FIs. He supports businesses in aligning with AML/CFT requirements from the CBUAE, DFSA, MoET, MoJ, VARA, CMA, FSRA, and FATF. Known for translating complex regulations into audit-ready procedures, Pathik enables operational clarity and compliance readiness.

Reach Out to Pathik

AML Regulations for Commercial Gaming Operators in UAE

Blogs

Last Updated: 04/29/2026

Table of Contents

Protect your business with reliable and effective AML strategies with AML UAE.

Key Highlights

In-scope status: Commercial gaming operators brought into the AML perimeter as a DNFBP activity under Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025, Article (3) Item 1.

Activity trigger: Single or linked financial transactions equal to or above AED 11,000. Pure gaming chips or gaming instruments do not count as a financial transaction.

Supervisory authority: General Commercial Gaming Regulatory Authority (GCGRA), the sole AML/CFT supervisor for the sector.

Primary federal law: Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 on Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Proliferation Financing.

Cross-sector baseline: Beneficial owner regime under Cabinet Decision No. (109) of 2023 and terrorist/PF sanctions regime under Cabinet Decision No. (74) of 2020.

Administrative penalties: AED 10,000 to AED 5,000,000 per violation under Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025, Article (17), plus warning, suspension, prohibition and licence revocation.

Record-keeping period: At least five years for transactions, identification documents, correspondence and analyses under Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025, Article (25).

Sector policy reference: Policy Paper on Commercial Gaming (2025) issued by the General Secretariat of the National AML/CFT Policies Committee.

Regulatory posture: Emerging niche sector; UAE ML/TF National Risk Assessment 2024 notes it was not separately evaluated as no entities were licensed at the time of assessment.

Definition

A commercial gaming operator in the UAE is a licensee of the General Commercial Gaming Regulatory Authority authorised to offer commercial games for value, and is subject to AML obligations once a single transaction, or linked transactions, equal or exceed AED 11,000.

Scope Note

This page is a forward-looking, sector-specific guide to AML regulations for commercial gaming operators in UAE. It focuses on how the federal AML framework, the overarching sanctions and proliferation financing guidance, the National Risk Assessment and the 2025 Commercial Gaming Policy Paper combine to shape compliance expectations for licensees of the General Commercial Gaming Regulatory Authority. 

The AML regulations for commercial gaming operators in UAE sit at the intersection of a well-established federal AML framework and a brand-new sector. Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 expanded the list of Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) to explicitly include commercial gaming operators, and the General Commercial Gaming Regulatory Authority (GCGRA) has been set up as the sole sector supervisor for AML and counter-financing of terrorism purposes. Licensees therefore have to implement the full suite of DNFBP obligations from day one, even though the sector has no operational history to draw on within the UAE.

This guide explains how AML regulations for commercial gaming operators in UAE are structured, who the supervisory authority is, and which federal laws, cross-sector guidance documents, risk assessments and sector-specific policy papers apply. It is the commercial gaming spoke of our DNFBPs pillar and sits within the broader AML Laws in UAE hub. Read it alongside our Federal AML laws and executive regulations page for the baseline legal text.

Who Counts as a Commercial Gaming Operator for AML Purposes in UAE?

AML regulations for commercial gaming operators in UAE apply to any operator of commercial games whose activity crosses the AED 11,000 trigger set out in Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025. Article (3) Item (1) of the Executive Regulations lists, among the categories of DNFBPs, “Commercial Gaming Operators, including Commercial Gaming conducted on board vessels or marine craft, when conducting a single financial transaction or several transactions that appear to be linked and whose value equals or exceeds eleven thousand dirhams (AED 11,000). A financial transaction shall not include a transaction that solely involves gaming chips or gaming instruments”.

Three features of this definition matter for the AML perimeter. First, it is activity-based; the obligation is triggered by transaction value. Second, it covers on-board operations on vessels or marine craft, keeping offshore setups inside the DNFBP perimeter. Third, it carves out pure chip or gaming-instrument transactions; those are treated as internal gaming mechanics rather than financial transactions for AML purposes. Every AED 11,000 equivalent cash-in, cash-out, wire transfer, e-wallet load or redemption does trigger customer due diligence, record-keeping and reporting obligations.

Who is in scope

Four tests every commercial gaming operator in the UAE has to apply before onboarding a patron.

1. Activity test: operator of commercial games

2. Location test: mainland UAE or UAE-flagged vessel

3. Threshold test: single or linked transactions at or above AED 11,000

4. Carve-out: pure chip or gaming instrument movements

1. Licensed commercial gaming operators

Entities licensed by the General Commercial Gaming Regulatory Authority to conduct commercial games in mainland UAE. Article (3) Item (1) of Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 places them squarely within the DNFBP perimeter.

2. On-board commercial gaming on vessels and marine craft

The DNFBP definition specifically extends to commercial gaming conducted on board vessels or marine craft. Operators cannot avoid AML obligations by moving activity offshore while remaining within UAE jurisdiction.

3. Activity that hits AED 11,000 single or linked transactions

The AED 11,000 trigger is applied on a single transaction, or several transactions that appear to be linked. Operators must have rules to aggregate same-patron activity across sessions, accounts, payment methods and time windows.

4. Transactions outside the AML perimeter

Transactions that solely involve gaming chips or gaming instruments are not financial transactions for AML purposes under Article (3) Item (1). Internal chip movements remain a risk indicator but do not by themselves trigger CDD.

Key legal hook

The DNFBP definition in Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 is the single legal hook that makes AML regulations for commercial gaming operators in UAE mandatory. Every downstream control, from CDD to reporting, flows from that designation.

Need a DNFBP gap assessment built for commercial gaming?

AML UAE supports GCGRA licensees with DNFBP scope reviews, enterprise risk assessments and AML programme design tailored to commercial gaming models.

AML Supervisory Authority for Commercial Gaming Operators in UAE

The AML supervisory authority for commercial gaming operators in UAE is the General Commercial Gaming Regulatory Authority. Paragraph 234 of the UAE ML/TF National Risk Assessment 2024 records that the authority was established in September 2023, and paragraph 241 treats its creation as a prudent step in anticipating commercial gaming activity. Because there were no licensed entities at the time of the National Risk Assessment, paragraph 234 also notes that the sector was not separately evaluated. GCGRA is therefore the first and only AML/CFT supervisor for commercial gaming in the UAE, with no overlap with the Ministry of Economy DNFBP supervision covered elsewhere in the DNFBPs cluster.

GCGRA’s role in AML supervision draws on the general competencies of a Supervisory Authority set out in Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025. Article (16) of the Decree-Law requires each Supervisory Authority to assess ML/TF risks in its sector, supervise financial institutions and DNFBPs under its jurisdiction, provide guidance, impose administrative penalties and maintain statistics. For commercial gaming the authority has expressed those competencies through the 2025 Commercial Gaming Policy Paper and ongoing licensing conditions.

What GCGRA does as AML/CFT supervisor

The General Commercial Gaming Regulatory Authority exercises the standard Supervisory Authority powers under Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025, applied to a sector-specific risk profile.

1. Sector risk assessment

2. Licensing and fit-and-proper controls

3. AML/CFT supervision and inspection

4. Policy, guidance and typologies

5. Administrative penalties

6. Coordination with FIU and EOCN

1. Sole AML supervisor for commercial gaming

GCGRA is the only federal body designated to supervise commercial gaming operators for AML/CFT in the UAE. This avoids the overlap seen in other DNFBP sectors where Ministry of Economy supervision runs alongside free zone regulators.

2. Supervisory competencies under Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025

Article (16) of Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 sets out the competencies of a Supervisory Authority, including assessing ML/TF risks, conducting AML/CFT supervision, issuing guidance, imposing administrative penalties and maintaining statistics. GCGRA exercises these powers for commercial gaming.

3. Coordination with the FIU

The Financial Intelligence Unit within the Central Bank, established under Article (11) of Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025, remains the sole recipient of suspicious transaction reports via the goAML system. GCGRA supervises the reporting culture; it does not receive STRs directly.

4. Coordination with EOCN on sanctions

The Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation issues and updates the Targeted Financial Sanctions regime. GCGRA expects commercial gaming operators to screen against the UAE Local Terrorist List and UN Security Council Consolidated List in accordance with Cabinet Decision No. (74) of 2020.

Supervisory context

Because commercial gaming has no UAE operating history and no licensed population at the time of the 2024 National Risk Assessment, GCGRA’s early supervisory approach relies heavily on the 2025 Commercial Gaming Policy Paper and cross-sector overarching guidance rather than sector-specific typologies.

Planning your GCGRA AML programme?

Our team helps commercial gaming licensees stand up AML governance, ERA, CDD workflows, sanctions screening and MLRO frameworks that map to GCGRA expectations.

AML Regulations Applicable to Commercial Gaming Operators in UAE

AML regulations for commercial gaming operators in UAE combine four layers of source material. Federal laws and executive regulations form the mandatory baseline; overarching sanctions, proliferation financing and typology guidance add cross-sector expectations; the UAE National Risk Assessment sets country-level context; and the 2025 Commercial Gaming Policy Paper provides sector-specific direction. This page captures all four layers so that GCGRA licensees can see the full compliance perimeter in one place.

The four layers of AML rules that apply to commercial gaming

Read them as a stack: federal laws create the obligation, overarching guidance fills in the sanctions and proliferation financing detail, and sector documents translate them into gaming-specific controls.

1. Federal AML laws and executive regulations

2. Overarching AML, TFS and PF guidance

3. National Risk Assessment 2024

4. Sector-specific Commercial Gaming Policy Paper 2025

Federal AML Laws and Executive Regulations Applicable to Commercial Gaming Operators

Federal laws and executive regulations are the mandatory AML baseline for commercial gaming operators in the UAE. The Decree-Law and its Executive Regulations establish obligations on customer due diligence, beneficial owner identification, suspicious transaction reporting, record-keeping, sanctions compliance and administrative penalties. The terrorism, beneficial owner and penalty frameworks complete the picture.

Federal AML laws and executive regulations at a glance

Six mandatory federal instruments underpin AML regulations for commercial gaming operators in UAE.

1. Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025

2. Federal Law No. (7) of 2014

3. Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025

4. Cabinet Decision No. (74) of 2020

5. Cabinet Decision No. (109) of 2023

6. Cabinet Resolution No. (132) of 2023

1. Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025 Regarding Anti-Money Laundering, and Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing

2025
Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 on Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Proliferation Financing
Issued by: UAE Federal Government

The primary federal AML law. It defines the money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing offences; establishes the Financial Intelligence Unit at the Central Bank under Article (11); sets out Supervisory Authority competencies under Article (16); requires reporting of suspicious transactions under Article (18); and imposes criminal and administrative penalties, with administrative fines ranging from AED 10,000 to AED 5,000,000 per violation under Article (17).

Key citation: Articles (11), (16), (17), (18) and (28) to (35).

2. Federal Law No. (7) of 2014 Combating Terrorism Crimes

2014
Federal Law No. (7) of 2014 Combating Terrorism Crimes
Issued by: UAE Federal Government

Sets the substantive terrorism offences that sit behind the terrorist financing offence in Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025. For gaming operators it matters because CDD, sanctions screening and STR obligations all anchor in whether a patron or counterparty is connected to terrorism offences defined in this law.

Key citation: Definitions of terrorist act, terrorist offence and terrorist organisation.

3. Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 Concerning the Executive Regulations of Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025

2025
Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 (Executive Regulations of the AML Decree-Law)
Issued by: UAE Cabinet

The operational rulebook for the AML Decree-Law. It lists the DNFBPs (including commercial gaming operators with the AED 11,000 trigger) under Article (3); sets the risk assessment obligation in Article (5); details CDD and beneficial owner identification in Articles (6) to (10); requires PEP handling in Article (16); mandates STR reporting and non-disclosure in Articles (17) to (19); governs third-party reliance in Article (20); demands internal policies and training in Article (21); requires appointment of a Compliance Officer in Article (22); addresses high-risk countries in Article (23); covers new technologies in Article (24); and sets the minimum five-year record-keeping period in Article (25).

Key citation: Article (3) Item (1) is the DNFBP entry for commercial gaming; AED 11,000 threshold and chip carve-out.

4. Cabinet Decision No. (74) of 2020 Regarding Terrorism Lists Regulation and Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions on the Suppression and Combating of Terrorism, Terrorist Financing, Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related resolutions

2020
Cabinet Decision No. (74) of 2020 on Terrorism Lists and UN Sanctions
Issued by: UAE Cabinet

The core targeted financial sanctions instrument. It governs the UAE Local Terrorist List and the implementation of UN Security Council Consolidated Lists on terrorism, terrorist financing and proliferation financing. Commercial gaming operators must screen patrons and counterparties against these lists, freeze assets without delay and report matches to the Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation.

Key citation: Freezing without delay, reporting to the Executive Office, and implementation of UN resolutions.

5. Cabinet Decision No. (109) of 2023 on Regulating the Beneficial Owner Procedures

2023
Cabinet Decision No. (109) of 2023 on Regulating the Beneficial Owner Procedures
Issued by: UAE Cabinet

The beneficial owner regime applicable to legal persons in the UAE. Commercial gaming operators that are legal persons must maintain and file beneficial owner and real beneficiary registers in line with this decision, update them on change, and provide the data to the Registrar and competent authorities as required.

Key citation: Obligation to maintain and disclose Real Beneficiary and Shareholder registers; 25 per cent ownership/control test.

6. Cabinet Resolution No. (132) of 2023 Concerning Administrative Penalties for Violations of Cabinet Resolution No. (109) of 2023 on the Regulation of Beneficial Owner Procedures

2023
Cabinet Resolution No. (132) of 2023 on Administrative Penalties for Beneficial Owner Violations
Issued by: UAE Cabinet

Sets graduated administrative penalties for failures to maintain and disclose beneficial owner information under Cabinet Decision No. (109) of 2023. Commercial gaming operators should treat beneficial owner breaches as material, not procedural, given the penalty structure.

Key citation: Written warning, financial penalty and suspension of activities for repeated or serious breaches.

Decoding the federal AML stack for your gaming licence?

We translate Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 into practical policies, risk matrices and monitoring rules calibrated to commercial gaming.

Overarching AML Guidance Applicable to Commercial Gaming Operators in the UAE

Overarching guidance extends the federal baseline with cross-sector expectations on targeted financial sanctions, proliferation financing, terrorist financing red flags, virtual asset provider risks and practical supervisory conduct. Each document is valid until specifically repealed; where it was issued under the prior AML law, it continues to apply to the extent consistent with Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025.

Overarching AML guidance at a glance

Thirteen cross-sector guidance documents that commercial gaming operators must read into their own AML programme.

1. EOCN TFS Guidance (2026)

2. FIU TF Strategic Analysis (2025)

3. TFS Case Studies Review (2024)

4. PF Institutional Risk Assessment Guidance (2023)

5. Terrorist and PF Red Flags (2023)

6. Unlicensed VASP Joint Guidance (2023)

7. Counter Proliferation Financing Guidance (2022)

8. Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory Practice (2021)

9. TFS Typology Paper (2021)

10. Guideline on Grievance Procedures

11. Online Grievance System User Guide

12. Combating PF and Sanctions Evasion

13. NAS Subscription Simple Guide

1. Guidance on Targeted Financial Sanctions for Financial Institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs – March 2026 

March 2026 
Guidance on Targeted Financial Sanctions for FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs 
Issued by: Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) 

The consolidated EOCN guidance on implementing targeted financial sanctions. It explains freezing without delay, rejection and reporting obligations, the role of the UAE Local Terrorist List and UN Consolidated List, registration for the Notification Alert System, and expectations on screening, governance and testing. Commercial gaming operators must build their sanctions programme to this document. 

Key citation: Freezing without delay; NAS registration; screening at onboarding and on list updates. 

2. FIU’s Strategic Analysis Report on Terrorist Financing – May 2025 

May 2025 
FIU Strategic Analysis Report on Terrorist Financing 
Issued by: UAE Financial Intelligence Unit 

Sets out the FIU’s strategic view of terrorist financing typologies, red flags and reporting patterns in the UAE. Gaming operators should feed this into transaction monitoring rules, EDD triggers and training, particularly for high-risk jurisdiction patronage and cash-heavy activity. 

Key citation: Strategic TF typologies and red flags relevant to patron profiling. 

3. Strategic Review on Targeted Financial Sanctions Case Studies – April 2024 

April 2024 (IEC-SR.01.22 series) 
Strategic Review on Targeted Financial Sanctions Case Studies 
Issued by: Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) 

Case-study based review of TFS implementation practice, covering asset-freezing failures, partial matches, false positives and typologies of evasion. Useful for gaming operators when calibrating screening thresholds and name-matching logic. 

Key citation: Sanctions evasion typologies and screening quality expectations. 

4. Proliferation Finance Institutional Risk Assessment Guidance for FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs – December 2023 

December 2023 
Proliferation Finance Institutional Risk Assessment Guidance 
Issued by: Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) 

Walks firms through conducting a proliferation financing institutional risk assessment. Commercial gaming operators should use it to build their own PF IRA, covering country, customer, product, channel and transaction risks, and linking conclusions to controls. 

Key citation: Five-factor PF IRA framework and control linkage. 

5. Terrorist and Proliferation Financing Red Flags Guidance – December 2023 

December 2023 
Terrorist and Proliferation Financing Red Flags Guidance 
Issued by: Supervisory Authority Sub-Committee 

A practical catalogue of red flag indicators for terrorist financing and proliferation financing, covering customer behaviour, transaction patterns, geographies and document anomalies. Directly usable as monitoring rule inputs for commercial gaming. 

Key citation: Red flag catalogue for TF and PF. 

6. Joint Guidance on Combating the Use of Unlicensed Virtual Asset Providers in the UAE – November 2023 

March 2022, updated 2023 
Joint Guidance on Combating the Use of Unlicensed Virtual Asset Providers 
Issued by: Joint issuance by UAE supervisory authorities 

Warns supervised firms against dealing with or enabling unlicensed virtual asset service providers. Relevant for gaming operators that consider VA payment rails, token integrations or patrons whose source of funds includes virtual assets. 

Key citation: No dealings with unlicensed VASPs; risk-based screening of VA payment flows. 

7. Guidance on Counter Proliferation Financing for FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs – November 2022 

March 2022 
Guidance on Counter Proliferation Financing 
Issued by: Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) 

Core PF typology and controls guidance, covering dual-use goods, front companies, trade-based PF and sanctions evasion. Commercial gaming operators use it primarily for PF EDD scenarios and to support their PF IRA. 

Key citation: PF typologies and control expectations for DNFBPs. 

8. Joint Guidance – Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory Practice – June 2021 

June 2021 
Joint Guidance on Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory Practice 
Issued by: Joint issuance by UAE supervisory authorities 

Contrasts satisfactory versus unsatisfactory AML practice across governance, CDD, EDD, monitoring, reporting, sanctions and training. Provides a useful supervisory lens for gaming operators benchmarking their controls during mobilisation. 

Key citation: Satisfactory vs unsatisfactory AML practice examples. 

9. Typologies on the Circumvention of Targeted Sanctions against Terrorism and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction – March 2021 

March 2021 
TFS Typology Paper 
Issued by: Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) 

Typology paper on how designated persons and entities attempt to circumvent targeted financial sanctions. Gaming operators use it to shape red flag scenarios, EDD questionnaires and internal training. 

Key citation: Sanctions evasion typologies. 

10. Guideline on Grievance Procedures 

Updated periodically 
Guideline on Grievance Procedures 
Issued by: Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) 

Explains the delisting and grievance process for persons subject to targeted financial sanctions. Relevant when a patron contests a listing or a freeze; operators must route such grievances through the prescribed procedure rather than adjusting controls unilaterally. 

Key citation: Formal grievance and delisting workflow. 

11. Online Grievance System User Guide 

Updated periodically 
Online Grievance System User Guide 
Issued by: Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) 

Practical user guide to the EOCN online grievance platform. Supports the formal delisting procedure with step-by-step instructions that compliance teams can reference when handling patron grievances. 

Key citation: Online grievance submission flow. 

12. Combating Proliferation Financing and Sanctions Evasion 

Updated periodically 
Combating Proliferation Financing and Sanctions Evasion 
Issued by: Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) 

Companion document to the PF guidance that deepens the discussion of sanctions evasion tactics and the regulatory expectation that DNFBPs integrate PF controls into their AML programmes. 

Key citation: Sanctions evasion detection and PF programme integration. 

13. Simple Guide to Subscribe to the EOCN Notification Alert System (NAS) 

Updated periodically 
NAS Subscription Simple Guide 
Issued by: Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) 

Step-by-step guide for DNFBPs to register for the EOCN Notification Alert System so that they receive list updates without delay. Subscription to NAS is the operational foundation of freezing without delay under Cabinet Decision No. (74) of 2020. 

Key citation: NAS registration underpins the freezing without delay obligation. 

Bring the overarching guidance into your sanctions and PF playbooks

We turn EOCN TFS, PF and typology guidance into concrete screening rules, PF IRAs and freezing playbooks that survive supervisory inspection.

NRA, SRA and Other Important Guidelines Applicable to Commercial Gaming Operators

The UAE’s National Risk Assessment is the country-level evidence base that supervisors, DNFBPs and financial institutions draw on for their enterprise risk assessments. For commercial gaming operators, it is also the document that explicitly acknowledges that their sector had no licensed population at the point of assessment, and that GCGRA was only recently formed.

UAE ML/TF National Risk Assessment – 2024 

2024 
UAE ML/TF National Risk Assessment 
Issued by: Executive Office of Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism 

Country-level assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing risks, threats, vulnerabilities and controls across sectors. Paragraph 234 records that GCGRA was introduced in September 2023 and that the commercial gaming sector was not evaluated because there were no licensed entities at the time. Paragraph 235 flags the need to develop a robust regulatory and supervisory framework aligned with FATF expectations. Paragraph 241 treats GCGRA’s establishment as a prudent step. 

Key citation: Paragraphs 234, 235 and 241 on commercial gaming and GCGRA. 

Sector-Specific Guidelines Applicable to Commercial Gaming Operators in UAE

The sector-specific guidance for commercial gaming operators in UAE is the 2025 Commercial Gaming Policy Paper. It sits below the federal law and the overarching guidance, and translates them into controls that match the ML/TF risk profile of commercial gaming. 

Policy Paper – Commercial Gaming Policy (2025) 

2025 
Policy Paper on Commercial Gaming 
Issued by: General Secretariat of the National AML/CFT Policies Committee (GSNAMLCFTPC) 

The founding sector paper for commercial gaming AML/CFT in the UAE. It identifies the key ML/TF risks for the sector (anonymous transactions, exploitation of player accounts, use of third-party payments, foreign jurisdiction patronage, multiple payment methods, casino value instruments, VIP programmes, employee complicity and cash usage); designates GCGRA as the sole AML/CFT supervisor; and sets out a requirements table covering governance, institutional risk assessment, patron risk classification, PDD at the AED 11,000 threshold, EDD for high-risk categories, record-keeping of at least five years, MLRO appointment, suspicious activity reporting, sanctions screening and technical controls including ISO 27001 alignment and vulnerability assessment and penetration testing. 

Key citation: Nine ML/TF sector risks; AML requirements table across governance, CDD, EDD, reporting and technical controls. 

Operationalise the 2025 Commercial Gaming Policy Paper

AML UAE helps GCGRA licensees convert the sector paper into a documented AML programme, sanctions framework, PDD/EDD workflows and technical control baseline.

Conclusion

The AML regulations for commercial gaming operators in UAE are mature on paper and new in practice. The perimeter is set by Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025, the controls are anchored in Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025, the sanctions and proliferation financing backbone is provided by Cabinet Decision No. (74) of 2020 and the EOCN guidance suite, and the sector-specific translation is delivered by the 2025 Commercial Gaming Policy Paper. GCGRA is the sole AML/CFT supervisor for the sector and is expected to adopt a risk-based supervisory approach as licensees go live.

For the first wave of GCGRA licensees, the practical compliance priorities are clear: build an enterprise risk assessment that takes the nine sector risks in the 2025 Policy Paper; stand up a DNFBP-grade CDD programme keyed to the AED 11,000 trigger; hard-wire sanctions screening and freezing without delay using NAS; integrate PF controls from the outset; appoint a Compliance Officer and MLRO under Article (22) of Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025; and maintain records for at least five years under Article (25). Getting these right from day one will matter more than any retrospective remediation once supervision intensifies.

FAQs on AML Regulations for Commercial Gaming Operators in UAE

Are commercial gaming operators covered by UAE AML law?

Yes. Commercial gaming operators are covered under UAE AML law. Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025, Article (3) Item (1) places them within the DNFBP perimeter once a single transaction or linked transactions reach AED 11,000. Transactions that involve only gaming chips or gaming instruments are not treated as financial transactions for this purpose.

Licensed commercial gaming operators must comply with the full DNFBP obligation set under Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025, including CDD, EDD, sanctions screening, STR reporting and five-year record-keeping.

The General Commercial Gaming Regulatory Authority (GCGRA) is the sole AML/CFT supervisor for commercial gaming operators in the UAE. The UAE ML/TF National Risk Assessment 2024 (paragraph 234) confirms that the authority was established in September 2023.

GCGRA exercises the Supervisory Authority competencies set out in Article 16 of Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025, coordinates with the FIU at the Central Bank for STRs and with the Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation on targeted financial sanctions.

A commercial gaming operator should start with six controls, all traceable to Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 and the 2025 Commercial Gaming Policy Paper: an enterprise risk assessment under Article (5); CDD and beneficial owner identification under Articles (6) to (10); PEP handling under Article (16); sanctions screening under Cabinet Decision No. (74) of 2020; STR filing via goAML under Articles (17) to (19); and record-keeping under Article (25).

These should be supported by the appointment of a Compliance Officer under Article (22), written internal policies under Article (21), training, and technical controls aligned with the 2025 Commercial Gaming Policy Paper’s ISO 27001 and VAPT expectations.

Source of funds and source of wealth checks flow from Articles (6) to (10) and Article (16) of Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025, supported by the 2025 Commercial Gaming Policy Paper’s treatment of patron risk and EDD. At onboarding, the operator collects and verifies funding information proportionate to patron risk; for higher-risk patrons, PEPs or those from higher-risk jurisdictions, enhanced evidence is required.

Ongoing source of funds review should be triggered by threshold breaches, unusual patterns, matches against EOCN and UN lists, and red flags drawn from the Terrorist and PF Red Flags Guidance of December 2023 and the FIU’s May 2025 Strategic Analysis Report on Terrorist Financing.

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Disclaimer : This article is general regulatory commentary prepared by Pathik Shah for amluae.com. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. UAE AML laws and guidance are updated regularly; always consult the primary texts on uaelegislation.gov.ae, the EOCN, the UAE FIU and the General Commercial Gaming Regulatory Authority, and take tailored legal or compliance advice before acting.

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About the Author

Pathik Shah

FCA, CAMS, CISA, CS, DISA (ICAI), FAFP (ICAI)

Pathik is an ACAMS-certified AML consultant specialising in governance, risk, and compliance for regulated entities in the UAE. He brings over 28 years of experience, with 1,000+ hours of AML training and 200+ advisory engagements across DNFBPs, VASPs, and FIs. He supports businesses in aligning with AML/CFT requirements from the CBUAE, DFSA, MoET, MoJ, VARA, CMA, FSRA, and FATF. Known for translating complex regulations into audit-ready procedures, Pathik enables operational clarity and compliance readiness.

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History of AML Regulations in UAE

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Last Updated: 05/04/2026

Table of Contents

Protect your business with reliable and effective AML strategies with AML UAE.

AT A GLANCE: UAE AML Legislative Timeline

Current Primary Law: Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025, entered force October 2025 (Article 42)

Current Executive Regulation: Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025 , replaces Cabinet Resolution No. 10 of 2019

Counter-Terrorism Law: Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 , remains in force alongside Law 10/2025

Targeted Financial Sanctions: Cabinet Resolution No. 74 of 2020 , without-delay asset freeze obligation (Article 15); 24-hour standard per Executive Office guidance

Beneficial Ownership Rules: Cabinet Resolution No. 109 of 2023 , 25% threshold; 60-day register deadline (Art. 8)

DNFBP Penalty Schedule: Cabinet Resolution No. 71 of 2024 , fines AED 50,000 to AED 1,000,000 (schedule, 41 violations)

Financial Intelligence Unit: Receives and analyses SAR/STR

ML Criminal Penalty: 1-10 years + AED 100,000-5,000,000; aggravated AED 1M-10M (Article 26, Law 10/2025)

FT Criminal Penalty: Life imprisonment or 10+ years + AED 1,000,000-10,000,000 (Article 26, Law 10/2025)

Legal Person ML/FT/PF Fine: AED 5,000,000-100,000,000 (Article 27, Law 10/2025)

Predecessor Primary Law: Federal Decree-Law No. 20 of 2018 , repealed by Article 41 of Law 10/2025

What Are UAE AML Regulations?

UAE AML regulations are the body of federal laws, cabinet resolutions, and supervisory guidance that require financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) to detect, prevent, and report money laundering and terrorism financing.

History of AML Regulations in UAE

The history of AML regulations in UAE is a story of progressive legal reform, shaped by the country’s position as a global financial hub and by successive rounds of international standard-setting from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the United Nations Security Council. This article traces the principal federal instruments that have defined the UAE’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CFT) framework, examining what each law introduced, what it repealed, and how the regulated population and supervisory architecture evolved over time.

The focus of this page is historical and chronological. For a detailed explanation of current compliance obligations, please see Federal AML Laws and Executive Regulations in the UAE. For guidance on which entities must comply, see Who Must Comply with UAE AML Regulations. Primary legislation is available via the UAE Legislation Portal and the National Anti-Money Laundering Committee website.

Note: Scope of This Page

This page covers the chronological legislative history of UAE AML/CFT regulation. It does not cover: (1) current compliance obligations in detail , see the Federal AML Laws page; (2) which entities must comply , see the Who Must Comply page; or (3) sector-specific requirements , see the relevant sector articles. The boundary between this page and the Federal AML Laws page is historical context versus current obligation.

History of AML Regulations in UAE

1. Why AML Became Important

The UAE’s economic role, FATF pressure, and the shift to preventive compliance

2. How the Framework Evolved

Law-by-law analysis of seven key federal instruments from 2014 to 2025

3. Conclusion

Key themes and what the 2025 reforms signal for practitioners

4. FAQs

Seven frequently asked questions answered from primary legal sources

Why AML Regulations Became Important in the UAE

The UAE’s commitment to combating money laundering and terrorism financing reflects both domestic economic priorities and obligations under international law. Three interlocking factors explain why the country developed one of the most comprehensive AML/CFT legislative frameworks in the region.

Why AML Regulations Became Important in the UAE

1. The UAE as a Global Hub

How the country’s financial and trade position creates AML risk and responsibility

2. The Global Push

UN Security Council resolutions, FATF standards, and international treaty obligations

3. From Crime Control to Prevention

The shift from post-facto criminalisation to risk-based preventive compliance

The UAE's Role as a Global Financial, Trade, and Investment Hub

The UAE is a natural crossroads between East and West. Dubai and Abu Dhabi host major international financial centres, one of the world’s highest-volume trade corridors, and a real estate market that attracts substantial cross-border capital. This economic openness is a strategic asset and a regulatory responsibility. A jurisdiction that processes high volumes of capital, provides financial infrastructure for regional commerce, and attracts significant foreign investment must maintain robust controls to prevent those systems from being exploited for illicit purposes.

Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 acknowledges this reality in its preamble, stating that the legislation is issued in fulfilment of the State’s international obligations and national commitments to protect the integrity of its financial system. The territorial scope set out in Article 2 of the law, which extends to acts committed outside the country where they affect UAE interests or financial institutions, reflects the need to police cross-border flows as well as domestic ones.

The breadth of the sectors brought within the UAE AML framework further illustrates the point. Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025 identifies fourteen categories of financial institution activity in Article 2, six categories of virtual asset service provider activity in Article 4, and a range of designated non-financial businesses and professions in Article 3, from commercial gaming operators to real estate brokers and trust and company service providers. This comprehensive scope maps directly onto the sectors most commonly exploited for illicit financial flows in a highly internationalised economy.

The Global Push for Stronger Anti-Money Laundering Frameworks

The preamble of Cabinet Resolution No. 74 of 2020, which establishes the UAE’s targeted financial sanctions framework, references five UN Security Council Resolutions explicitly: Resolution 1267 (1999), establishing the Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions regime; Resolutions 1988 and 1989 (both 2011), which separated and refined those regimes; Resolution 1718 (2006), addressing North Korea’s weapons programme; and Resolution 2231 (2015), concerning Iran’s nuclear activities. The obligation to implement these resolutions without delay is encoded in Article 15 of Cabinet Resolution No. 74 of 2020, which requires asset freezes to be effected within 24 hours of a designation or notification.

The FATF Recommendations form the overarching international standard to which the UAE’s legislative framework must conform. Cabinet Resolution No. 109 of 2023 references Federal Decree-Law No. 20 of 2018 and Cabinet Resolution No. 10 of 2019. Cabinet Resolution No. 71 of 2024 references Cabinet Resolution No. 16 of 2021 before repealing it. Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 expressly repeals Law 20 of 2018 in Article 41, completing the most recent reform cycle.

The institutional architecture created by Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 reflects these international obligations. Article 12 establishes a Supreme Committee for supervising the national AML/CFT strategy. Article 13 establishes the National Committee for Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, charged with coordinating strategy across supervisory authorities. Article 11 embeds the Financial Intelligence Unit within the Central Bank of the UAE, providing the operational infrastructure for the exchange of financial intelligence with foreign counterparts and for the reporting and analysis of suspicious transactions

The Move from Crime Control to Preventive Compliance

A reading of the instruments examined in this article reveals a clear direction of travel: from reactive criminalisation to proactive, risk-based prevention. Federal Law No. 7 of 2014, the oldest instrument discussed here, is principally a criminal statute concerned with terrorism and terrorism financing as offences. Its primary remedies are penal: imprisonment and fines following the commission of a crime, as set out in Articles 29 and 34 of that law.

The instruments from 2020 onwards are primarily preventive. Cabinet Resolution No. 74 of 2020 mandates active screening of customer databases against UN and national sanctions lists and requires institutions to freeze assets before a transaction is completed, an obligation that applies even where no criminal investigation has been opened. Cabinet Resolution No. 109 of 2023 moves further upstream, requiring legal persons to identify and register their real beneficiaries as an ongoing disclosure obligation aimed at eliminating corporate anonymity before any financial transaction is in question.

Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025 complete this transition. Article 19 of Law 10/2025 imposes preventive measures obligations on financial institutions, DNFBPs, and VASPs as ongoing compliance requirements, independent of any specific transaction or suspicious activity. Article 17 empowers supervisory authorities to impose administrative penalties of AED 10,000 to AED 5,000,000 for compliance failures alone, meaning that inadequate internal controls, poor record-keeping, or failure to appoint a compliance officer are themselves punishable, whether or not any money laundering has occurred.

Need guidance on current AML obligations?

This article covers legislative history. For an explanation of what the law requires today, read our guide to Federal AML Laws and Executive Regulations in the UAE.

How the UAE AML Framework has evolved in Substance

The following section examines seven federal instruments in order of their issuance date, most recent first. For each instrument, it sets out the date of issue, the primary purpose, the key provisions, and what the instrument repealed or replaced. All article references are to the specific instruments cited and are traceable to the source legislation texts held in the UAE legislation repository.

How the UAE AML Framework has evolved in Substance

1. Law 10/2025 (October 2025)

Current primary AML statute; repeals Law 20/2018; embeds FIU in CBUAE; new criminal penalties

2. CR 134/2025 (December 2025)

Executive regulation for Law 10/2025; replaces CR 10/2019; introduces VASP and commercial gaming categories

3. CR 71/2024 (July 2024)

DNFBP penalty schedule for MoJ/MoET-supervised entities; 41 violations; fines up to AED 1,000,000

4. CR 109/2023 (November 2023)

Real beneficiary procedures; 25% threshold; 60-day register deadline; replaces CR 58/2020

5. CR 132/2023 (December 2023)

Administrative penalties for CR 109/2023 violations; graduated fines; licence suspension on third offence

6. CR 74/2020 (October 2020)

TFS implementation; UN sanctions screening; 24-hour freeze obligation; replaces CR 20/2019

7. Federal Law 7/2014

Counter-terrorism law; terrorism financing offences; life imprisonment for promotion of terrorism

2025

Primary Law

Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025

Repeals Law 20/2018. Embeds FIU in CBUAE. Introduces FIU suspension and freeze powers. Broad criminal and administrative penalty framework.

2025

Exec. Regulation

Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025

Executive regulation for Law 10/2025. Introduces commercial gaming and VASP categories. Sets CDD thresholds. Replaces CR 10/2019.

2024

DNFBP Penalties

Cabinet Resolution No. 71 of 2024

41 violations; fines AED 50,000-1,000,000. Doubling for repeat offences. Replaces CR 16/2021.

2023

Beneficial Owner

Cabinet Resolution No. 109 of 2023

Real beneficiary register; 25% threshold; 60-day deadline. Replaces CR 58/2020.

2023

UBO Penalties

Cabinet Resolution No. 132 of 2023

Administrative penalties for CR 109/2023 violations. Graduated fines; licence suspension on third offence. Replaces CR 53/2021.

2020

Sanctions/TFS

Cabinet Resolution No. 74 of 2020

Implements UN UNSC Res. 1267, 1718, 1988, 1989, 2231. 24-hour freeze obligation. Replaces CR 20/2019.

2014

Counter-Terrorism

Federal Law No. 7 of 2014

Foundational counter-terrorism and TF statute. Life imprisonment for terrorism financing promotion. Remains in force alongside Law 10/2025.

Federal Decree Law No. 10 of 2025, October 2025

Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Illegal Organisations is the UAE’s current primary AML legislation. Issued on 30 September 2025, it entered into force two weeks after publication in the Official Gazette, per Article 42. The law supersedes Federal Decree-Law No. 20 of 2018, which it expressly repeals under Article 41, whilst preserving circulars, resolutions, and supervisory guidance issued under the repealed law where they do not conflict with the new legislation.

Article 2 defines money laundering as the conversion, transfer, deposit, or acquisition of proceeds with the intent to conceal their illicit origin or to assist in evading criminal liability. Article 3 defines terrorism financing. Article 4 extends criminal liability to legal persons alongside natural persons, meaning that companies, institutions, and other corporate entities face prosecution under the law in addition to the individuals acting on their behalf.

The institutional architecture introduced by Law 10/2025 has three principal elements. Article 11 formally embeds and strengthens the Financial Intelligence Unit within the Central Bank of the UAE (CBUAE). The FIU had operated under the previous Law 20/2018, and the 2025 legislation reinforces its mandate and expands its powers. Article 11 grants the FIU authority to receive and analyse suspicious transaction reports and to disseminate intelligence to competent authorities. Article 12 establishes the Supreme Committee for supervising the national AML/CFT strategy. Article 13 establishes the National Committee for Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, charged with coordinating the national strategy and monitoring its implementation across supervisory authorities.

A significant new power introduced by the 2025 law is Article 5, which gives the FIU the authority to order a cessation of any suspicious activity for a period of up to ten working days, and to impose a freeze on related assets for up to thirty days pending referral to the competent authority. This places the FIU in an active protective role rather than a purely analytical one.

Criminal penalties are set out in Article 26. Money laundering carries one to ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of AED 100,000 to AED 5,000,000; aggravated cases attract a fine of AED 1,000,000 to AED 10,000,000. Financing of terrorism carries life imprisonment or not less than ten years, plus a fine of AED 1,000,000 to AED 10,000,000. Legal persons face fines of AED 5,000,000 to AED 100,000,000 under Article 27. Violations of suspicious transaction reporting obligations carry imprisonment and a fine of AED 100,000 to AED 1,000,000 under Article 28. Tipping off, disclosing a report or investigation to the subject, carries a fine of at least AED 50,000 under Article 29. Supervisory authorities are empowered by Article 17 to impose administrative penalties of AED 10,000 to AED 5,000,000 for compliance failures. For the full obligations framework under the current law, see Federal AML Laws and Executive Regulations in the UAE.

Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025, December 2025

Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025 is the executive regulation of Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025. It provides the operational detail required to convert the primary law’s principles into specific procedural requirements and threshold obligations for supervised entities. Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025 replaces Cabinet Resolution No. 10 of 2019, which had served as the executive regulation for the repealed Law 20 of 2018.

Article 1 introduces a number of defined terms not previously present in UAE AML legislation, including Commercial Gaming, Trust Protector, and Nominator, categories that reflect the expanding scope of the framework under international standards. Article 2 sets out fourteen categories of financial institution activity subject to the AML/CFT framework, providing a comprehensive definition of the population of regulated financial entities. Article 4 identifies six categories of virtual asset service provider activity, bringing VASPs comprehensively within the supervised population under this legislative instrument for the first time.

Article 3 defines DNFBP obligations with specific transaction thresholds. Commercial gaming operations trigger CDD obligations at AED 11,000. Dealers in precious metals and precious stones must apply CDD for occasional transactions of AED 55,000 or more. For financial institutions, Article 7 sets CDD trigger thresholds at AED 55,000 for occasional transactions and AED 3,500 for wire transfers; VASPs are subject to the same AED 3,500 wire transfer threshold. Beneficial ownership identification under Article 10 uses a threshold of 25 per cent shareholding or voting rights.

The Resolution also contains detailed provisions on CDD timing under Article 6, risk identification under Article 5, and the conditions under which entities may commence a business relationship before verification is complete under a risk-based approach. Taken together, Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025 and Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 constitute the complete 2025 legislative architecture governing AML/CFT compliance in the UAE.

Unsure whether your business is in scope?

Our guide to who must comply with UAE AML regulations sets out the complete list of regulated entity categories and the obligations that apply to each.

Cabinet Resolution No. (71) of 2024, July 2024

Cabinet Resolution No. 71 of 2024 was issued on 8 July 2024. It regulates violations and administrative penalties applicable to designated non-financial businesses and professions that fall under the supervisory oversight of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Economy (MoET). The Resolution’s scope of application, defined in Article 2, covers all DNFBPs under Ministry oversight who violate any provision of the AML Decree-Law, the executive regulation, or any implementing resolutions.

Article 3 empowers the Ministry to impose one or more of the administrative penalties available under Article 14 of the Decree-Law, to impose the administrative fines specified in the schedule annexed to the Resolution, or both, upon commission of any violation listed in that schedule. The schedule lists 41 violation categories. Fines range from AED 50,000 to AED 1,000,000. Selected examples from the schedule include: failure to establish policies and internal controls approved by senior management (AED 100,000-200,000, violation 1); failure to undertake required customer due diligence for transactions at or above AED 55,000 (AED 50,000-200,000, violation 9); failure to report suspicious transactions promptly to the Financial Intelligence Unit (AED 100,000-500,000, violation 22); and failure to freeze funds without prior notice upon a sanctions match (AED 500,000-1,000,000, violation 35).

Article 5 of Cabinet Resolution No. 71 of 2024 provides that the Ministry may double the administrative fine where a violation is repeated. Article 5, clause 3, further provides that imposition of a fine does not prevent the Ministry from also applying any other administrative sanction available under Article 14 of the primary Decree-Law. Cabinet Resolution No. 71 of 2024 repeals Cabinet Resolution No. 16 of 2021 under Article 8, updating the DNFBP penalty regime with a more detailed and higher-ceiling structure.

Cabinet Decision No. (109) of 2023, November 2023

Cabinet Resolution No. 109 of 2023, issued on 6 November 2023, establishes a comprehensive framework for identifying, recording, and disclosing the real beneficiaries of legal persons licensed or registered in the UAE. The Resolution aims to eliminate anonymity from corporate ownership structures, which the FATF has consistently identified as a primary vehicle for money laundering and terrorism financing. Cabinet Resolution No. 109 of 2023 repeals Cabinet Resolution No. 58 of 2020, which had established the earlier real beneficiary framework, under Article 22.

Article 5 defines the real beneficiary of a legal person as the natural person who owns or ultimately controls it through direct or indirect shareholding of 25 per cent or more of the capital, through voting rights of 25 per cent or more, or through the exercise of ultimate control by other means, including the right to appoint or remove the majority of board members. The Resolution establishes a cascading determination method: if no qualifying shareholder can be identified, the natural person exercising control through other means is treated as the real beneficiary; if no such person can be identified, the person holding the most senior management position is deemed the real beneficiary (Article 5, clause 6).

The procedural obligations are set out in Articles 8 to 11. Article 8 requires every legal person to establish and maintain a Real Beneficiary Register within 60 days of the Resolution’s implementation (or from the date of licensing, for newly established entities). Updates to the register must be made within 15 days of any change. A separate Partners or Shareholders Register must be maintained under Article 10, with the same update timeline. Article 11 obliges legal persons to submit the data in both registers to the relevant Registrar within the same 60-day period and to take reasonable measures to preserve these records from damage or loss. The Registrar is required under Article 13 to apply a risk-based approach to registered entities to ensure they are not misused for money laundering and terrorism financing.

Article 3 of the Resolution excludes companies wholly owned by the federal or local government, financial free zones, and entities with a government partner from the scope of the beneficial ownership disclosure obligations. This exemption reflects the different transparency and accountability mechanisms applicable to state-owned or government-linked entities.

Cabinet Resolution No. (132) of 2023, December 2023

Cabinet Resolution No. 132 of 2023, issued on 15 December 2023, sets out the administrative penalty regime for violations of Cabinet Resolution No. 109 of 2023. It gives the real beneficiary disclosure framework its enforcement mechanism and repeals Cabinet Resolution No. 53 of 2021 under Article 8. The Resolution applies to legal persons licensed or registered in the UAE, including in non-financial free zones, that violate the provisions of Cabinet Resolution No. 109 of 2023.

The penalty schedule annexed to the Resolution covers 15 categories of violations related to the real beneficiary and shareholder register obligations. The structure is graduated: a written notice requiring correction within a specified period on the first occurrence, escalating to a monetary fine on the second occurrence, and a higher fine on the third occurrence. Article 3, clause 2, grants the Registrar an additional power on the third offence: suspension of the violating entity’s commercial licence and closure of its commercial premises, pending payment of the fine and correction of the violation.

Fines under the schedule range from AED 5,000 (second-time failure to disclose the details of shares issued in the names of board members, per Article 11/6 of Cabinet Resolution No. 109 of 2023) to AED 100,000 (third-time failure to create and maintain a Real Beneficiary Register at all, per Article 8/1 of Cabinet Resolution No. 109 of 2023). Failure by a liquidator to maintain records for five years after dissolution of a legal person carries a flat fine of AED 100,000 on first occurrence (violation 15, citing Article 11/8 of Cabinet Resolution No. 109 of 2023). Article 4 of Cabinet Resolution No. 132 of 2023 reserves to the Cabinet the power to amend the fine amounts by addition, deletion, or amendment.

Cabinet Resolution No. (74) of 2020, October 2020

Cabinet Resolution No. 74 of 2020 establishes the UAE’s framework for implementing targeted financial sanctions (TFS) and administering terrorist designation lists. It gives domestic legal effect to a series of UN Security Council Resolutions: 1267 (1999) and its successors 1988 and 1989 (both 2011), which govern the Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions regimes respectively; 1718 (2006), which addresses North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programme; and 2231 (2015), which concerns Iran’s nuclear activities. Cabinet Resolution No. 74 of 2020 replaces Cabinet Resolution No. 20 of 2019.

Article 3 of the Resolution sets out the functions of the Supreme Council for National Security in relation to local terrorist lists, including the procedures for nomination, addition, amendment, and de-listing of designated persons and entities. Article 15 is the operational core: it requires all financial institutions, DNFBPs, and other obligated entities to freeze, without prior notice or delay, the funds and other assets of any person or entity appearing on the UN Consolidated List or the national terrorist list, as soon as they become aware of a match. The phrase ‘without delay’ in Article 15 does not specify a time period in the Resolution’s text; the 24-hour operational standard for effecting a freeze is set out in guidance published by the Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation, which supervises compliance with the targeted financial sanctions regime.

The administrative consequence of failing to comply with the TFS obligations of Cabinet Resolution No. 74 of 2020 is captured in Cabinet Resolution No. 71 of 2024, which lists violations 33 to 41 in its schedule as explicitly referencing the 2020 Resolution. Relevant violations include: failure to register with the Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (AED 50,000-1,000,000, violation 33); failure to screen databases against designated lists on an ongoing basis (AED 50,000-1,000,000, violation 34); failure to freeze matched funds without prior warning (AED 500,000-1,000,000, violation 35); and failure to report promptly to the Executive Office upon determining any match (AED 100,000-1,000,000, violation 38).

Federal Law No. (7) of 2014 Combating Terrorism Crimes

Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 Concerning Combating Terrorism Crimes and their Financing is the foundational counter-terrorism statute in the UAE. It was enacted before the current AML primary law and continues in force alongside Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025, which preserves prior legislation not specifically repealed or contradicted (Article 41 of Law 10/2025). Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 establishes the criminal framework within which terrorism financing is prosecuted, distinct from the AML framework established by Law 10/2025.

The law defines a range of key concepts, including terrorist crimes, terrorist purposes, terrorist consequences, and terrorist organisations. Article 5 addresses the seizure of vehicles and transport used in the commission of terrorist operations, carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Article 29 addresses the direct and indirect financing of terrorism, providing for life imprisonment or a term of not less than ten years for persons convicted of terrorism financing offences. Article 34 criminalises the promotion of terrorist organisations, activities, and ideology, imposing a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine ranging from AED 2,000,000 to AED 5,000,000.

The practical significance of Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 for financial institutions and DNFBPs is that it defines the predicate criminal conduct against which their AML/CFT controls must be calibrated. The obligation under Article 18 of Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 to report suspicion of terrorism financing to the Financial Intelligence Unit operates in conjunction with the criminal offences established in Federal Law No. 7 of 2014. A compliance programme that correctly identifies and reports indicators of terrorism financing is, in effect, providing intelligence relevant to enforcement under both instruments simultaneously.

Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 remains the primary legal basis for terrorism-related prosecutions in the UAE alongside Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025. Its persistence in the legislative framework, even as the AML primary law was replaced in its entirety in 2025, reflects the UAE’s commitment to maintaining a stable and comprehensive counter-terrorism legal framework as a foundation for the preventive compliance obligations layered on top of it.

Speak to an AML compliance specialist

AML UAE provides practical compliance guidance and advisory services tailored to the UAE regulatory framework. Whether you are a financial institution, DNFBP, or VASP, our specialists can help you navigate your obligations under the 2025 legislative framework.

Conclusion

The seven instruments examined in this article trace a coherent legislative trajectory. Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 established the criminal framework for terrorism and terrorism financing. Cabinet Resolution No. 74 of 2020 operationalised international sanctions obligations, introducing a real-time screening and freeze regime. Cabinet Resolutions No. 109 and No. 132 of 2023 addressed the transparency gap in corporate ownership by mandating beneficial ownership registers and attaching a penalty framework. Cabinet Resolution No. 71 of 2024 updated the DNFBP administrative penalty schedule, raising fine ceilings and introducing a doubling mechanism for repeat violations. Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025 completed the current reform cycle, consolidating and updating the entire framework and bringing virtual assets and commercial gaming fully within the regulated population. 

Three themes emerge from this history. First, the shift from crime control to prevention: the framework has moved steadily away from post-facto criminalisation towards ongoing, risk-based obligations that attach before any suspicious activity occurs. Second, the broadening of the regulated population: from banks and financial institutions in the early framework, through DNFBPs and real estate brokers, to virtual asset service providers and commercial gaming operators under the 2025 legislation. Third, the deepening of international alignment: each legislative update has been driven at least in part by FATF standards and UN Security Council obligations, a dynamic that will continue to generate further reform as international standards evolve. 

For practitioners, the key starting points are the primary law and its executive regulation: Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025. For a guide to current compliance obligations, see Federal AML Laws and Executive Regulations in the UAE. For the full list of regulated entities, see Who Must Comply with UAE AML Regulations. The National Anti-Money Laundering Committee website publishes regulatory guidance and updates as they are issued. 

Status of Key Legislative Instruments

The table below sets out the current status of each instrument discussed in this article, whether it remains in force, has been replaced, or has been repealed. Practitioners should confirm the current position against the UAE Legislation Portal before relying on any instrument for compliance purposes.

Instrument Status Notes 
Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 In Force Current primary AML/CFT statute. In force from October 2025 (Article 42). 
Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025 In Force Current executive regulation for Law 10/2025. Replaces CR 10/2019.
Cabinet Resolution No. 71 of 2024 In Force Current DNFBP administrative penalty schedule. Replaces CR 16/2021.
Cabinet Resolution No. 109 of 2023 In Force Current real beneficiary framework. Replaces CR 58/2020.
Cabinet Resolution No. 132 of 2023 In Force Penalty schedule for CR 109/2023 violations. Replaces CR 53/2021.
Cabinet Resolution No. 74 of 2020 In Force TFS and sanctions framework. Replaces CR 20/2019. Not repealed by 2025 law.
Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 In Force Counter-terrorism statute. Preserved by Article 41 of Law 10/2025.
Federal Decree-Law No. 20 of 2018 Repealed Repealed by Article 41 of Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025.
Cabinet Resolution No. 10 of 2019 ReplacedExecutive regulation for Law 20/2018. Replaced by CR 134/2025. 
Cabinet Resolution No. 16 of 2021 Replaced Prior DNFBP penalty schedule. Replaced by CR 71/2024 (Article 8).
Cabinet Resolution No. 58 of 2020 Replaced Prior real beneficiary framework. Replaced by CR 109/2023 (Article 22).
Cabinet Resolution No. 53 of 2021 Replaced Prior penalty schedule for UBO violations. Replaced by CR 132/2023 (Article 8).
Cabinet Resolution No. 20 of 2019 Replaced Prior TFS framework. Replaced by CR 74/2020.

Frequently Asked Questions

When did the UAE first introduce AML regulations?

The UAE has maintained a formal AML legislative framework for more than two decades. The most recent iteration of the primary AML statute, Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025, expressly repeals Federal Decree-Law No. 20 of 2018 under Article 41, which was the immediately preceding primary AML law. The preambles of Cabinet Resolutions 109/2023, 71/2024, and 134/2025 each reference Law 20 of 2018 and its executive regulation, Cabinet Resolution No. 10 of 2019, as the predecessor instruments they build upon or replace. The seven instruments examined in this article cover the period from 2014 to 2025, representing the modern, internationally aligned phase of UAE AML regulation.

Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 is the current primary AML/CFT legislation. Article 41 repeals Federal Decree-Law No. 20 of 2018 and any provision that contradicts the new law. However, the same article preserves circulars, resolutions, and decisions issued under the 2018 law to the extent they do not conflict with the 2025 statute or its executive regulation, Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025. This means that supervisory guidance, sector-specific circulars, and administrative decisions issued by the CBUAE, CMA, and other supervisory authorities under the old framework generally remain valid, unless a specific conflict exists with the new legislation. Practitioners should review each item of existing guidance against the new law to confirm its continued applicability.

Frequent legislative updates reflect two primary pressures: evolving international standards and expanding domestic risk categories. The FATF Recommendations are reviewed periodically, and member jurisdictions are expected to align their laws accordingly. The preambles of Cabinet Resolutions 74/2020, 109/2023, 71/2024, and others reference and supersede the instruments that preceded them, illustrating the iterative nature of reform. New risk categories, virtual assets, commercial gaming, trust arrangements, and complex corporate structures require specific legislative responses as they grow in economic significance. The governance architecture of Law 10/2025, including the National Committee under Article 13 and the Supreme Committee under Article 12, is designed to ensure continuous monitoring and timely legislative updating.

The UAE AML framework applies to three broad categories of entities. Financial institutions are defined across fourteen activity types listed in Article 2 of Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025. Designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) are defined in Article 3 of the same Resolution and include: commercial gaming operators, real estate brokers, dealers in precious metals and precious stones, lawyers, accountants, notaries, and trust and company service providers. Virtual asset service providers are defined across six activity types in Article 4 of Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025. For a complete breakdown with entity-specific obligations, see Who Must Comply with UAE AML Regulations.

Each authority supervises a distinct population of entities. The Central Bank of the UAE (CBUAE) supervises financial institutions licensed on the UAE mainland, including banks, exchange houses, finance companies, and payment service providers. The Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) supervises financial institutions within the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), a financial free zone that operates under its own legal framework. The Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA) supervises financial institutions within the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM), another financial free zone with a separate regulatory regime. The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) supervises securities and investment businesses. Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 designates supervisory authorities generically in Article 16 and empowers them to impose administrative penalties of AED 10,000 to AED 5,000,000 per Article 17, with each authority applying these powers within its own supervised population.

The most significant changes for DNFBPs under the 2025 legislative package concern scope, thresholds, and the penalty framework. Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025 introduces commercial gaming as a new DNFBP category under Article 3, with a CDD threshold of AED 11,000 per transaction. The AED 55,000 threshold for precious metals and precious stones dealers is retained. Article 3 also defines the activities of real estate brokers, lawyers, accountants, notaries, and trust and company service providers in updated terms consistent with international standards. The administrative penalty schedule applicable to DNFBPs under Ministry of Justice and MoET oversight was updated by Cabinet Resolution No. 71 of 2024, which replaced the 2021 penalty schedule, raised fine ceilings to AED 1,000,000, and introduced a doubling mechanism for repeated violations under Article 5.

The Financial Intelligence Unit has operated within the UAE’s AML framework since before the 2025 reforms. It functioned under Federal Decree-Law No. 20 of 2018 and was already embedded within the Central Bank of the UAE. Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 formally re-embeds and significantly strengthens the FIU under Article 11, reinforcing its mandate and conferring new active powers. Under Law 10/2025, the FIU retains its analytical functions, receiving and disseminating suspicious transaction reports, and gains new protective powers under Article 5: the authority to order the suspension of suspicious transactions for up to ten working days and to freeze related assets for up to thirty days pending referral to the competent authority. The expansion of the FIU’s powers beyond analysis into active intervention is one of the most significant institutional developments in the current reform cycle.

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Legal Disclaimer: This article is provided for general information and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The information reflects the legislative position as of April 2026. Laws and regulations may change. For advice specific to your situation, consult a qualified legal or compliance professional.

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About the Author

Pathik Shah

FCA, CAMS, CISA, CS, DISA (ICAI), FAFP (ICAI)

Pathik is an ACAMS-certified AML consultant specialising in governance, risk, and compliance for regulated entities in the UAE. He brings over 28 years of experience, with 1,000+ hours of AML training and 200+ advisory engagements across DNFBPs, VASPs, and FIs. He supports businesses in aligning with AML/CFT requirements from the CBUAE, DFSA, MoET, MoJ, VARA, CMA, FSRA, and FATF. Known for translating complex regulations into audit-ready procedures, Pathik enables operational clarity and compliance readiness.

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AML/CFT Supervisory Authorities in UAE

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Last Updated: 05/04/2026

Table of Contents

Protect your business with reliable and effective AML strategies with AML UAE.

At a Glance: AML Supervisory Authorities in UAE

Legal Basis  Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025, Article 1

Definition  Federal and local authorities entrusted with supervision of relevant regulated sectors

Banks and many other financial institution  Central Bank of UAE (CBUAE)

Mainland DNFBPs (Accountants, TCSPs, DPMS, real estate agents)  Ministry of Economy and Tourism (MoET)

Mainland lawyers, notaries, and other legal professionals  Ministry of Justice (MoJ)

Commercial gaming sector   General Commercial Gaming Regulatory Authority (GCGRA)

VASPs in Dubai outside DIFC   Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority (VARA)

VASPs outside Dubai and outside DIFC / ADGM  Capital Market Authority (CMA)

DIFC-authorised entities and other persons within DFSA’s regulatory perimeter   Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA)

ADGM-authorised financial services firms and other persons within FSRA’s financial regulatory perimeter  Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA)

ADGM-licensed DNFBPs  ADGM Registration Authority monitors AML compliance for ADGM-licensed DNFBPs under an agreement with FSRA

STR reporting channel  UAE FIU via goAML portal , all sectors, all supervisory authorities

TFS implementation   Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN)

Scope of This Page :

This page provides the complete authority map showing all AML/CFT supervisory authorities in UAE and what they supervise. It does not detail sector-specific AML obligations, which are covered in dedicated sector articles. For STR guidance, see the FIU page. For individual sector obligations, see the relevant pages linked at the footer of this article.

Who Is My AML Supervisory Authority?

Use this four-step decision path to identify the authority that supervises your AML/CFT compliance:

01 Where are you licensed or operating? , Mainland / commercial free zone, DIFC, ADGM, or Dubai (outside DIFC)?

02 What type of entity are you? , Financial institution, DNFBP, VASP, commercial gaming operator, or legal professional?

03 Are you within the regulatory perimeter of CBUAE, MoET, MoJ, GCGRA, CMA, DFSA, FSRA, VARA, or the ADGM Registration Authority?

04 Regardless of your supervisory authority , all STRs are filed through the UAE FIU’s goAML portal, and all TFS instructions come from EOCN.

What Is a Supervisory Authority Under UAE AML/CFT Law?

What Is a Supervisory Authority?

1. Meaning of Supervisory Authority

The legal definition from Article 1 of the Federal Decree

2. What a Supervisory Authority Does in Practice

Risk assessments, inspections, penalties under Article 16-17

3. Not the Same as the FIU

The FIU receives STRs; supervisory authorities enforce compliance

4. Not the Same as Law Enforcement

Distinct from investigative and prosecutorial bodies

Meaning of Supervisory Authority

“The federal and local authorities entrusted under the legislation with the supervision of the financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses and professions, virtual asset service providers, and non-profit organizations (NPOs); or the competent authorities responsible for granting approval to engage in an activity or profession, where no specific supervisory authority is designated by the legislation.”

Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025, Article 1

UAE AML/CFT supervisory authorities operate at both federal and local levels. The federal framework under Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025 recognises that regulated sectors have distinct characteristics requiring specialist oversight. Accordingly, rather than creating a single monolithic regulator, the UAE assigns supervisory responsibility to the authority best placed to understand each sector’s risks.

The definition is deliberately broad. Where no specific supervisory authority has been designated by legislation, the competent authority responsible for granting approval to practise the relevant activity or profession assumes the supervisory role by default. This prevents regulatory gaps.

The definition also encompasses non-profit organisations (NPOs). Where an NPO falls within the supervised population, the same default rule applies: the competent authority responsible for approving or registering the NPO assumes the supervisory role unless legislation designates a specific authority for that category.

What a Supervisory Authority Does in Practice

Article 16 of Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025 sets out the core competences of every supervisory authority. Within its respective area of competence, each authority must: conduct risk assessments concerning the likelihood of money laundering, terrorist financing, or proliferation financing occurring within the entities it supervises; perform supervisory and inspection operations, whether desk-based or field-based; and maintain statistics on the measures undertaken and the penalties imposed.

Where an entity fails to comply, Article 17 of the Decree empowers any supervisory authority to impose the following administrative penalties: a written warning; an administrative fine of not less than AED 10,000 and not exceeding AED 5,000,000 for each violation; prohibition from operating in the relevant sector for a determined period; restriction of board member or executive powers; suspension or replacement of directors or supervisory personnel; suspension or restriction of the activity or profession; and revocation of the licence. The supervisory authority may also publish penalties through media outlets and impose incremental fines for repeated violations within one year.

Supervisory Authorities Are Not the Same as the FIU

Article 11 of the Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025 establishes an independent Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) within the Central Bank. All Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) from financial institutions, DNFBPs, and VASPs must be submitted exclusively to the FIU through the goAML electronic system. The FIU analyses these reports and either refers them to the Concerned Authorities automatically or upon request.

The distinction matters in practice. A supervisory authority, such as CBUAE or MoET, is responsible for ensuring that entities under its supervision have adequate AML/CFT frameworks in place. The FIU, by contrast, is the national intelligence function: it receives, analyses, and disseminates financial intelligence. Submitting an STR to the FIU does not replace the obligation to comply with your supervisory authority’s requirements, and vice versa.

Supervisory Authorities Are Not the Same as Law Enforcement Agencies

Article 1 of the Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025 defines Law Enforcement Authorities separately: these are “the federal and local authorities entrusted with combating, investigating, detecting, and gathering evidence in respect of the offences, including Money Laundering, Predicate Offences, the Financing of Terrorism, and the Proliferation Financing.” They operate under the Public Prosecution and the competent courts, not as supervisors of regulated sectors.

An inspection visit from a supervisory authority is an administrative compliance exercise. An investigation by a law enforcement authority is a criminal matter. The two processes may run in parallel, but they serve distinct purposes and involve distinct legal powers.

Need help mapping your supervisory authority obligations?

AML UAE advises regulated entities across all sectors on identifying their supervisory authority, understanding inspection expectations, and building compliant AML frameworks.

The Main AML/CFT Supervisory Authorities in the UAE

The Main Supervisory Authorities

1. CBUAE

Banks, insurance, exchange houses, payment services

2. MoET

Real estate, DPMS, TCSPs, accountants , most mainland DNFBPs

3. Ministry of Justice

Lawyers, notaries and other legal professionals

4. GCGRA

All commercial gaming operators, the newest supervisory authority

5. CMA (formerly SCA)

Capital markets, securities, VASPs outside Dubai and outside DIFC / ADGM

6. VARA

Virtual asset service providers in Dubai (excl. DIFC)

7. DFSA

DIFC-authorised entities and persons within DFSA’s regulatory perimeter

8. FSRA

Financial services firms and other persons within FSRA’s financial regulatory perimeter; ADGM-licensed DNFBPs monitored by the ADGM Registration Authority

Authority Sector Coverage Jurisdiction Website 
CBUAE Banks, exchange houses, insurance, payment services, money transferFederal (mainland + commercial FZs)https://www.centralbank.ae/en/
MoET  Real estate agents, DPMS, TCSPs, and accountants Mainland UAEhttps://www.moet.gov.ae/en/home
Ministry of Justice Lawyers, notaries, and independent legal professionals when carrying out specified DNFBP activitiesMainland UAEhttps://www.moj.gov.ae/
GCGRA All commercial gaming operators (land-based, internet, sports wagering, lottery) Federal (all UAE) https://www.gcgra.gov.ae/en/
CMA (formerly SCA)  Capital markets, securities, and VASPs outside Dubai and outside DIFC / ADGM  Federal (all UAE)  https://sca.gov.ae/en/home
VARA  Virtual asset service providers in Dubai (excl. DIFC)  Dubai (excl. DIFC)  https://www.vara.ae/en/
DFSA  DIFC-authorised entities and other persons within DFSA’s regulatory perimeter  DIFC financial free zone  https://www.dfsa.ae/
FSRA  Financial services firms and other persons within FSRA’s financial regulatory perimeter  ADGM financial free zone  https://www.adgm.com/financial-services-regulatory-authority
ADGM Registration Authority  ADGM-licensed DNFBPs; monitors AML compliance for ADGM-licensed DNFBPs under an agreement with FSRA  ADGM financial free zone  https://www.adgm.com/registration-authority

The Central Bank of the UAE (CBUAE)

The Central Bank of the UAE (CBUAE) is the primary supervisory authority for financial institutions in the mainland UAE and commercial free zones. It oversees banks, exchange houses, insurance companies, payment service providers, and money or value transfer services. The CBUAE applies a risk-based supervisory framework aligned with FATF Recommendations, combining off-site monitoring with on-site inspections.

The UAE National Risk Assessment 2024 identifies the banking sector as one of the highest-value channels through which ML proceeds may flow, reflecting the CBUAE’s critical gatekeeping role. Financial institutions supervised by CBUAE must comply with its AML/CFT rulebook, guidance, and any circulars issued thereunder, in addition to the obligations under Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025.

The Ministry of Economy and Tourism (MoET)

The Ministry of Economy and Tourism (MoET) is the designated supervisory authority for most designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) in the mainland UAE. Its supervisory portfolio includes real estate brokers and agents, dealers in precious metals and stones (DPMS), company and trust service providers (TCSPs), accountants, and other commercial activities for which specific supervisory designations have been made.

The DNFBP sector was identified as carrying significant ML/TF risk in the UAE National Risk Assessment 2024, particularly real estate and DPMS. MoET exercises its supervisory mandate through both desk-based reviews and field inspections, and issues circulars and implementation guides for DNFBPs. MoET’s AML enforcement capability has grown substantially since 2020, with a dedicated supervisory function now established within the ministry.

The Ministry of Justice (MoJ)

The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is the supervisory authority for lawyers, notaries, and other independent legal professionals in the mainland UAE when they carry out the specified activities that bring them within the DNFBP perimeter. Article 3(4) of Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 classifies lawyers, notaries, and independent legal professionals as DNFBPs when they prepare, conduct, or execute financial transactions on behalf of clients in relation to specified activities, including buying and selling real estate, managing client funds, organising contributions for company formation, and establishing or managing legal arrangements.

The MoJ supervises compliance with these obligations and coordinates with MoET and other supervisory authorities on cross-sector enforcement.

The General Commercial Gaming Regulatory Authority (GCGRA)

The General Commercial Gaming Regulatory Authority (GCGRA) was established by Federal Law by Decree and publicly launched in September 2023. It is the sole federal body mandated to regulate, license, and supervise all commercial gaming activities in the UAE, including land-based gaming facilities, internet gaming, sports wagering, and lottery operations.

Commercial gaming operators fall within the UAE AML/CFT perimeter under Article 3(1) of Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 when conducting single or linked financial transactions that equal or exceed AED 11,000. The GCGRA explicitly holds the role of “supervisory authority of AML/CFT for the commercial gaming sector” as confirmed in the Commercial Gaming Policy Paper published jointly by the GCGRA and the General Secretariat of the National AML/CFT Committee (GS-NAMLCFTPC). Within its first year of operation, the GCGRA issued the UAE’s first gaming operator licences, including a Land-Based Gaming Facilities Licence for Wynn Al Marjan in Ras Al Khaimah, and blocked over 6,500 illegal gaming sites.

The Capital Market Authority (CMA)

The Capital Market Authority (CMA), formerly known as the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA), is the federal regulator for capital markets and securities activities in the mainland UAE and commercial free zones. Following its renaming, the CMA’s AML supervisory mandate extends to securities firms, fund managers, investment advisers, and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) operating outside Dubai and outside the financial free zones of DIFC and ADGM.

The CMA applies the same risk-based supervisory framework to VASPs within its jurisdiction as it does to other regulated financial activities, ensuring that supervisory coverage extends across the emerging virtual asset sector beyond the dedicated VARA, DFSA, and FSRA perimeters.

The Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority (VARA)

The Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority (VARA) was established in Dubai to regulate virtual asset service providers operating within Dubai, except for entities located within the DIFC financial free zone. VARA issues licences to VASPs and functions as their primary AML/CFT supervisory authority within its jurisdiction, applying obligations derived from Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 alongside its own VARA Virtual Asset and Related Activities Regulations.

VASPs in Dubai must obtain a VARA licence before commencing operations. The VARA framework requires licensed VASPs to implement comprehensive AML/CFT programmes, submit STRs to the UAE FIU via goAML, and comply with targeted financial sanctions obligations issued by the EOCN. VARA’s rulebook system distinguishes between different categories of virtual asset activity, each with tailored supervisory expectations.

The Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA)

The Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) is the independent financial regulator of the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), a financial free zone established by federal legislation and operating under its own legal framework. All entities authorised to conduct financial services within the DIFC, including banks, asset managers, brokers, and VASPs, are supervised by the DFSA for AML/CFT purposes.

The DFSA operates its own AML rulebook and supervisory regime, which is aligned with FATF Recommendations and recognised internationally. The CBUAE framework applies to mainland entities; within the DIFC, the DFSA is the relevant supervisory authority for AML/CFT purposes. This distinction has direct implications for which regulations, guidance notes, and inspection processes apply.

The Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA)

The Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA) is the independent financial regulator of Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM), the financial free zone located on Al Maryah Island in Abu Dhabi. The FSRA supervises firms and persons within its financial regulatory perimeter in ADGM, including banks, fund managers, insurance companies, and VASPs, for AML/CFT compliance under the FSRA’s Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Rules and Guidance (AML Rulebook).

It is important to note that FSRA’s supervisory authority does not extend to all entities in ADGM. For ADGM-licensed DNFBPs and non-financial entities, the ADGM Registration Authority holds the commercial regulatory mandate. It monitors AML compliance for ADGM-licensed DNFBPs under an agreement with the FSRA.

Like the DFSA, the FSRA’s financial supervisory authority is ring-fenced to its jurisdiction: the ADGM. The CBUAE or CMA does not supervise financial institutions in ADGM for AML purposes. The FSRA applies a risk-based supervisory approach, conducts periodic thematic reviews, and maintains an active enforcement function.

Unsure which supervisory authority applies to your business?

AML UAE provides sector-specific guidance on supervisory authority identification, registration requirements, and compliance obligations for all regulated sectors in the UAE.

How Supervisory Responsibilities Are Divided Across the UAE

How Responsibilities Are Divided

1. Mainland UAE

CBUAE, MoET, MoJ, GCGRA, and CMA cover different sectors

2. Commercial Free Zones

FIs supervised by CBUAE; DNFBPs by MoET/GCGRA depending on sector

3. Financial Free Zones

DIFC under DFSA; ADGM financial services under FSRA, with ADGM DNFBP AML monitoring by the Registration Authority

4. Dubai VASPs

VARA holds exclusive jurisdiction outside DIFC

5. VASPs Outside Dubai

CMA supervises VASPs in other emirates and commercial free zones

Mainland UAE

In the mainland UAE, supervisory responsibility is divided by sector. The CBUAE supervises financial institutions. MoET supervises the majority of DNFBP sectors. The Ministry of Justice supervises lawyers, notaries, and other legal professionals. The GCGRA supervises commercial gaming operators. The CMA supervises capital markets firms and VASPs that fall outside the perimeters of the VARA, DFSA, and FSRA. This means that a single business area may contain entities supervised by three or four different authorities, each with its own inspection calendar, guidance library, and enforcement approach.

Commercial Free Zones

Commercial free zones, such as DMCC and JAFZA, are not financial free zones. Entities in these zones are generally subject to UAE federal AML law and supervised by the same authorities as their mainland counterparts, unless a specific legal arrangement provides otherwise. CBUAE generally supervises a financial institution in a commercial free zone. MoET generally supervises a real estate broker or TCSP in a commercial free zone. The free zone authority itself does not function as an AML supervisory authority unless specifically designated under the relevant legislation.

Financial Free Zones

The UAE has two financial free zones: the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) and Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM). These are constitutionally recognised free zones with their own civil and commercial laws, courts, and financial regulators. Entities operating within them are subject to the AML/CFT requirements of the applicable financial free zone regulator rather than the federal supervisory bodies, though federal criminal law, including the money laundering offence under Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025, continues to apply throughout the UAE.

DIFC, supervised by DFSA

All entities authorised to conduct financial services or related activities within the DIFC are supervised by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) for AML/CFT purposes. The DFSA’s AML Module (AML) within its Rulebook sets out the detailed obligations. DIFC entities submit STRs to the UAE FIU via goAML in the same way as all other regulated entities, but their primary supervisory relationship and inspection regime is governed by the DFSA.

ADGM, financial services supervised by FSRA; DNFBPs monitored by ADGM Registration Authority

In ADGM, supervisory responsibility is not exercised solely by the FSRA. FSRA-authorised firms, including banks, fund managers, and VASPs, are supervised for AML/CFT compliance by the FSRA under its AML Rulebook, which incorporates FATF Recommendations and international standards. For ADGM-licensed DNFBPs, however, the ADGM Registration Authority is responsible for monitoring AML compliance under an agreement with the FSRA.

Dubai Virtual Asset Service Providers

VARA holds exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over VASPs operating within Dubai, with the single exception of entities within the DIFC (which are supervised by the DFSA). VASPs wishing to operate in Dubai must obtain a VARA licence and comply with VARA’s Virtual Assets and Related Activities Regulations (VARA Regulations). Operating as a VASP in Dubai without a VARA licence is illegal.

Virtual Asset Service Providers in the UAE Outside Dubai

VASPs operating in emirates other than Dubai, or in commercial free zones outside DIFC and ADGM, are regulated by the Capital Market Authority (CMA). The CMA issues licences for VASP activities in Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and other mainland or commercial free zone locations, and supervises those entities for AML/CFT compliance. VASPs in ADGM are supervised by the FSRA rather than the CMA.

Common Areas of Confusion

Who Supervises DNFBPs in Mainland UAE?

MoET supervises the majority of DNFBP sectors in the mainland UAE, including real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and precious stones, company and trust service providers, and accountants. Lawyers, notaries and other legal professionals are supervised by the Ministry of Justice. Commercial gaming operators, Internet Gaming Operators, Land-Based Gaming Facilities Operators, Sports Wagering Operators, and Lottery Operators are supervised by the GCGRA. Article 3 of Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 sets out the full list of DNFBP categories.

Who Supervises Lawyers and Legal Consultants?

In the mainland UAE, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) supervises lawyers, notaries, and other independent legal professionals for AML/CFT compliance when they are carrying out the specified activities that bring them within the DNFBP perimeter, such as managing client funds, preparing or executing real estate transactions, or forming or managing legal arrangements. A lawyer or legal consultant practising within the DIFC is subject to DFSA oversight. One practising within ADGM falls under the applicable ADGM framework, which distinguishes between firms within FSRA’s financial regulatory perimeter and non-financial activities within the Registration Authority’s commercial regulatory remit. The applicable supervisory authority depends on where the legal professional is licensed and practises, not on the nationality of their clients or the location of the underlying transaction.

Who Supervises Virtual Asset Businesses in Dubai?

VARA supervises all VASPs in Dubai, excluding those in the DIFC. The Dubai government granted VARA exclusive licensing authority. A VASP entity established in a commercial free zone within Dubai (such as DMCC) still requires a VARA licence and is subject to VARA’s AML supervision. Only if the VASP is authorised within the DIFC does the DFSA assume supervisory authority. There is no overlap: if you are in Dubai outside the DIFC, your supervisor is VARA.

Does DIFC Follow DFSA Rules or Federal AML Law?

Both, in different respects. For AML/CFT compliance purposes, DIFC-authorised entities and other persons within DFSA’s regulatory perimeter are governed by the DFSA’s AML Module and subject to DFSA inspections. For AML/CFT compliance purposes, DIFC and ADGM-authorised firms follow their respective applicable free-zone regulatory rulebooks, while federal criminal law and national reporting and sanctions mechanisms continue to apply across the UAE. A DIFC entity that commits money laundering can be prosecuted under federal law, even though its day-to-day AML/CFT compliance obligations are supervised by the DFSA.

Does ADGM Follow FSRA Rules, ADGM Registration Authority Requirements, or Federal AML Law?

FSRA-authorised firms and other persons within FSRA’s financial regulatory perimeter comply with the FSRA’s AML Rulebook and are supervised by the FSRA. For ADGM-licensed DNFBPs, the ADGM Registration Authority monitors AML compliance under an agreement with FSRA, so the FSRA is not the supervisory authority for all ADGM entities. The ADGM operates its own legal system for civil and commercial matters, including financial regulation. Federal criminal law, including the money laundering offence, continues to apply in ADGM, as it does across all of the UAE territory. All ADGM entities submit STRs to the UAE FIU via the goAML portal, which is the single national channel for STR submission regardless of supervisory authority.

Is the FIU Also a Supervisory Authority?

No. Article 11 of the Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025 establishes the FIU as an independent financial intelligence function within the Central Bank. Its role is to receive all Suspicious Transaction Reports, study and analyse them, and refer findings to the Concerned Authorities. The FIU does not conduct compliance inspections of regulated entities, does not issue AML guidance to regulated sectors, and does not impose administrative penalties. Those functions belong to the relevant supervisory authority for each sector. The FIU and supervisory authorities serve complementary but distinct functions.

What Is EOCN and What Does It Do?

The Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) is defined in Article 1 of Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025 as the body “concerned with the implementation of targeted financial sanctions within the State.” EOCN administers the UAE’s domestic terrorist and sanctions lists and ensures that instructions on Targeted Financial Sanctions (TFS) are disseminated to all regulated entities. All financial institutions, DNFBPs, and VASPs must comply immediately with TFS instructions issued by EOCN. The EOCN is not a supervisory authority for AML compliance; it is the national body responsible for implementing targeted financial sanctions. Supervisory authorities ensure that entities under their oversight have effective sanctions compliance systems, but the TFS instructions themselves originate from EOCN.

Receive practical AML/CFT compliance guidance

AML UAE publishes sector-specific blogs and regulatory updates for all supervised sectors in the UAE.

Why Understanding the Right Supervisory Authority Matters

1. Correct Registration and Reporting Channels

Register with the right authority; use the correct reporting platform

2. Proper Engagement During Inspections

Different authorities run inspections differently , preparation varies

3. Correct Application of Sector-Specific Guidance

Each supervisory authority issues its own circulars and guidance

4. Avoiding Regulatory Breaches from Confusion

Jurisdictional errors are treated as compliance failures

Correct Registration and Reporting Channels

Regulated entities must register with, or obtain a licence from, the correct supervisory authority for their sector and location. Operating without the correct authorisation, or registering with the wrong authority, is a regulatory breach in its own right. All regulated entities across all supervisory authorities submit STRs through the single national channel: the UAE FIU’s goAML portal. However, sector-specific compliance registers, inspection schedules, and guidance libraries are maintained separately by each supervisory authority.

Proper Engagement During Inspections

Supervisory inspections vary significantly between authorities. CBUAE bank examinations follow a structured prudential and AML framework. MoET inspections of DNFBPs may focus on registration, customer due diligence documentation, and beneficial ownership records. DFSA and FSRA inspections draw on their detailed rulebook requirements and international supervisory methodologies. GCGRA inspections are still developing their framework. Knowing your supervisory authority enables you to prepare for inspections correctly, including understanding what documentation to have ready, which guidance applies, and who your regulatory contact point is.

Correct Application of Sector-Specific Guidance

Each supervisory authority publishes its own guidance, circulars, and implementation notes. A circular issued by MoET to DNFBPs does not apply to entities supervised by the CBUAE, and vice versa. Applying the wrong guidance or overlooking guidance from your own supervisory authority can leave compliance gaps that expose an entity to enforcement action. Following guidance from the correct supervisory authority is a prerequisite for demonstrable compliance.

Avoiding Regulatory Breaches Caused by Confusion over Jurisdiction

Jurisdictional confusion has practical consequences. An entity that believes it is supervised by CBUAE when it should be supervised by MoET may fail to register correctly, miss MoET inspection cycles, or apply CBUAE guidance that does not cover its sector’s specific risk profile. Article 17 of Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025 empowers supervisory authorities to impose fines of up to AED 5,000,000 per violation, suspend activities, and revoke licences. Jurisdictional error does not constitute a defence to regulatory non-compliance.

UAE AML/CFT Regulatory Source Hierarchy

Federal AML law (Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025) , the overarching criminal and regulatory framework

Executive regulations (Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025) , detailed implementing obligations, sector definitions, and thresholds

Sector rulebooks and regulator instruments , issued by CBUAE, MoET, DFSA, FSRA, VARA, CMA, MoJ, GCGRA for their respective sectors

Circulars, guidance notes, and policy papers , supplementary implementation guidance from each supervisory authority

Conclusion

The UAE operates a multi-authority AML/CFT supervisory architecture in which multiple federal, local, free-zone, and sector-specific authorities exercise jurisdiction over distinct sectors and geographic zones. Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 provides the overarching framework, while specific authority mandates are established by sector-specific legislation and regulatory instruments.

CBUAE supervises many financial institutions. MoET supervises most mainland DNFBPs, subject to sector-specific carve-outs for lawyers and gaming. The Ministry of Justice supervises lawyers and notaries engaged in specified DNFBP activities. The GCGRA supervises the commercial gaming sector. The CMA supervises capital markets and VASPs outside Dubai and outside DIFC and ADGM. VARA supervises VASPs within Dubai outside the DIFC. The DFSA supervises entities and persons within its regulatory perimeter in DIFC. In ADGM, the FSRA supervises firms within its financial regulatory perimeter, while the ADGM Registration Authority monitors AML compliance for ADGM-licensed DNFBPs under an agreement with FSRA. All STRs flow to the UAE FIU via goAML, and targeted financial sanctions instructions are issued by the EOCN.

For regulated entities, identifying the correct supervisory authority is the foundational compliance question. Everything else, which guidance applies, which inspection regime to prepare for, which reporting channel to use, and which penalties may be imposed, flows from that answer.

Frequently Asked Questions

Who supervises AML compliance for banks in the UAE?

The Central Bank of the UAE (CBUAE) is the AML supervisory authority for banks and other financial institutions in the mainland UAE and in commercial free zones. The DFSA supervises banks in the DIFC; those in ADGM are supervised by the FSRA. All banks submit STRs to the UAE FIU via the goAML portal, regardless of their supervisory authority.

The Ministry of Economy and Tourism (MoET) supervises most DNFBP sectors in the mainland UAE, including real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and precious stones, company and trust service providers, and accountants. The Ministry of Justice supervises lawyers and notaries. The GCGRA supervises commercial gaming operators. Article 3 of Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 defines the full DNFBP categories.

The UAE Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is an independent unit within the Central Bank, established under Article 11 of Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025. It receives all Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) from financial institutions, DNFBPs, and VASPs exclusively through the goAML portal. The FIU studies and analyses these reports and refers findings to the Concerned Authorities. The FIU is not an AML supervisory authority and does not conduct compliance inspections.

The Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) is responsible for implementing targeted financial sanctions in the UAE, as defined in Article 1 of Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025. EOCN administers the domestic terrorist and sanctions lists and issues TFS instructions to all regulated entities. Supervisory authorities ensure that entities under their supervision have effective sanctions-compliance frameworks, but the TFS instructions themselves originate from EOCN.

No. The UAE uses a multi-authority model where supervisory responsibility is assigned by sector and geographic zone. Depending on the activity and jurisdiction, the relevant authority may include CBUAE, MoET, Ministry of Justice, GCGRA, CMA, VARA, DFSA, FSRA, or, for ADGM-licensed DNFBPs, the ADGM Registration Authority. The NAMLCFTC coordinates the national AML/CFT strategy across all supervisory authorities, and the UAE FIU serves as the single national financial intelligence function.

The ADGM Registration Authority monitors AML compliance for ADGM-licensed DNFBPs under an agreement with the FSRA. The FSRA is ADGM’s financial regulator and supervises firms within its financial regulatory perimeter. Still, it is not accurate to describe ADGM-licensed DNFBPs as supervised by FSRA in the same way as ADGM financial services firms. Entities in ADGM should identify whether they fall within the FSRA’s financial regulatory perimeter or within the Registration Authority’s commercial regulatory remit.

No. The FSRA is ADGM’s financial regulator for firms and persons within its regulatory perimeter, including banks, fund managers, and VASPs. The ADGM Registration Authority holds the commercial regulatory mandate and monitors AML compliance for ADGM-licensed DNFBPs under an agreement with FSRA. An ADGM entity that is not within the FSRA’s financial regulatory perimeter should look to the ADGM Registration Authority as the relevant AML monitoring body.

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About the Author

Pathik Shah

FCA, CAMS, CISA, CS, DISA (ICAI), FAFP (ICAI)

Pathik is an ACAMS-certified AML consultant specialising in governance, risk, and compliance for regulated entities in the UAE. He brings over 28 years of experience, with 1,000+ hours of AML training and 200+ advisory engagements across DNFBPs, VASPs, and FIs. He supports businesses in aligning with AML/CFT requirements from the CBUAE, DFSA, MoET, MoJ, VARA, CMA, FSRA, and FATF. Known for translating complex regulations into audit-ready procedures, Pathik enables operational clarity and compliance readiness.

Reach Out to Pathik

AML Regulations for Lawyers, Notaries, and Other Legal Professionals in UAE

How the Ministry of Justice supervises the sector

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Last Updated: 04/29/2026

Table of Contents

Protect your business with reliable and effective AML strategies with AML UAE.

AML Regulations for Lawyers, Notaries, and Other Legal Professionals in UAE: At a Glance

  • Covered activities: Five activities under Article 3(4) of Cabinet Resolution 134/2025 bring a lawyer, notary, or legal consultant inside the AML regime.
  • Supervisory authority: The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) supervises law firms, legal consultancy offices, and notaries public under Ministerial Resolution 248 of 2025.
  • Primary legislation: Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 replace Federal Decree-Law 20 of 2018; all unrepealed circulars remain valid.
  • Administrative penalties: Forty-one violation categories under Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024 carry fines ranging from AED 50,000 to AED 1,000,000, doubled on repetition.
  • Legal privilege: Article 18(2) of both Federal Decree Law No. (10) of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 protects defence, representation, arbitration, mediation, and legal opinion activities from the STR duty.
  • Reporting channel: Suspicious transactions go to the Financial Intelligence Unit through the goAML platform.
  • Record retention: Five years for customer records and all AML documentation, starting from the end of the business relationship or the completion of the transaction.
  • Free-zone carve-out: Firms licensed in ADGM and DIFC sit under ADGM (RA) and DFSA respectively; MoJ supervision does not apply to them.

AML Regulations for Lawyers, Notaries, and Other Legal Professionals in UAE

AML regulations for lawyers in UAE place five defined activities inside the anti-money-laundering perimeter and require lawyers, legal consultants, and notaries public under the supervisory remit of the Ministry of Justice. The current framework is anchored in Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 Regarding Anti-Money Laundering, and Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing and its Executive Regulations in Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025, both of which repealed Federal Decree-Law No. (20) of 2018 and its earlier Executive Regulations, while preserving every circular and notification that has not been specifically revoked.

This spoke article sits inside the DNFBPs regulatory cluster on AML UAE and focuses only on legal professionals supervised by the Ministry of Justice. Firms licensed in Abu Dhabi Global Market or the Dubai International Financial Centre sit under the ADGM Registration Authority (RA) and the DFSA, respectively, so this guide addresses their position only in the carve-out note at the end of the supervisor section. Every specific article number, penalty figure, timeline, and threshold below is traceable to a named instrument published on uaelegislation.gov.ae or to a named Ministry of Justice publication on moj.gov.ae. For the federal law in its own right, see the guide to anti-money laundering laws in UAE.

Scope of this page:

This page covers lawyers, notaries, and legal consultants performing the five covered activities under Article 3(4) of Cabinet Resolution 134/2025, supervised by the Ministry of Justice. Accountants, auditors, and trust and company service providers are addressed on their own sibling pages in the DNFBPs cluster. Where cross-sector rules are common to every DNFBP (for example beneficial owner disclosure, targeted financial sanctions, and administrative penalties), this page states what they require of legal professionals specifically and links to the pillar page for the wider framing.

Who Counts as a Lawyer, Notary, or Legal Professional for AML Purposes in UAE?

A lawyer, legal consultant, or notary public is inside the UAE AML regime when they prepare, carry out, or assist a client with any of the five activities listed in Article 3, Clause 4 of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025.

The Five Covered Activities Under Article 3(4) of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025

The Executive Regulations list the activities that bring an independent legal professional inside the AML perimeter. Each is a transactional or representational act carried out for or on behalf of a client; performing any one of them triggers customer due diligence, record keeping, suspicious transaction reporting, and the wider obligations set out in Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025.

1. Real estate transactions

Buying or selling real estate, whether the professional acts for the buyer, the seller, or holds client funds in the course of the transaction.

2. Managing client money

Managing customer funds, securities, or other assets held in a professional or fiduciary capacity.

3. Account management

Managing bank accounts, savings accounts, or securities accounts for a client.

4. Company contributions

Organising contributions for establishing, operating, or managing companies.

5. Legal persons and arrangements

Establishing, operating, or managing legal persons or legal arrangements, or performing any trading or buying and selling of commercial entities.

Source: Article 3, Clause 4, Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025. The same five activities appear in the definition of designated non-financial businesses and professions in Article 1 of Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025, read with Article 3, Clause 2 of the Executive Regulations. 

Notaries Public

A notary public is a public officer who authenticates signatures, declarations, powers of attorney, contracts, and other legal documents. Notaries working in the private sector, private notaries, and the notarial sections of law firms are brought within the AML, in line with Article 3(4) of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025. Ministerial Resolution 248 of 2025 explicitly extends the Ministry of Justice supervisory framework to notaries public alongside law firms and legal consultancy offices.

Work Outside the AML Perimeter

From a professional secrecy perspective, Article 18, Clause 2 of Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025 and Article 18, Clause 2 of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 both carve out work involving assessing the client’s legal position, defending the client, or representing the client in judicial, administrative, arbitral, or mediation proceedings. Firms must still apply AML controls to the transactional elements of a matter even if the advocacy elements fall within privilege.

AML Supervisory Authority for Lawyers, Notaries, and Other Legal Professionals in UAE

The Ministry of Justice is the supervisory authority for law firms, legal consultancy offices, and notaries public in the Mainland. This was confirmed when Cabinet Decision No. (1/3 W) of 2019 designated the Ministry of Justice as the authority responsible for supervising lawyers and legal firms for AML/CFT purposes. Ministerial Resolution No. (248) of 2025, issued on 29 April 2025, replaces Ministerial Resolutions 532 and 533 of 2019 and sets out the supervisory procedures and controls in their current form.

UAE AML Framework Layers That Apply to Legal Professionals

FEDERAL  FDL 10/2025 and CR 134/2025 (Executive Regulations); FL 7/2014 Combating Terrorism Crimes; FDL 34/2022 Legal Profession; CR 8/2025 Executive Regulations of FDL 34/2022. 
CROSS-SECTOR  CR 74/2020 TFS and UN sanctions; CR 109/2023 Beneficial Owner procedures; CR 132/2023 BO penalties; CR 71/2024 administrative penalties for MoJ and MoE supervisees; EOCN TFS Guideline and CPF Guidance. 
SECTOR-SPECIFIC  MR 248/2025 supervisory controls for law firms, legal consultancies, and notaries public; MoJ Guidebook (November 2025); MoJ circulars from 2020 to 2026. 

How the Ministry of Justice supervises the sector

Three operational building blocks explain how MoJ plans, conducts, and concludes supervisory action over legal professionals.

AML/CTF Department

The dedicated AML/CTF Department inside MoJ is the operational face of supervision, assigning inspectors and issuing guidance.

Risk-based inspections

Inspections follow a risk-based methodology that weights firm size, client profile, and the five covered activities.

Administrative sanctions

Breaches are dealt with under Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024 and Article 6 of Ministerial Resolution 248 of 2025.

The MoJ AML/CTF Department and Its Fifteen Functions

The Guidebook for Law Firms and Legal Consultancy Offices on Combating Money Laundering, Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing, Second Edition, published by the Ministry of Justice in November, sets out fifteen functions for the Department. These include, among others, supervising law firms, legal consultancy offices, and notaries public for AML/CFT/CPF compliance; carrying out risk-based on-site and off-site inspections; imposing administrative sanctions and escalating suspected criminal conduct to prosecutors; cooperating with the Financial Intelligence Unit, the Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation, and other domestic and foreign counterparts; maintaining typologies; issuing sector guidance; and running awareness programmes.

Risk-Based Supervision and Inspection Readiness

Ministerial Resolution 248 of 2025 requires MoJ to adopt a risk-based approach when planning and conducting inspections and when deciding the scope and depth of each visit. Practically, this means firms are rated using factors such as client geographies, types of covered activities, complexity of legal persons being established or managed, cash handling, and past supervisory history.

A firm that is well prepared keeps a complete documentation pack at all times, including its firm-wide risk assessment, client risk assessments, sanctions screening logs, transaction risk assessments, STR-decision logs, training records, and a corrective action register showing how any previous findings have been closed out.

Inspection readiness is a continuous state, not a reaction

MoJ inspectors are entitled to request any AML document, client file, or system log at short notice. Firms that treat inspection readiness as a perpetual discipline, rather than a pre-visit scramble, consistently score better against the Guidebook’s controls.

Administrative Sanctions and Appeals

Article 6 of Ministerial Resolution 248 of 2025 provides that the AML Department may impose any of the administrative penalties set out in Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024 on a law firm, legal consultancy office, or notary public that breaches the AML rules. The Guidebook identifies seven types of sanctions, which can include warnings, fines, restrictions on activity, suspension of managers or compliance officers, and suspension or cancellation of the licence.

A grievance may be filed with the Minister of Justice within twenty working days from the date of notification under Article 7 of MR 248 of 2025, with the Ministry responding within thirty working days under Article 8, failing which silence amounts to rejection per the general forty-day rule in Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024.

Financial Free-Zone Carve-Out

Firms licensed in Abu Dhabi Global Market are supervised by the Registration Authority, and firms licensed in the Dubai International Financial Centre are supervised by the Dubai Financial Services Authority under the DIFC regulatory regime. MoJ supervision does not apply to them. A dual-licensed group of companies can adopt a group-wide AML programme while retaining separate records and applying the rulebook of the authority that licenses each leg of the business.

Dimension Mainland ADGM DIFC
Supervisory authority Ministry of Justice Registration Authority (RA) Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA)
Licensing authority  Ministry of Justice; Executive Council decisions for notaries Registration Authority of ADGM DIFC Authority
Core AML rulebook FDL 10/2025, CR 134/2025, CR 71/2024, MR 248/2025 FSRA AML Rulebook under ADGM Financial Services and Markets Regulations DFSA AML Module under the DIFC Regulatory Law
Sector guidance MoJ Guidebook for Law Firms and Legal Consultancy Offices (November 2025) FSRA-issued AML guidance for DNFBPs in ADGM DFSA-issued AML guidance for DNFBPs in DIFC 

Preparing for a MoJ inspection?

AML UAE runs pre-inspection readiness reviews against the MoJ Guidebook's ten obligations and Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024 violations, with a prioritised remediation plan.

AML Regulations Applicable to Lawyers, Notaries, and Other Legal Professionals in UAE

The AML rulebook for legal professionals in the UAE is a stack. At the base sit the federal law and its Executive Regulations, followed by cross-sector resolutions on sanctions, beneficial ownership, and penalties. Sector-specific layers come next: Ministerial Resolution 248 of 2025 for supervision, the MoJ Guidebook for substantive controls, and a sequence of MoJ circulars that operationalise particular obligations. Overarching guidance from the Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation, the Financial Intelligence Unit, and the National Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Committee completes the picture.

Four groups of instruments every law firm must follow

Each group sits on a distinct tier of the framework; together, they form the complete AML rulebook for MoJ-supervised legal professionals.

1. Federal AML laws

Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025 and Executive Regulations 134 of 2025, plus terrorism, beneficial owner, sanctions, and penalty resolutions.

2. Overarching guidance

EOCN TFS and CPF guidance, FIU strategic analysis, red flag typologies, and joint guidance on satisfactory practice.

3. NRA and SRA

UAE ML/TF National Risk Assessment 2024 and sectoral risk assessments feeding into MoJ’s supervisory priorities.

4. Sector instruments

MoJ Guidebook (November 2025) and circulars from 2020 to 2026 on CDD, TFS, REAR, high-risk jurisdictions, and policy updates.

Federal AML Laws and Executive Regulations Applicable to Lawyers, Notaries, and Legal Professionals

Eleven federal instruments form the statutory base for AML compliance by lawyers, notaries, and legal consultants in UAE. They range from the primary AML decree law and its Executive Regulations through to sector-neutral resolutions on sanctions, beneficial ownership, and penalties, and two instruments specific to the profession itself.

Ten federal instruments in this section

Each item below is a separate subsection summarising its scope, the articles most relevant to legal professionals, and the key thresholds or penalties.

01. FDL 10/2025

AML/CFT/CPF Federal Decree-Law

02. CR 134/2025

Executive Regulations

03. CR 8/2025

Executive Regulations of Legal Profession Law

04. MR 248/2025

MoJ supervisory procedures 

05. CR 71/2024

Administrative penalties for MoJ/MoE supervisees

06. FDL 34/2022

Legal Profession Law 

07. CR 74/2020

Terrorist lists and UNSC resolutions

08. FL 7/2014

Combating Terrorism Crimes

09. CR 109/2023

Beneficial owner procedures

10. CR 132/2023

BO administrative penalties

1. Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025 Regarding Anti-Money Laundering, and Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing

Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025, issued on 30 September 2025, is the primary AML statute for the UAE. Article 41 repealed Federal Decree-Law No. (20) of 2018 and superseded its Executive Regulations, subject to any instruments issued under the old law remaining in force until amended, unless inconsistent with the new decree.

For lawyers, notaries, and legal consultants the most important provisions are Articles 2 and 3 which criminalise money laundering, financing of terrorism, and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; Article 18 which imposes the suspicious transaction reporting duty on DNFBPs subject to the privilege carve-out in clause 2; Article 19 on the prohibition on tipping off; Article 26 setting imprisonment from one to ten years and fines from AED 100,000 to AED 5,000,000 for laundering; Article 27 setting legal-person fines of AED 5,000,000 to AED 100,000,000; Article 28 imposing AED 100,000 to AED 1,000,000 for breaches of Article 18; Article 29 setting fines from AED 50,000 for tipping off; and Article 33 setting fines from AED 20,000 for breaches of targeted financial sanctions.

2. Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 Concerning the Executive Regulations of Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025

Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 is the operational manual for the federal decree law. Article 3, Clause 4 lists the five covered activities that bring lawyers, notaries, and independent legal professionals inside the AML regime.

Article 18, Clause 2 preserves legal professional privilege over assessment of the client’s legal position, defence, representation, arbitration, mediation, and the issuing of a legal opinion.

Article 19, Clause 2 makes clear that dissuading a client from engaging in an unlawful act is not tipping off.

3. Cabinet Resolution No. (8) of 2025 Regarding the Executive Regulations of Federal Decree-Law No. (34) of 2022 Regulating the Legal Profession and Legal Consultation Profession

Cabinet Resolution No. (8) of 2025 is the Executive Regulations of the Legal Profession Law. While its scope is the profession generally rather than AML specifically, it governs licensing, categories of registration, conduct rules, disciplinary committees, and registers maintained by the Ministry of Justice, and it therefore sets the institutional foundation against which AML sanctions, such as suspension or cancellation of a licence, actually operate. Compliance officers should read it alongside Federal Decree-Law No. (34) of 2022 when assessing the consequences of supervisory action.

4. Ministerial Resolution No. (248) of 2025 on Supervising Law Firms, Legal Consultancy Offices, and Notaries Public

Ministerial Resolution No. (248) of 2025, issued on 29 April 2025, regulates the procedures and controls for supervising and monitoring law firms, legal consultancy offices, and notaries public in the field of combating money laundering and terrorism. It establishes the AML/CTF Department as the competent body; sets out inspection methodology; confirms application of Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024 penalties through Article 6; provides a twenty-working-day grievance window in Article 7; mandates a thirty-working-day response window in Article 8; and repeals Ministerial Resolutions 532 and 533 of 2019.

5. Cabinet Resolution No. (71) of 2024 Regulating Violations and Administrative Penalties Imposed on Violators of AML/CFT Measures Under the Supervision of MoJ and MoE

Cabinet Resolution No. (71) of 2024, issued on 8 July 2024, is the administrative penalties grid for DNFBPs supervised by MoJ and by the Ministry of Economy. It repeals Cabinet Resolution No. (16) of 2021 and sets out forty-one categories of violation with fines ranging from AED 50,000 to AED 1,000,000. Article 4 provides a twenty-working-day notification window, a thirty-working-day grievance window, and a forty-day deemed-rejection rule where the grievance is not filed. Article 5 allows fines to be doubled on repetition within a set period. A selection of the schedule is reproduced below for orientation; firms should consult the full text for the complete list.

ArtViolation summaryFine (AED) 
1.Failure to apply customer due diligence measures to new or existing clients.50,000 – 200,000
2.Failure to identify the beneficial owner or to take reasonable steps to verify beneficial ownership information.50,000 – 200,000
3.Failure to conduct ongoing monitoring of the business relationship and to scrutinise transactions.50,000 – 500,000
4.Failure to conduct ongoing monitoring of the business relationship and to scrutinise transactions.100,000 – 500,000 

6. Federal Decree-Law No. (34) of 2022 Regulating the Legal Profession and Legal Consultation Profession

Federal Decree-Law No. (34) of 2022 is the governing law of the legal profession. It sets out licensing conditions, categories of lawyers, conduct duties, disciplinary committees, and the powers of the Ministry of Justice and the Executive Council. For AML purposes, it is the upstream instrument that defines who is a lawyer or legal consultant and whose license may be suspended or cancelled when penalties under Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024 are imposed.

7. Cabinet Decision No. (74) of 2020 Regarding Terrorism Lists and Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions

Cabinet Decision No. (74) of 2020 regulates the UAE’s domestic terrorism lists and the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions on the suppression and combating of terrorism, terrorist financing, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and related resolutions. It creates the obligation on every DNFBP, including law firms and notaries, to screen customers, transactions, and related parties against the UN Consolidated List and the UAE Local List; to apply without delay freezing measures on any confirmed match; and to report Confirmed Name Match Reports and Partial Name Match Reports to the FIU.

8. Federal Law No. (7) of 2014 on Combating Terrorism Crimes

Federal Law No. (7) of 2014 on Combating Terrorism Crimes is the criminal statute on terrorism offences, including financing. It defines terrorist acts, terrorist organisations, and the financing of terrorism, and it underpins the obligation in Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025 to report suspicions of terrorism-related activity. Legal professionals should read it alongside Cabinet Decision 74 of 2020 when drafting STR scripts and training modules.

9. Cabinet Decision No. (109) of 2023 on Regulating the Beneficial Owner Procedures

Cabinet Decision No. (109) of 2023 governs beneficial owner disclosure for legal persons in the UAE. For legal professionals, the instrument is particularly relevant when they establish or manage companies for clients: they must help the entity meet the requirements to maintain a beneficial owner register, a nominee director register where applicable, and a partners or shareholders register; keep the information accurate and current; and file prescribed beneficial owner information with the registrar. The 25 per cent ownership threshold referenced in Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 mirrors the BO identification trigger used across the UAE framework.

10. Cabinet Resolution No. (132) of 2023 Concerning Administrative Penalties for Violations of Cabinet Decision No. (109) of 2023

Cabinet Resolution No. (132) of 2023 is the administrative penalties grid for beneficial owner breaches. Law firms that provide company formation and ongoing management services should understand these penalties because, although the penalty is imposed on the legal person, the firm’s role in maintaining the register and filing the data can attract parallel administrative liability under Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024 as part of its AML obligations.

Quick Reference Timeline of Federal AML Instruments Affecting Legal Professionals

2014   CRIMINAL LAW 

Federal Law No. (7) of 2014 on Combating Terrorism Crimes 

Defines terrorism offences including financing and underpins STR scripts. 

2020   CROSS-SECTOR 

Cabinet Decision No. (74) of 2020 on terrorism lists and UNSC resolutions 

Creates screening, freezing, and EOCN reporting duties for every DNFBP. 

2022   PROFESSION 

Federal Decree-Law No. (34) of 2022 Regulating the Legal Profession 

Governs licensing, categories of lawyer, and disciplinary framework. 

2023   CROSS-SECTOR 

Cabinet Decision No. (109) of 2023 on Beneficial Owner Procedures 

Registers, filings, and 25 per cent identification threshold for legal persons. 

2023   CROSS-SECTOR 

Cabinet Resolution No. (132) of 2023 on BO Administrative Penalties 

Penalty grid for beneficial owner non-compliance. 

2024   CROSS-SECTOR 

Cabinet Resolution No. (71) of 2024 on AML/CFT Administrative Penalties 

Forty-one violations; fines AED 50,000 to AED 1,000,000; doubling on repetition. 

2025   PROFESSION 

Cabinet Resolution No. (8) of 2025 Executive Regulations of FDL 34/2022 

Operational rules for licensing, registers, and disciplinary action. 

2025   SECTOR 

Ministerial Resolution No. (248) of 2025 on supervision of law firms and notaries 

Establishes MoJ AML/CTF Department, inspection methodology, and grievance windows. 

2025   FEDERAL 

Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 on AML/CFT/CPF 

Primary AML statute; repeals FDL 20/2018; imprisonment and fine bands. 

2025   FEDERAL 

Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 Executive Regulations of FDL 10/2025 

Five covered activities; privilege carve-out; thresholds; BO rule. 

Need to map these laws to your firm's existing AML manual?

AML UAE performs gap-analysis mapping each article in FDL 10/2025, CR 134/2025, and CR 71/2024 to your current policies and procedures.

Overarching AML Guidance Applicable to Lawyers, Notaries, and Legal Professionals

Beyond federal statutes, legal professionals must follow a library of cross-sector guidance issued by the Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation, the Financial Intelligence Unit, and the National AML/CFT Committee. These documents are not stand-alone rulebooks, but failure to act on them is regularly cited as a contributing factor when administrative penalties are imposed under Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024.

Thirteen cross-sector documents in this section

Dates, issuers, and scope; each gets its own reference card below.

01. TFS Guidance (EOCN)

AML/CFT/CPF Federal DecCore guidance on targeted financial sanctions for FIs, DNFBPs, and VASPs. ree-Law

02. FIU Strategic Analysis

Terrorist financing typologies and facilitators, May 2025

03. Strategic Review

TFS case studies covering 2019 to 2021.

04. PF Institutional RA

Proliferation finance institutional risk assessment guidance.

05. TF and PF Red Flags

Red flag indicators on terrorist and proliferation financing.

06. Unlicensed VA Providers

Joint guidance on combating unlicensed virtual asset providers.

07. CPF Guidance

Counter proliferation financing guidance for FIs, DNFBPs, and VASPs.

08. Satisfactory Practice

Joint guidance on satisfactory and unsatisfactory practice.

09. TFS Typologies

EOCN typologies on circumvention of targeted sanctions.

10. Grievance Guideline

Framework for challenging supervisory decisions.

11. Online Grievance Guide

Step-by-step user guide for the MoJ online grievance system.

12. Combating PF & Sanctions Evasion

Cross-agency publication on PF and sanctions evasion.

13.NAS Simple Guide

How to subscribe to the EOCN Notification Alert System.

1. Guidance on Targeted Financial Sanctions for FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs (EOCN)

Issued January 2021; Last amended March 2026 

Guidance on Targeted Financial Sanctions for Financial Institutions, Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions, and Virtual Asset Service Providers 

Central EOCN guidance explaining the legal framework for TFS, scope of application, freezing without delay, reporting of Confirmed Name Match Reports and Partial Name Match Reports, use of the goAML and EOCN Notification Alert System, and expectations on sanctions screening, governance, and training. Published on eocn.gov.ae.

2. FIU Strategic Analysis Report on Terrorist Financing (May 2025)

May 2025 

Terrorist Financing Typologies and Facilitators – A Strategic Analysis Report 

UAEFIU public version strategic analysis setting out TF typologies and facilitator profiles observed in UAE STR data; complements sector red-flag catalogues and informs MoJ risk-based inspection priorities. 

3. Strategic Review on Targeted Financial Sanctions Case Studies (April 2024)

April 2024 (content: November 2021, IEC-SR.01.22) 

Strategic Review on Targeted Financial Sanctions Case Studies 2019-2021 

EOCN review of case studies drawn from UAE TFS implementation, highlighting common failings such as delayed screening, weak governance, and unreported partial matches. Useful for law firms drafting sanctions-screening logs.

4. Proliferation Finance Institutional Risk Assessment Guidance (December 2023)

Published December 2023 

Proliferation Finance Institutional Risk Assessment Guidance for FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs 

Methodology for conducting a firm-level PF risk assessment, including jurisdiction, customer, product, and delivery-channel risk. Expected input into a law firm’s enterprise-wide risk assessment.

5. Terrorist and Proliferation Financing Red Flags Guidance (December 2023)

Published September 2023; updated December 2023 

Terrorist and Proliferation Financing Red Flags Guidance 

Concise catalogue of TF and PF red flags designed to be embedded in STR decision trees. Firms should map each indicator to their goAML reporting workflow.

6. Joint Guidance on Combating the Use of Unlicensed Virtual Asset Providers (November 2023)

Issued March 2022 (Supervisory Authority Sub-Committee) 

Joint Guidance on Combating the Use of Unlicensed Virtual Asset Providers in the United Arab Emirates 

Expectations on DNFBPs, including law firms handling digital-asset company formations, to screen for unlicensed virtual asset activity and reject onboarding where red flags are present

7. Guidance on Counter Proliferation Financing for FIs, DNFBPs, and VASPs (November 2022)

Published 01 November 2022 – EOCN-PF.01.23 

Counter Proliferation Financing Guideline 

Authoritative EOCN guidance on CPF obligations, including understanding dual-use goods typologies, sanctions evasion tactics, and the expected governance response. 

8. Joint Guidance on Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory Practice (June 2021)

June 2021 

Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing Guidelines – Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory Practice 

Supervisory Authority Sub-Committee guidance contrasting practices that are considered satisfactory with those that are unsatisfactory. A reliable benchmark for internal audits.

9. Typologies on the Circumvention of Targeted Sanctions (March 2021)

Issued 20 March 2021; last amended 11 May 2021 

Typologies on the Circumvention of Targeted Sanctions against Terrorism and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (United Arab Emirates) 

EOCN typology paper focusing on evasion techniques including shell companies, trade-based methods, and misuse of legal persons. Particularly relevant to law firms establishing and managing entities. 

10. Guideline on Grievance Procedures

Undated (EOCN publication) 

Guideline on Grievance Procedures 

Framework guidance on filing grievances against supervisory decisions across federal authorities. Read alongside Articles 7 and 8 of MR 248 of 2025 for timelines. 

11. Online Grievance System User Guide

Undated 

Online Grievance System – User Guide 

Step-by-step walkthrough of the online grievance platform, including registration, grievance submission, and status tracking

12. Combating Proliferation Financing and Sanctions Evasion

EOCN publication 

Combating Proliferation Financing & Sanctions Evasion 

Reference text on PF typologies and evasion techniques; integrates with the CPF Guidance and the Typology Paper.

13. Simple Guide to Subscribe to the EOCN Notification Alert System (NAS)

EOCN publication 

Simple Guide to Subscribe to the EOCN Notification Alert System (NAS) 

Short operational guide to subscribing to the NAS, which delivers near real-time notifications of UN and UAE list updates and is a standard control for every law firm’s sanctions programme. 

Turning guidance into workable controls

AML UAE converts cross-sector guidance into operational checklists, screening-log templates, and STR decision trees tailored to your firm's covered activities.

NRA, SRA, and Other Important Guidelines Applicable to Lawyers and Legal Professionals

The UAE Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Report is the single most important cross-cutting risk document for every DNFBP, including law firms and notaries. Published by the National Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Financing of Illegal Organisations Committee, it sets the macro picture against which sectoral risk assessments and firm-level risk assessments are calibrated.

UAE Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Report – 2024

National AML/CFT Committee 

UAE Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing National Risk Assessment Report 

The NRA assesses ML and TF threats and vulnerabilities across the UAE financial, VASP, and DNFBP sectors. In the UAE, the Law Firms and Legal Consultations Sector is classified as Medium-Low risk for ML since there are no evidence showing that the sector has been abused for ML, or any predicate offences 

to ML. For legal professionals it highlights risks associated with the establishment and management of legal persons and arrangements, real estate transactions, and complex cross-border structures, feeding into the MoJ’s sector supervision plan. Circular No. (2) of 2025 of the Ministry of Justice directly instructs law firms to reflect NRA findings in their firm-wide risk assessments. 

Does your firm's risk assessment reflect the NRA?

AML UAE helps law firms translate NRA findings into firm-specific risk factors and weight them appropriately in the customer risk methodology.

Sector-Specific Guidelines Applicable to Lawyers, Notaries, and Legal Professionals

Sector-specific instruments are issued by the Ministry of Justice. They fall into two groups: the central Guidebook that explains what satisfactory compliance looks like, and a sequence of circulars that direct firms to act on discrete obligations (policy updates, high-risk country lists, TFS implementation, and the real-estate activities report). All circulars listed below are officially published by the Ministry of Justice; the 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026 policy update circulars are available on the MoJ website, while the earlier circulars are published in Arabic on the MoJ portal.

Twelve sector instruments in this section

The Guidebook plus eleven circulars spanning 2020 to 2026. Each card below states what the instrument requires of a law firm or notary.

01.Circular 1/2026

Updating AML policies, procedures, and controls.

02. MoJ Guidebook (Nov 2025)

Substantive sector reference.

03. Circular 3/2025

Updated list of high-risk jurisdictions.

04. Circular 2/2025

Acting on the UAE National Risk Assessment.

05. Circular 1/2025

Institutional assessment process controls.

06. Circular 1/2024

Simplified due diligence procedures.

07. Circular 2/2023

Obligations concerning high-risk jurisdictions.

08. Circular 1/2023

Commitment to institutional assessment controls.

09. Circular 14/2022

REAR – Real Estate Activities Report.

10. Circular 9/2022

Implementation of TFS under UN resolutions.

11. Circular 11/2021

Lawyers’ obligations on high-risk country lists.

12. Circular 18 + Circular 36/2020

Sanctions-list reporting and UN list implementation.

1. Circular No. (1) of 2026 Concerning the Obligation of Law Firms and Legal Consultancy Offices to Update Policies, Procedures, and Controls Related to AML/CFT/CPF (Arabic only)

Issued 2026 

Circular No. 1 of 2026 – Updated AML/CFT/CPF policies, procedures, and controls 

Directs law firms and legal consultancy offices to refresh their internal AML/CFT/CPF policies, procedures, and controls to reflect Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025, and to update documentation accordingly. Published by the Ministry of Justice; currently available in Arabic only.

2. Guidebook for Law Firms and Legal Consultancy Offices on AML/CFT/CPF (November 2025)

Second Edition, published 25 November 2025 

Guidebook for Law Firms and Legal Consultancy Offices on Combating Money Laundering, Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing 

The principal sector reference issued by the Director of the AML/CTF Department at the Ministry of Justice. It covers relevant legislation, supervisory structure, AML Department functions, key obligations, compliance-officer requirements, STR reporting via goAML, five-year record retention, TFS 24-hour freeze and one-business-day EOCN notification, administrative sanctions, appeal procedures, and sources of assistance including amlctf@moj.gov.ae and the EOCN address iec@uaeiec.gov.ae

3. Circular No. (3) of 2025 Regarding the Update of the List of High-Risk Countries and Countries Subject to Enhanced Monitoring (Arabic only)

Issued 2025 

Circular No. 3 of 2025 – Updated list of high-risk countries 

Directs lawyers and law firms to apply enhanced due diligence to clients from the updated FATF high-risk jurisdictions and jurisdictions subject to increased monitoring. Currently available in Arabic only on the Ministry of Justice website. 

4. Circular No. (2) of 2025 Regarding the National Risk Assessment (Arabic only)

Issued 2025 

Circular No. 2 of 2025 – National Risk Assessment 

Requires law firms to align their firm-wide risk assessments, client risk methodologies, and control environments with findings in the UAE National Risk Assessment. Currently available in Arabic only. 

5. Circular No. (1) of 2025 Regarding Commitment of Law Firms to the Controls of Institutional Assessment Processes (Arabic only)

Issued 2025 

Circular No. 1 of 2025 – Institutional assessment process controls 

Sets expectations on the institutional assessment process that law firms must follow, including documentation, sign-off, and periodic review. Currently available in Arabic only.

6. Circular No. (1) of 2024 Regarding Simplified Due Diligence Procedures (Arabic only)

Issued 2024 

Circular No. 1 of 2024 – Simplified due diligence procedures 

Clarifies the circumstances in which simplified due diligence is permitted, aligning with Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 on low-risk scenarios. Currently available in Arabic only

7. Circular No. (2) of 2023 Regarding Obligations of Lawyers Concerning the Updated List of High-Risk Countries (Arabic only)

Circular No. 2 of 2023 concerns lawyers’ obligations concerning the updated list of high-risk countries. A copy of this circular was not available to us in PDF form at the time of writing; the text is referenced in the Ministry of Justice archive, but firms should obtain the current version directly from the Ministry before applying it. 

8. Circular No. (1) of 2023 Regarding Commitment of Law Firms to the Controls of Institutional Assessment Processes (Arabic only)

Issued 2023 

Circular No. 1 of 2023 – Institutional assessment controls 

Earlier MoJ circular requiring law firms to commit to the controls of institutional AML assessment processes; superseded in substance by Circular No. 1 of 2025 on the same subject.

9. Circular No. (14) of 2022 Regarding the REAR Real Estate Activities Report (Arabic only)

Issued 2022 

Circular No. 14 of 2022 – REAR (Real Estate Activity Report) 

Instructs law firms involved in real estate transactions to file the Real Estate Activity Report on relevant transactions, consistent with the requirements that apply across DNFBPs handling real estate. 

10. Circular No. (9) of 2022 on Implementation by Lawyers of Targeted Financial Sanctions Under UN Security Council Resolutions (Arabic only)

Issued 2022 

Circular No. 9 of 2022 – Implementation by lawyers of targeted financial sanctions 

Reaffirms that lawyers must implement targeted financial sanctions stipulated by UN Security Council resolutions and the UAE cabinet, with without-delay freezing and reporting via EOCN.

11. Circular No. (11) of 2021 Regarding Lawyers' Obligations on Updated List of High-Risk Countries (Arabic only)

Issued 2021 

Circular No. 11 of 2021 – Lawyers’ obligations on high-risk countries 

Requires lawyers to apply enhanced due diligence to clients from high-risk jurisdictions; predecessor to Circular 3 of 2025 on the same subject. 

12. Circular No. (18) Regarding Lawyers' Implementation of Obligations to Report Clients on Sanctions Lists (Arabic only)

Issued 2020 

Circular No. 18 – Reporting of clients on international or local sanctions lists 

Directs law firms to report clients appearing on international or local sanctions lists in accordance with federal and EOCN procedures.

13. Circular No. (36) of 2020 Regarding the International and Local Sanctions Lists (Arabic only)

Issued 2020 

Circular No. 36 of 2020 – International and local sanctions lists 

Implements UN Security Council and cabinet sanctions lists at the level of lawyers and law firms, including obligations to screen clients and report matches. 

Conclusion

AML regulations for lawyers in UAE are neither a single rulebook nor a single set of penalties. They are a federated framework anchored in Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 and its Executive Regulations, built up through Cabinet Resolution No. (74) of 2020 on sanctions, Cabinet Decision No. (109) of 2023 on beneficial ownership, Cabinet Resolution No. (132) of 2023 on BO penalties, and Cabinet Resolution No. (71) of 2024 on administrative penalties, and made operational for the legal sector through Ministerial Resolution No. (248) of 2025, the Ministry of Justice Guidebook of November 2025, and a sequence of MoJ circulars from 2020 to 2026. 

What this means in practice for law firms, legal consultancy offices, and notaries public is that compliance is continuous rather than episodic. A satisfactory firm will maintain an enterprise-wide risk assessment that reflects the UAE National Risk Assessment; a client-onboarding process that systematically tests whether a matter falls within one of the five covered activities; sanctions-screening logs and Confirmed Name Match Report workflows that support the 24-hour freeze and one-business-day EOCN reporting; STR decision trees that operate through goAML and respect the privilege carve-out in Article 18, Clause 2 of FDL 10 of 2025 and CR 134 of 2025; a five-year records retention architecture; policies and procedures that are refreshed whenever a new MoJ circular is issued; and a training programme that keeps partners, lawyers, paralegals, and notaries public current on the framework. 

Firms licensed in ADGM or DIFC operate inside their respective free-zone regimes and should look to FSRA and DFSA rulebooks rather than MoJ instruments. For every other MoJ-supervised legal professional, the rulebook above is the benchmark the AML/CTF Department will use on an inspection. 

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Frequently Asked Questions

When do lawyers and legal consultants fall under UAE AML law?

A lawyer, legal consultant, or notary public falls under UAE AML law when they prepare or carry out any of the five covered activities under Article 3, Clause 4 of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025: buying or selling real estate; managing client money, securities, or assets; managing bank, savings, or securities accounts; organising contributions for a company; or establishing, operating, or managing legal persons or arrangements. Pure litigation, arbitration, mediation, and legal opinion work is protected by the privilege carve-out in Article 18, Clause 2 of Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025. 

The Ministry of Justice supervises law firms, legal consultancy offices, and notaries public through its AML/CTF Department, following Cabinet Decision No. (1/3 W) of 2019 and Cabinet Decision 65 of 2024, which upgraded the AML section into a full department. Ministerial Resolution No. (248) of 2025 sets out the current supervisory procedures and controls. Firms licensed in ADGM are supervised by FSRA; firms licensed in DIFC are supervised by DFSA. 

A law firm should maintain its firm-wide risk assessment; each client risk assessment; CDD and enhanced due diligence files; beneficial ownership information; transaction records and transaction risk assessments for covered activities; sanctions-screening logs, including CNMR and PNMR records and EOCN correspondence; STR decision records and goAML submission receipts; training and attendance records; and a corrective action register. Retention is for five years from the end of the business relationship or completion of the transaction, per the MoJ Guidebook of November 2025 and Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025. 

Ministerial Resolution No. (248) of 2025, issued on 29 April 2025, replaces Ministerial Resolutions 532 and 533 of 2019. It confirms the MoJ AML/CTF Department as the competent supervisory body for law firms, legal consultancy offices, and notaries public; applies the Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024 penalty schedule through Article 6; provides a 20-working-day grievance window in Article 7; and requires a 30-working-day response in Article 8. Firms should refresh their sanctions, STR, and governance policies to align with the new instrument. 

Yes. Law firms licensed in Abu Dhabi Global Market are supervised by the Registration Authority and follow the ADGM Financial Services and Markets Regulations together with the FSRA AML Rulebook. Law firms licensed in the Dubai International Financial Centre are supervised by the Dubai Financial Services Authority and follow the DIFC Regulatory Law and DFSA AML Module. These free-zone regimes are distinct from the Mainland MoJ regime described above and are covered on the ADGM and DIFC pages in this cluster.

Talk to AML UAE about your firm's compliance programme

Whether you are setting up a new law firm, responding to a MoJ inspection, or refreshing policies following Circular 1 of 2026, AML UAE helps legal professionals implement the full framework.

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About the Author

Pathik Shah

FCA, CAMS, CISA, CS, DISA (ICAI), FAFP (ICAI)

Pathik is an ACAMS-certified AML consultant specialising in governance, risk, and compliance for regulated entities in the UAE. He brings over 28 years of experience, with 1,000+ hours of AML training and 200+ advisory engagements across DNFBPs, VASPs, and FIs. He supports businesses in aligning with AML/CFT requirements from the CBUAE, DFSA, MoET, MoJ, VARA, CMA, FSRA, and FATF. Known for translating complex regulations into audit-ready procedures, Pathik enables operational clarity and compliance readiness.

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AML Regulations for Real Estate Agents and Brokers in UAE

At a glance AML regulations for real estate agents in UAE

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Last Updated: 04/28/2026

Table of Contents

Protect your business with reliable and effective AML strategies with AML UAE.

At a glance: AML regulations for real estate agents in UAE

The points below distil the core AML obligations for real estate brokers and agents in the UAE. Every item is traceable to a named law, cabinet resolution or Ministry of Economy circular cited later in this article.

At a glance AML regulations for real estate agents in UAE

Who is regulated

Licensed real estate brokers and agents concluding purchase or sale transactions on behalf of a customer, under Article 3(2) of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025.

Supervisor

Ministry of Economy, ADGM RA and DFSA inside the financial free zones.

REAR cash trigger

AED 55,000 or more in physical cash on a single or linked freehold sale or purchase, per MoET Circular 05/2022.

REAR virtual asset trigger

Any freehold transaction settled wholly or partly in a virtual asset, or funded by cash converted from a virtual asset.

Reporting channel

goAML platform of the UAE Financial Intelligence Unit; REAR is additional to STR, SAR, CNMR, PNMR and HRC, HRCA reports

Record retention

Minimum five years for all customer, transaction and REAR documentation, under Article 19(1)(f) of Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025, Article 25 of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 and MoET Circular 05/2022.

Administrative fines

AED 10,000 to AED 5,000,000 per violation under Article 17 of Federal Decree Law No. 10/2025; line items in Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024 range from AED 50,000 to AED 1,000,000.

Criminal exposure

Legal-person fines of AED 5,000,000 to AED 100,000,000 for the ML offence under Article 27 of Federal Decree Law No. 10/2025, plus dissolution and premises closure.

National risk rating

High residual ML risk on the mainland under the 2024 UAE National Risk Assessment.

AML regulations for real estate agents in UAE sit at the intersection of federal AML law, Ministry of Economy sector supervision and the UAE Financial Intelligence Unit reporting regime. Every licensed real estate broker or agent concluding a purchase or sale on behalf of a customer is a Designated Non-Financial Business and Profession (DNFBP) under Article 3(2) of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025, and must operate a risk-based AML/CFT/CPF programme anchored in Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025. This article walks through who qualifies as a regulated real estate broker, who supervises the sector, which specific laws and circulars apply, and which obligations actually bite on a typical freehold transaction.

Real estate is not a low-risk sector in the UAE. The 2024 National Risk Assessment rates mainland real estate brokers and agents at high residual ML risk, driven by cash-intensive transactions, foreign buyers and the use of legal persons to hold residential property. The FIU strategic analysis reviewed 976 Real Estate Activity Reports and 405 suspicious reports from real estate agents and brokers for the period 2020 to 2023, and the dominant typologies and red flags from that analysis are now embedded in the Ministry of Economy supervision.

To see how this page fits the wider AML framework, start with the DNFBPs pillar page and the hub guide to AML laws in UAE. If you operate inside the ADGM or DIFC, the regime is materially different and is covered in our ADGM AML regulations and DIFC AML regulations pages.

AML regulations for real estate agents in UAE

Four pillars of sector compliance walked through in this article, each anchored in specific UAE laws, circulars and guidance.

1. Who counts as a broker or agent

The DNFBP scope test under Article 3(2) of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025, plus Ministry of Economy scope statements

2. Who supervises the sector

Ministry of Economy and Tourism (MoET) for mainland and Commercial Free Zones, with distinct regimes for ADGM and DIFC.

3. Applicable laws and guidance

Federal decree-law, executive regulations, EOCN and FIU guidance, NRA, DNFBP circulars and real estate sector guidance.

4. Conclusion and obligations

Practical synthesis of CDD, REAR, STR, UBO and record-keeping duties, plus main red flags and penalties.

Who Counts as a Real Estate Agent or Broker for AML Purposes in the UAE?

For AML purposes in the UAE, a real estate agent or broker is any licensed natural or legal person that concludes a purchase or sale of real estate on behalf of a customer. That scope is set by Article 3(2) of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025, which replaced Cabinet Decision 10 of 2019 as the executive regulation of the federal AML decree-law.

Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 lists seven categories of Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions. Brokers and real estate agents are the second category, defined as DNFBPs when concluding transactions or settlements on behalf of their customers for the purchase or sale of real estate. The trigger is the act of concluding a purchase or sale for a client, not the act of holding a trade licence. Marketing, property management, valuation, and pure leasing work fall outside the statutory DNFBP scope, although the Ministry of Economy’s Supplemental Guidance for the Real Estate Sector notes that brokers should apply similar AML controls to lease transactions when the risk profile is comparable.

The Ministry of Economy reinforces the scope in its foundational Circular No. 1/2021 to real estate brokers and agents and in the September 2025 AML/CFT Guidelines for DNFBPs, both of which confirm that every brokerage concluding a purchase or sale for a customer is a DNFBP and must register on goAML, appoint a compliance officer and operate a full AML/CFT/CPF programme.

Lawyers, notaries and independent legal professionals become DNFBPs when preparing, conducting or executing financial transactions for a client concerning the purchase and sale of real estate (Article 3(4)(a) of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025). Company and Trust Service Providers become DNFBPs when acting as agents in the incorporation of legal persons that hold real estate. Dealers in precious metals and stones become DNFBPs at the AED 55,000 single or linked cash transaction threshold. Those adjacent categories are covered in the DNFBPs pillar page and in the specific lawyers and notaries, TCSPs and DPMS pages.

Scale of the regulated population: the UAEFIU 2023 Strategic Analysis Report on Real Estate Money Laundering records 4,446 registered real estate agents and brokers as of September 2023. The 2024 National Risk Assessment notes that approximately 99.8 per cent of real estate agents operate in the mainland and commercial free zones under Ministry of Economy oversight, with only a small minority inside the financial free zones supervised by the DFSA and the ADGM.

Scope test in one sentence

If your firm is licensed as a real estate broker or agent in the UAE and you conclude the purchase or sale of real estate for a customer, you are a DNFBP under Article 3(2) of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 and all obligations in this article apply, regardless of brokerage size, nationality of clients or property value.

Not sure whether you are a regulated DNFBP?

If your brokerage wants a second opinion on DNFBP scope, CDD trigger points or REAR reporting boundaries, the AML UAE team runs scoping assessments for real estate firms of every size.

AML Supervisory Authority for Real Estate Agents and Brokers in UAE

The AML supervisory authority for real estate agents and brokers on the UAE mainland and in commercial free zones is the Ministry of Economy and Tourism (MoET). The MoET was designated as the supervisor of DNFBPs in 2019 under Cabinet Resolutions 28/4/M and 3/1 and continues to hold that role under the regime introduced by Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025.

The Ministry of Economy and Tourism issues binding sector circulars, publishes implementation guides, runs risk-based on-site and off-site inspections, operates the supervisory grievance system and acts as the gateway for administrative fines under Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024. Every licensed real estate broker or agent on the mainland or in a commercial free zone registers, communicates and reports to the Ministry of Economy and Tourism.

Inside the two financial free zones, supervision is different. The ADGM Registration Authority (ADGM RA) supervises real estate activity within ADGM. The Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) supervises real estate activity within DIFC. These regimes apply their own AML rulebooks and are not covered by this page.

Two other federal authorities form essential touch points for every broker, even under the Ministry of Economy supervision. The UAE Financial Intelligence Unit receives all REAR, STR, SAR, CNMR, PNMR, and HRC reports through goAML. The Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) administers the UAE Targeted Financial Sanctions list and the Automatic Reporting System for sanctions screening outcomes. Ministry of Economy and Tourism circulars require brokers to register with the EOCN Notification Alert System (NAS) and to use the Automatic Reporting System on sanctions matches.

A single brokerage can touch more than one supervisor on a given deal. A mainland broker that introduces a property within DIFC to a client, or uses a DIFC-licensed law firm to conclude the transaction, still carries its own Ministry of Economy obligations in parallel with the DIFC obligations of the legal counterpart. See the DIFC AML regulations page and ADGM AML regulations page for each free-zone regime.

AML Regulations Applicable to Real Estate Agents and Brokers in UAE

The AML regulations applicable to real estate agents and brokers in UAE sit in five concentric layers: federal laws and executive regulations, overarching EOCN and FIU guidance, the national risk assessment, DNFBP-wide Ministry of Economy and Tourism circulars, and sector-specific real estate guidance. Each layer speaks to a different part of the compliance programme, and a real estate broker is expected to read down through all five.

Five regulatory layers for real estate brokers and agents

1. Federal AML laws

Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025, Federal Law 7 of 2014, and the executive, terrorism-list and beneficial-owner cabinet resolutions that form the backbone of the regime.

2. Overarching AML guidance

The UAE ML/TF National Risk Assessment 2024 that frames real estate as a high-residual-risk mainland sector.

3. NRA and other guidelines

The UAE ML/TF National Risk Assessment 2024 that frames real estate as a high-residual-risk mainland sector.

4. NRA and other guidelines

Ministry of Economy circulars applicable to all DNFBPs, including high-risk country lists, sanctions screening and CDD implementation guides.

5. Real estate sector guidance

Real estate specific Ministry of Economy circulars, FIU typology reports and supplemental guidance.

Federal AML Laws and Executive Regulations Applicable to the Real Estate Sector

These seven federal instruments define the offence structure, set the DNFBP scope, regulate beneficial ownership and provide the administrative penalty schedule that the Ministry of Economy applies to real estate brokers. They form the non-negotiable statutory floor for every real estate AML programme.

1. Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025

The AML/CFT/PF offences, obligations and penalty framework applicable to all DNFBPs including real estate brokers.

2. Federal Law 7 of 2014

Defines terrorism crimes and forms the predicate anchor for terrorism-financing obligations in real estate transactions.

3. Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025

Executive regulations that fix DNFBP scope, CDD timing, thresholds and record keeping.

4. Cabinet Decision 74 of 2020

UAE terrorism-lists regime and UN Security Council resolution implementation; binding on every broker screening its customers.

5. Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024

The unified violations and administrative fines schedule imposed by the Ministry of Economy on DNFBPs.

6. Cabinet Decision 109 of 2023

Governs beneficial-owner procedures that brokers rely on when verifying legal-person customers.

7. Cabinet Resolution 132 of 2023

Fines regime for beneficial-owner violations under Cabinet Decision 109 of 2023.

1. Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 Regarding Anti-Money Laundering, and Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing

This is the governing AML/CFT/PF statute for every real estate broker in the UAE. Article 2 defines money laundering; Article 3 defines the financing of terrorism and proliferation; Article 18 requires reporting of suspicious transactions through the Financial Intelligence Unit; Article 19(1)(e) imposes targeted financial sanctions duties; Article 24 protects the confidentiality of reports (with tipping-off penalised under Article 29); and Articles 17, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33 and 35 set the administrative and criminal penalty framework. The DNFBP definition that captures real estate brokers sits in the definitions chapter of this decree-law and is fleshed out in its executive regulation, Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025.

2. Federal Law No. (7) of 2014 Combating Terrorism Crimes

Federal Law 7 of 2014 defines terrorism offences, terrorist organisations and terrorist acts in the UAE. It is the predicate statute that underpins the terrorism-financing obligations imposed on real estate brokers under Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025, Cabinet Decision 74 of 2020 and the EOCN Targeted Financial Sanctions guidance. Brokers who encounter a customer match on a terrorism sanctions list apply the sanctions regime by reference to this statute.

3. Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 Concerning the Executive Regulations of Federal Decree-Law No. (10) of 2025 Concerning Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons

Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 is the practical rulebook that real estate brokers apply every day. Article 3(2) places brokers and agents within the DNFBP perimeter; Articles 5 to 9 set the risk-based approach and customer due diligence timing; Article 10 addresses beneficial-owner identification; Article 16 governs enhanced due diligence for politically exposed persons; Article 21 fixes internal programme, compliance officer and training requirements; and Article 25 sets the five-year record-keeping duty. This resolution replaces Cabinet Decision 10 of 2019, but circulars issued under the 2019 regulation remain valid unless specifically repealed.

4. Cabinet Decision No. (74) of 2020 Regarding Terrorism Lists Regulation and Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions on the Suppression and Combating of Terrorism, Terrorist Financing, Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related resolutions

Cabinet Decision 74 of 2020 establishes the UAE Local Terrorism List, governs listing and delisting procedures and implements UN Security Council resolutions 1267, 1373, 1718, 2231 and their successors. Real estate brokers use this instrument, together with the EOCN NAS and Automatic Reporting System, to screen every customer, beneficial owner and counterparty. A confirmed match triggers a freeze, a Confirmed Name Match Report (CNMR) on goAML and immediate notification to the EOCN.

5. Cabinet Resolution No. (71) of 2024 Regulating Violations, Administrative Penalties Imposed on Violators of Measures for Confronting Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism Subject to the Control of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Economy

Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024 is the unified penalty schedule that the Ministry of Economy uses against real estate brokers and other DNFBPs. Article 3 empowers the Ministry of Economy to impose the administrative penalties in Article 14 of the previous federal decree-law (now Article 17 of Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025), the fines in the attached schedule, or both. The schedule includes fines of AED 50,000 to AED 200,000 for CDD failures, AED 100,000 to AED 500,000 for enhanced due diligence failures and AED 50,000 to AED 1,000,000 for failure to act on National Risk Assessment findings, which are the bands real estate brokers see most often.

6. Cabinet Decision No. (109) of 2023 On Regulating the Beneficial Owner Procedures

Cabinet Decision 109 of 2023 governs the UBO regime that real estate brokers rely on when verifying legal-person customers. Article 4 lists the basic data that every legal person must maintain on its beneficial owners, partners and nominee directors; Article 8 sets the duty to keep the UBO register up to date; Article 11 obliges the legal person to disclose UBO information to the registrar, and Article 11(8) fixes a five-year retention duty for UBO records after dissolution or liquidation. MoE Circular 05/2022 requires real estate brokers to collect the UBO register for every legal-person buyer or seller, in addition to the trade licence, articles of association and Emirates ID or passport of each UBO and shareholder.

7. Cabinet Resolution No. (132) of 2023 Concerning the Administrative Penalties against Violators of the Provisions of the Cabinet Resolution No. (109) of 2023 Concerning the Regulation of Beneficial Owner Procedures

Cabinet Resolution 132 of 2023 sets out the specific administrative fines applied to legal persons and their representatives who fail to maintain, update or disclose UBO data under Cabinet Decision 109 of 2023. Real estate brokers do not themselves impose these fines, but they must recognise them when a legal-person customer declines to provide UBO data. A refusal by a counterparty to provide UBO information is itself a CDD red flag and a basis for declining to conclude the transaction.

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Overarching AML Guidance Applicable to Real Estate Agents and Brokers

The EOCN and the UAE Financial Intelligence Unit publish cross-sector guidance and strategic reports that apply to every DNFBP, including real estate brokers. Together they set expectations on targeted financial sanctions, proliferation financing, terrorism-finance red flags and the use of the Automatic Reporting System and grievance channels.

Thirteen cross-sector guidance instruments a real estate broker should treat as mandatory reference material.

1. EOCN TFS Guidance – March 2026

The latest targeted financial sanctions guidance for FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs; supersedes earlier TFS guidelines on sanctions controls.

2. FIU Strategic Analysis on Terrorist Financing – May 2025

Analysis of emerging TF patterns relevant to brokers handling cross-border or high-risk-country customers

3. Strategic Review on TFS Case Studies – April 2024

Worked examples of sanctions evasion patterns and expected broker controls.

4. Proliferation Financing IRA Guidance – December 2023

Institutional risk assessment template for PF risk.

5. TF and PF Red Flags Guidance – December 2023

Behavioural and transactional indicators of TF and PF linked to real estate and other sectors.

6. Joint Guidance on Unlicensed VASPs – November 2023

How to detect buyers settling real estate via unlicensed virtual-asset providers.

7. CPF Guidance – November 2022

Counter proliferation financing programme expectations for DNFBPs and VASPs.

8. Joint Guidance – Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory Practice – June 2021

Side-by-side examples of acceptable and unacceptable AML controls.

9. Typologies on TFS Circumvention – March 2021

Typologies on how sanctioned persons misuse legal and real-estate structures.

10. EOCN Guideline on Grievance Procedures

Formal route to challenge sanctions listings or freezing orders.

11. Online Grievance System User Guide

Operational guide for the electronic grievance platform.

12. Combating Proliferation Financing and Sanctions Evasion

EOCN technical guidance on sanctions evasion red flags.

13. Simple Guide to Subscribe to EOCN NAS

Step-by-step to register for the Notification Alert System used for sanctions list updates.

1. Guidance on Targeted Financial Sanctions for Financial Institutions, Designated Non-Financial Business and Professions (DNFBPs) and Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) issued by the Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) – March 2026

This is the most recent cross-sector TFS guideline from the EOCN. It consolidates screening, listing, delisting, reporting and record-keeping expectations for DNFBPs, including real estate brokers, against UN Security Council resolutions and the UAE Local Terrorism List. The guidance fixes expectations on the use of the Automatic Reporting System for Confirmed Name Match Reports and Partial Name Match Reports, and on the integration of NAS alerts into customer screening workflows.

2. FIU’s Strategic Analysis Report on Terrorist Financing – May 2025

The UAEFIU strategic report identifies TF typologies and emerging patterns seen across STR and SAR filings. For real estate brokers, it matters because freehold purchases by or on behalf of designated persons, or using funds routed through high-risk jurisdictions, are persistent patterns the FIU expects brokers to detect and report via goAML.

3. Strategic Review on Targeted Financial Sanctions Case Studies – April 2024

This review from the EOCN collates anonymised case studies on TFS compliance failures and successes in the UAE. Real estate brokers use the case studies to benchmark their own sanctions screening thresholds, their handling of false-positive alerts and their internal escalation procedures.

4. Proliferation Finance Institutional Risk Assessment Guidance for FIs, DNFBPs, and VASPs – December 2023

This EOCN document provides a template for the PF institutional risk assessment that every DNFBP, including real estate brokers, must produce and keep current. The template covers threat, vulnerability and control assessments, and is the document that the Ministry of Economy expects to see during an on-site inspection of any brokerage.

5. Terrorist and Proliferation Financing Red Flags Guidance – December 2023

This red-flag compendium lists customer, transactional and geographic indicators of TF and PF risk relevant to DNFBPs. Several red flags apply directly to real estate transactions, including payments from or to high-risk jurisdictions, structuring cash deposits and use of complex legal persons with no apparent commercial purpose.

6. Joint Guidance on Combating the Use of Unlicensed Virtual Asset Providers in the UAE – November 2023

Issued jointly by the UAEFIU, SCA, EOCN and other authorities, this guidance explains how unlicensed VASPs are used to move illicit funds into and out of the UAE, and how DNFBPs should detect the pattern. It is highly relevant to real estate brokers because virtual-asset settlements or conversions on freehold transactions trigger REAR filing under MoE Circular 05/2022.

7. Guidance on Counter Proliferation Financing for FIs, DNFBPs, and VASPs – November 2022

This older but still binding CPF guideline sets the minimum controls that a real estate brokerage must apply to proliferation financing risk. It has been supplemented by the 2023 PF institutional risk assessment guidance, but has not been repealed; brokers read both together.

8. Joint Guidance – Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory Practice – June 2021

This cross-supervisor joint guidance shows how the UAE regulators score AML control effectiveness. Several examples cover real estate transactions, especially around beneficial ownership, source of funds and suspicious transaction reporting. It is a useful calibration benchmark when a broker is writing its AML policies.

9. Typologies on the circumvention of Targeted Sanctions against Terrorism and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction – March 2021

Typologies published by the EOCN that show how sanctioned persons attempt to use legal persons, family members and intermediaries to move funds or acquire assets, including real estate. Real estate brokers use the typologies to design screening rules and to train front-office staff.

10. EOCN Guideline on Grievance Procedures

The grievance procedure lets a listed person or their representative challenge the listing or a resulting freeze action. Real estate brokers keep a copy of the guidelines to answer customer queries where a freeze on a pending property purchase has been applied.

11. Online Grievance System User Guide

The EOCN publishes an electronic portal for submitting grievances against listings and freezing actions. The user guide is a practical reference for compliance officers needing to navigate the portal on behalf of a customer or counterparty.

12. Combating Proliferation Financing and Sanctions Evasion

This EOCN policy document sets out typologies and controls specifically aimed at proliferation financing and sanctions evasion. Real estate brokers use it to supplement the PF institutional risk assessment with scenario-based control testing, especially around corporate buyers linked to high-risk jurisdictions.

13. Simple Guide to Subscribe to the EOCN Notification Alert System (NAS)

The NAS is the free, opt-in subscription service that delivers every update to the UAE Local Terrorism List and the UNSC Consolidated List directly to subscribed compliance officers. The EOCN expects every DNFBP, including real estate brokers, to subscribe to the relevant compliance officer to NAS.

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NRA, SRA, and Other Important Guidelines Applicable to Real Estate Agents and Brokers

The national risk assessment tells real estate brokers how the State itself rates ML and TF risk in the sector. The 2024 exercise is the most recent authoritative assessment and is the reference document that Ministry of Economy supervisors benchmark against.

UAE ML/TF National Risk Assessment – 2024

The 2024 National Risk Assessment classifies mainland real estate brokers and agents as high residual ML risk. The assessment highlights cash-intensive transactions, luxury freehold properties, foreign investment and the use of legal persons to hold residential property as the dominant risk drivers. It records that approximately 96 per cent of the circa 16,000 DNFBP firms fall under Ministry of Economy supervision and that 99.8 per cent of real estate agents sit in the mainland and commercial free zones. Brokers must map their own business-wide risk assessment to the 2024 NRA findings; Ministry of Economy Circular 4 of 2025 explicitly requires DNFBPs to integrate the NRA conclusions into their risk management.

DNFBP Sector-Specific Guidance Applicable to Real Estate Agents and Brokers

Ministry of Economy circulars and DNFBP-wide guidance apply to every regulated real estate broker. They translate the federal decree-law and executive regulations into operational expectations, and are the documents that Ministry of Economy supervisors quote during inspections.

Ministry of Economy DNFBP circulars and guides

Ten cross-DNFBP instruments binding on real estate brokers alongside sector-specific circulars.

1. Circular 1 of 2026 – high-risk country list

Latest update to the lists of high-risk countries and jurisdictions under increased monitoring.

2. AML/CFT Guidelines for DNFBPs – September 2025

The foundational MoET DNFBP playbook covering governance, CDD, STR and record keeping.

3. Circular 3 of 2025 - sanctions screening

Reinforces the obligation to screen customers and beneficial owners against sanctions and terrorism lists.

4. Circular 4 of 2025 – NRA 2024

Requires DNFBPs to integrate NRA 2024 findings into business-wide risk assessments.

5. Circular 6 of 2025 – risk-based CDD

Focuses on when simplified due diligence is acceptable versus enhanced due diligence.

6. Circular 7 of 2025 – UN sanctions on Iran

Implements the snapback of UN sanctions under UNSCR 1737 and successors.

7. Circular 8 of 2025 – high-risk country list

Immediate predecessor of Circular 1 of 2026; still relevant for back-book records.

8. Implementation Guide on CRA – November 2024

Step-by-step customer risk assessment methodology for DNFBPs.

9. Implementation Guide on CDD – November 2024

Step-by-step customer due diligence methodology.

10. Circular 2 of 2022 – UNSCRs 1718 and 2231

Updated TFS expectations for DNFBPs under the DPRK and Iran UN sanctions regimes.

1. Circular No. (1) of 2026 on Updating the Lists of High-Risk Countries, Countries Subject to Increased Monitoring, and Related Measures

Circular 1 of 2026 updates the Ministry of Economy list of high-risk countries and countries subject to increased monitoring, in line with the most recent FATF plenary outcomes. Real estate brokers integrate the list into screening and customer risk assessment, apply enhanced due diligence to customers connected to high-risk jurisdictions, and consider filing a High Risk Country Report or High Risk Country Activity Report on goAML where a transaction has a material link to such a country.

2. AML/CFT Guidelines for Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions – September 2025

These are the revised Ministry of Economy guidelines for DNFBPs, signed by the Director of the AML Department in September 2025. The guidelines cover governance, compliance officer duties, business-wide risk assessment, customer risk assessment, CDD and enhanced due diligence, STR and SAR filing, record keeping, and staff training. They explicitly identify real estate agents and brokers as a core DNFBP category and are the single most-cited supervisory document in Ministry of Economy inspections.

3. Circular No. (3) of 2025 emphasizes the importance of screening sanctions and terrorist lists

Circular 3 of 2025 reinforces the screening obligation. It requires every DNFBP, including real estate brokers, to screen customers, beneficial owners and relevant counterparties against the UN, UAE Local Terrorism List and Ministry of Economy notifications at onboarding, at every transaction and whenever the lists are updated. The circular ties the obligation to the Automatic Reporting System for CNMR and PNMR filing.

4. Circular No. (4) of 2025 on Understanding the Importance of the UAE 2024 National Risk Assessment

Circular 4 of 2025 instructs DNFBPs to read the 2024 NRA and to integrate its findings into their business-wide risk assessments, customer risk methodology, staff training and internal policies. For real estate brokers, the integration turns the NRA’s high-risk rating on mainland real estate into a concrete risk factor that must be reflected in each customer’s risk score.

5. Circular No. (6) of 2025 on Emphasizing the Implementation of Risk-Based Customer Due Diligence Measures (with a Focus on Simplified Due Diligence)

Circular 6 of 2025 explains the scope and limits of simplified due diligence and reinforces the primacy of the risk-based approach. For real estate brokers, the circular is material because simplified due diligence is almost never appropriate on freehold purchase or sale transactions above AED 55,000 in cash or settled in virtual assets; those transactions trigger full CDD and REAR obligations.

6. Circular No. (7) of 2025 Regarding the Reimposition of United Nations Sanctions Related to Iran Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1737 (2006) and Subsequent Resolutions

Circular 7 of 2025 implements the reimposed UN sanctions on Iran. It extends the sanctions perimeter and lists the categories of Iranian persons and entities now subject to asset freezing. Real estate brokers update customer screening and beneficial-owner checks in light of this instrument, particularly when a transaction has any Iran nexus.

7. Circular No. (8) of 2025 on Updating the Lists of High-Risk Countries, Countries Subject to Increased Monitoring, and Related Measures

Circular 8 of 2025 is the immediate predecessor of Circular 1 of 2026. It is no longer the operative list but remains part of a broker’s audit trail for customer risk decisions taken during its period of application.

8. Implementation Guide For DNFBPs on Customer Risk Assessment (CRA) – November 2024

The Implementation Guide on CRA sets out the Ministry of Economy’s recommended methodology for scoring customer ML/TF/PF risk. It gives real estate brokers a concrete template that combines customer, geographic, product and delivery-channel factors, and it specifies the frequency of rescoring. Real estate-specific factors such as freehold versus leasehold, cash versus financed and residential versus commercial properties map cleanly into the CRA template.

9. Implementation Guide For DNFBPs on Customer Due Diligence (CDD) – November 2024

The CDD Implementation Guide describes how to conduct identification, verification, beneficial-ownership investigation, source-of-funds review and ongoing monitoring. The guide sets expectations on acceptable identity documents, verification sources and enhanced measures for PEPs and high-risk countries. Real estate brokers use it alongside MoET Circular 05/2022 and the Supplemental Guidance for the Real Estate Sector to build a sector-specific CDD workflow.

10. Circular No. (2) of 2022 regarding Implementation of Targeted Financial Sanctions (TFS) on UNSCRs 1718 (2006) and 2231 (2015)

Circular 2 of 2022 consolidates earlier TFS obligations on the DPRK (UNSCR 1718) and Iran (UNSCR 2231) programmes. It remains in force as a binding instruction to real estate brokers alongside Circular 7 of 2025 and the EOCN guidance. A broker facing a match on either programme must freeze the assets, submit a CNMR through the Automatic Reporting System and notify the EOCN without delay.

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Sector-Specific Guidelines Applicable to Real Estate Agents and Brokers

Four real-estate-specific documents set the sector detail that a broker must master alongside the cross-DNFBP framework. They fix the Real Estate Activity Report trigger points, the typologies the UAEFIU expects brokers to detect, and the baseline compliance programme for the sector.

1. FIU Real Estate ML Typologies – December 2023

UAEFIU strategic analysis of real-estate ML patterns in the UAE, based on 976 REARs and 405 broker STRs.

2. MoE Circular 05/2022 – Real Estate Activity Report

Mandates the REAR for freehold cash and virtual-asset transactions at or above AED 55,000.

3. MoET Circular 1 of 2021

Foundational Ministry of Economy compliance circular to real estate brokers and agents.

4. Supplemental Guidance for the Real Estate Sector – May 2019

Detailed AML/CFT guidance and indicators of suspicious transactions for real estate professionals.

1. FIU’s Strategic Analysis Report on Real Estate Money Laundering Typologies and Patterns – December 2023

The UAEFIU strategic analysis examines 976 Real Estate Activity Reports, 405 suspicious reports from real estate agents and brokers and 612 suspicious reports from other reporting entities between 1 July 2020 and 30 June 2023. The report identifies six dominant typologies for the UAE real estate sector: use of third parties and family members, abuse of legal-person structures and corporate accounts, involvement of DNFBPs and brokers’ own bank accounts, claimed rental income, use of home finance and early settlement and manipulation of the property price. The report also covers unlicensed real estate crowdfunding, hawala and VASP-related patterns. Real estate brokers should map each typology to at least one red flag inside their transaction monitoring rule set. See the full report on the UAEFIU website.

2. Ministry of Economy Circular No. (05/2022) On Real Estate Activity Report

MoE Circular 05/2022, dated 24 June 2022 and effective from 1 July 2022, is the single most operationally important document for real estate brokers. It requires every licensed real estate broker or agent in the UAE to submit a Real Estate Activity Report (REAR) through goAML whenever a freehold purchase or sale transaction involves (a) a single or linked physical cash transaction equal to or exceeding AED 55,000, (b) payment in virtual assets for a portion or the whole of the property value, or (c) funds converted from a virtual asset to cash for a portion or the whole of the property value. The circular mandates the collection of Emirates ID or passport, receipts, contracts and the Purchase and Sale Agreement; for legal-person counterparties, it additionally requires the trade licence, articles of association, UBO register and Emirates ID or passport of every UBO and shareholder. Records must be kept for at least five years. A REAR does not replace STR, SAR, CNMR, PNMR, HRC or HRCA obligations.

3. MoET Circular No. (1) of 2021

MoET Circular 1 of 2021, dated 4 February 2021, is the foundational Ministry of Economy circular to real estate brokers, DPMS, auditors and corporate service providers. It sets the baseline compliance programme: appoint a compliance officer under Article 21 of Cabinet Decision 10 of 2019 (now Article 21 of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025), perform customer due diligence, report suspicious transactions via goAML, comply with targeted financial sanctions, and keep records for five years. The circular remains valid because it was issued under the predecessor executive regulation and has not been specifically repealed; it should be read together with the September 2025 DNFBP Guidelines and MoE Circular 05/2022.

4. Supplemental Guidance for the Real Estate Sector – May 2019

The Supplemental Guidance is the detailed sector companion to the DNFBP Guidelines. Section 11.3 covers real estate specifically: scope of DNFBP obligations, sector-specific risk factors, enhanced CDD expectations, ongoing monitoring and an extensive catalogue of typologies and indicators of suspicious transactions. The indicators cover concealment of beneficial ownership, concealment of the illicit source of funds, realisation of value or utility for the perpetrators, and the means of payment. Brokers use the guidance to calibrate their red-flag library and to train transaction-facing staff.

Conclusion: practical AML obligations, REAR, red flags and penalties

This section consolidates the operational duties, the REAR mechanics, the typology-driven red flags and the penalty exposure that a licensed real estate broker must manage in practice.

What a real estate broker must actually do

Four compliance priorities that translate the laws and circulars above into day-to-day work.

1. Core obligations

Register, appoint a compliance officer, assess risk, conduct CDD, monitor ongoing relationships and keep records for five years.

2. Real Estate Activity Report

File a REAR on every freehold cash or virtual-asset transaction above the trigger, in addition to STR, SAR, CNMR and PNMR obligations.

3. Red flags in practice

Six UAEFIU typologies to embed in front-office screening and transaction monitoring rule sets.

4. Penalties and enforcement

Administrative fines under Article 17 of Federal Decree Law No. 10/2025 and Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024; criminal liability under Articles 27 to 35 of Federal Decree Law No. 10/2025.

Core obligations for real estate brokers

  • Every licensed real estate broker or agent who concludes a purchase or sale for a customer must:
  • Register on goAML and on the EOCN Automatic Reporting System;
  • Appoint a compliance officer under Article 21 of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025;
  • Produce and maintain a business-wide risk assessment integrating the 2024 National Risk Assessment findings;
  • Develop AML policies and procedures
  • Conduct risk-based customer due diligence under Articles 5 to 9 of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025;
  • Identify and verify the beneficial owner under Article 10 of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 and Cabinet Decision 109 of 2023;
  • Apply enhanced due diligence to politically exposed persons under Article 16 of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 and to high-risk-country customers and complex legal-person structures;
  • Screen against UN, UAE Local Terrorism List and Ministry of Economy notifications;
  • File STRs, SARs, CNMRs, PNMRs, HRC, and HRCA reports via goAML without tipping-off; and
  • Keep all records for at least five years under Article 19(1)(f) of Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025 and Article 25 of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025.

Real Estate Activity Report (REAR) mechanics

MoE Circular 05/2022 mandates a REAR whenever a freehold purchase or sale involves AED 55,000 or more in physical cash (single or linked), or any virtual-asset settlement or cash converted from a virtual asset. The report is submitted on goAML and sits on top of the STR, SAR, CNMR, PNMR, HRC and HRCA regimes; it does not replace them. For a legal person, the broker collects, in addition to the buyer’s or seller’s Emirates ID or passport and the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the trade licence, articles of association, UBO register and identity documents of each UBO and shareholder. Records are kept for at least five years. A broker that fails to submit the REAR, or submits it late or with incomplete data, exposes itself to administrative fines under Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024 and, where the underlying transaction is linked to an offence, to criminal liability under Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025.

Typology-driven red flags

The UAEFIU 2023 strategic analysis, the 2019 Supplemental Guidance, and the 2023 TF and PF Red Flags Guidance together give real estate brokers a consolidated red-flag library. Six high-confidence red flags stand out:

High-confidence red flags from UAEFIU typologies

Use the library below to draft your screening procedures and transaction-monitoring thresholds.

1. Third parties and family members

Properties bought in the name of family members with no independent source of funds; powers of attorney used to obscure true buyer.

2. Corporate buyer with no economic substance

Recently incorporated legal persons with no activity, nominee directors or shared addresses across multiple entities.

3. DNFBP or broker bank account misuse

Funds moved through a broker’s own bank account or the client account of a lawyer or notary without a clear purpose

4. Claimed rental income

Cash inflows labelled as rental income but with no visible tenant, lease agreement or market-consistent rent.

5. Rapid home finance and early settlement

Mortgage taken and settled within months using cash of unexplained origin, often following a cross-border transfer.

6. Price manipulation

Sale price significantly above or below market without commercial justification; repeated transactions between connected parties

The Supplemental Guidance adds detailed indicators across customer, transaction and means-of-payment dimensions. Among the most common for UAE brokers are: customer reluctance to explain the source of funds, use of legal persons registered in high-risk jurisdictions, use of bearer instruments or cashier’s cheques that conceal the payer, structuring cash deposits to stay under reporting thresholds, and last-minute changes to buyer identity or contract price. Every red flag should trigger enhanced due diligence, a senior-management review and, where suspicion crystallises, a suspicious-transaction report through goAML.

Penalties for non-compliance

Non-compliance exposes a brokerage to three layers of liability.

1. Administrative action:

  • Under Article 17 of Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025, the Ministry of Economy can issue warnings, impose fines from AED 10,000 to AED 5,000,000 per violation, ban violators, suspend managers, restrict or cancel the trade licence and close the premises.
  • The unified schedule in Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024 fixes specific ranges, including AED 100,000 to AED 200,000 for failing to set an AML policy approved by top management, AED 50,000 to AED 500,000 for failing to assess and document crime risks, AED 100,000 to AED 500,000 for failing to apply enhanced due diligence to high-risk customers and AED 50,000 to AED 200,000 for failing to complete CDD before establishing a business relationship. The Ministry may double fines for repeat violations within twelve months.

2. Criminal Liability:

  • Criminal liability under Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025: Article 27 provides that a legal person whose representatives, directors or agents commit an ML, TF or PF offence on its behalf is punished by a fine of AED 5,000,000 to AED 100,000,000, or an amount equal to the value of the criminal property, whichever is greater, and the Court may order dissolution and closure of premises.
  • Article 28 imposes imprisonment and a fine of AED 100,000 to AED 1,000,000 for deliberate or grossly negligent failure to report suspicious transactions under Article 18; Article 29 imposes imprisonment and a fine from AED 50,000 for tipping-off and for failing to comply with freezing orders; Article 32 imposes AED 200,000 to AED 10,000,000 for engaging in DNFBP activity without the necessary registration; Article 33 imposes a fine from AED 20,000 for violating EOCN targeted financial sanctions instructions; Article 35 imposes a fine from AED 20,000 for providing false beneficial-owner information. An attempt is punished on the same footing as the completed offence (Article 26(5)).

3. Reputational and licensing consequences:

  • The Ministry of Economy publishes enforcement outcomes, the EOCN publishes freezing actions, and supervisors in the ADGM and DIFC cooperate with the Ministry of Economy and UAEFIU on cross-jurisdiction matters.

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FAQs: AML regulations for real estate agents in UAE

Are real estate brokers and agents subject to AML rules in the UAE?

Yes. Every licensed real estate broker or agent that concludes a purchase or sale of real estate for a customer is a Designated Non-Financial Business and Profession (DNFBP) under Article 3(2) of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025, and is subject to the full AML/CFT/PF obligations in Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025, the Ministry of Economy circulars and the EOCN and FIU guidance. The Ministry of Economy supervises mainland and commercial-free-zone brokerages; ADGM and DIFC brokerages follow their own regimes.

The Real Estate Activity Report (REAR) is a transaction-level filing on the goAML platform required by MoE Circular 05/2022 since 1 July 2022. Brokers file a REAR on every freehold purchase or sale transaction involving AED 55,000 or more in physical cash (single or linked), or any settlement in virtual assets, or any cash funded by conversion from a virtual asset. A REAR is filed in addition to any STR, SAR, CNMR, PNMR, HRC or HRCA obligations, and records are kept for at least five years.

At minimum: identify and verify the customer under Article 9 and the beneficial owner under Article 10 of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025; screen every party against UN sanctions, the UAE Local Terrorism List and MoE notifications; understand the source of funds and source of wealth for high-value or cash-intensive transactions; apply enhanced due diligence to politically exposed persons under Article 16 and customers linked to high-risk countries; conduct ongoing monitoring for the duration of the relationship; and report suspicions via goAML. The November 2024 Implementation Guides on CRA and CDD provide the detailed methodology.

The UAEFIU 2023 strategic analysis identifies six dominant typologies: use of third parties and family members, abuse of legal-person structures and corporate accounts, misuse of DNFBPs and brokers’ bank accounts, claimed rental income with no substance, home finance followed by rapid early settlement and manipulation of the property price. The 2019 Supplemental Guidance lists detailed indicators across the customer, the transaction and the means of payment. Any combination of these factors requires enhanced due diligence and, if suspicion remains, an STR via goAML.

Yes. Real estate activity inside the ADGM is supervised by the ADGM Registration Authority and follows the ADGM AML rulebook. Real estate activity inside the DIFC is supervised by the Dubai Financial Services Authority and follows the DFSA AML rulebook. Both regimes align with Federal Decree-Law 10 of 2025 at the principles level, but the specific rules, thresholds, reporting channels, and penalty schedules are different. Brokers operating across the mainland and a financial free zone must comply with both regimes in parallel.

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About the Author

Pathik Shah

FCA, CAMS, CISA, CS, DISA (ICAI), FAFP (ICAI)

Pathik is an ACAMS-certified AML consultant specialising in governance, risk, and compliance for regulated entities in the UAE. He brings over 28 years of experience, with 1,000+ hours of AML training and 200+ advisory engagements across DNFBPs, VASPs, and FIs. He supports businesses in aligning with AML/CFT requirements from the CBUAE, DFSA, MoET, MoJ, VARA, CMA, FSRA, and FATF. Known for translating complex regulations into audit-ready procedures, Pathik enables operational clarity and compliance readiness.

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AML Regulations for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones (DPMS) in UAE

AML Regulations for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones (DPMS) in UAE

Blogs

Last Updated: 04/27/2026

Table of Contents

Protect your business with reliable and effective AML strategies with AML UAE.

Key Highlights

• DPMS are brought into the AML/CFT perimeter at an AED 55,000 transaction threshold defined in Article 3(3) of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025.

• The Anti-Money Laundering Department of the Ministry of Economy and Tourism supervises DPMS operating in the mainland and commercial free zones.

• Every threshold-crossing transaction must be captured in a Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones Report (DPMSR) filed on goAML (MoE Circular 08/AML/2021).

• Gold refiners and supply-chain participants are subject to an additional 5-step responsible sourcing framework under Ministerial Decree 68 of 2024.

• Administrative fines for AML/CFT violations range from AED 50,000 to AED 1,000,000 per violation under Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024.

• The UAE’s 2024 National Risk Assessment rates the sector’s inherent ML/TF risk as medium-to-high.

AML Regulations for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones (DPMS) in UAE

The AML Regulations for DPMS in UAE sit inside the wider Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBP) framework explained in our parent guide, AML Regulations for DNFBPs in UAE. Precious metals and stones markets combine high intrinsic value, cross-border mobility and deep cash reliance, which is why Federal Decree Law 10 of 2025, Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 and a dedicated set of Ministry of Economy and Tourism (MoET) circulars bring dealers in precious metals and stones inside the UAE’s AML/CFT/CPF perimeter.

This page explains the legal framework, the supervisory architecture, the 5-step gold sourcing overlay and the obligations that every DPMS must meet when it crosses the AED 55,000 threshold set out in Article 3(3) of the Executive Regulations.

At a Glance

Perimeter: Any dealer in precious metals or precious stones carrying out a single cash transaction, or linked cash transactions, equal to or above AED 55,000 (Cabinet Resolution 134/2025, Article 3(3)).

Primary supervisor: Ministry of Economy and Tourism (MoET) for mainland and commercial free zone DPMS.

Governing law: Federal Decree Law 10 of 2025 (AML/CFT/CPF); Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 (Executive Regulations).

Reporting trigger: DPMSR filed on goAML for each cash or wire transaction at or above AED 55,000 (MoE Circular 08/AML/2021).

Gold sourcing overlay: Gold refineries and supply chain entities must apply the 5-step Due Diligence Regulations for Responsible Sourcing of Gold (Ministerial Decree 68/2024; Circular 2/2024).

Penalty range: AED 50,000 to AED 1,000,000 per violation (Cabinet Resolution 71 of 2024).

Sector risk rating: Medium-to-high ML/TF risk (UAE National Risk Assessment 2024).

Population on goAML: 8,191 DPMS registered as of 30 June 2025; 1,448,825 DPMSRs filed Jul 2021 – Jun 2025 (UAEFIU Strategic Analysis Report on DPMS, Sept 2025).

Scope note

This page explains AML regulations applicable to dealers in precious metals and stones (DPMS) in the UAE, with specific coverage of gold sourcing and the AED 55,000 reporting threshold. Broader AML obligations that apply across all DNFBPs are explained in AML Regulations for DNFBPs in UAE.

What this DPMS guide covers

Three substantive sections walk you through perimeter, supervisor and the layered AML regulations for DPMS in UAE.

1. Who Counts as a DPMS in the UAE

2. AML Supervisory Authority for DPMS

3. AML Regulations Applicable to DPMS

Who Counts as a Dealer in Precious Metals and Stones (DPMS) in the UAE?

A dealer in precious metals and stones (DPMS) is any natural or legal person who, in the course of business, trades in precious metals or precious stones and who carries out a single cash transaction, or several linked cash transactions, at or above AED 55,000. This perimeter is set in Article 3(3) of Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025 concerning the Executive Regulations of Federal Decree Law No. 10 of 2025.

The term covers gold retailers, jewellers, refineries, bullion wholesalers, diamond and coloured-stone traders, pearl traders and recycling operations within the Ministry of Economy and Tourism’s supervisory remit. The trigger is the AED 55,000 cash value; the rule applies equally to a single retail sale and to a string of related transactions that together cross the threshold. Transactions below AED 55,000 remain inside the AML system for record-keeping and suspicious transaction reporting, but they do not by themselves create DPMSR reporting exposure. The DPMSR reporting obligation and the applicability of the AML/CFT federal law are two different things. One should not confuse the applicability of the law with the DPMSR submission obligations.

Legal test

“Dealers in valuable metals and precious stones, when carrying out any single cash transaction or several transactions that appear to be linked and whose value equals or exceeds fifty-five thousand dirhams (AED 55,000).” — Article 3(3), Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025.

Dealers established in the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) and the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) are supervised by their own regulators (the ADGM RA and the DFSA, respectively) under rulebooks that mirror the federal AML/CFT regime; the substantive obligations and threshold logic track federal law, but the primary touchpoint is the financial free zone regulator rather than MoET.

AML Supervisory Authority for DPMS in the UAE

The Anti-Money Laundering Department within the Ministry of Economy and Tourism (MoET) is the federal supervisor for DPMS operating in the mainland and commercial free zones. This mandate is grounded in Cabinet decisions that assign DNFBP supervision to MoET and is reaffirmed in the DNFBP Guidelines issued by the Ministry in September 2025, which list DPMS among the four supervised categories alongside real estate agents and brokers, independent accountants and auditors, and trust and corporate service providers.

MoET enforces the AML/CFT obligations through on-site inspections, thematic reviews, administrative penalties imposed under Cabinet Resolution No. 71 of 2024, and circular-based guidance. It coordinates closely with the UAE Financial Intelligence Unit (UAEFIU), which operates the goAML reporting platform, and with the Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN), which administers targeted financial sanctions. DPMS in ADGM and DIFC report to the ADGM RA and DFSA, respectively; DPMS in financial free zones follow the free zone’s AML framework, which cross-references to federal law.

1. Federal Supervisor

MoET is the primary AML/CFT supervisor for DPMS in mainland UAE and commercial free zones.

2. Financial Intelligence Unit

UAEFIU receives all Suspicious Transaction Reports, Confirmed Name Match Reports (CNMRs), PNMRs and DPMSRs through the goAML system.

3. Sanctions Authority

The Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN) administers targeted financial sanctions and the Notification Alert System (NAS).

4. Financial Free Zone Regulators

ADGM RA and DIFC DFSA supervise DPMS authorised inside their respective jurisdictions under rulebooks aligned with federal AML law.

AML Regulations Applicable to DPMS in the UAE

The AML regulations for DPMS in UAE are organised in five concentric layers: the federal AML statute and its executive and penalty regulations; cross-sector overarching guidance from the National Committee, the EOCN, the UAEFIU and other federal bodies; the National Risk Assessment; DNFBP sector-specific guidance and circulars issued by MoET; and sector-specific DPMS guidance addressing gold sourcing, goAML reporting and precious-metals typologies. The subsections below walk through each layer and cite the applicable instruments.

What this DPMS guide covers

Three substantive sections walk you through perimeter, supervisor and the layered AML regulations for DPMS in UAE.

1. Federal AML Laws and Executive Regulations

2. Overarching AML Guidance

3. NRA, SRA, and Other Important Guidelines

4. DNFBP Sector-Specific Guidance

5. Sector-Specific DPMS Guidelines

Federal AML Laws and Executive Regulations Applicable to Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones

Federal primary and secondary legislation sets the baseline AML/CFT/CPF obligations that every DPMS must meet, regardless of whether it trades in gold bars, loose diamonds or polished jewellery. The federal layer is reinforced by two dedicated penalty resolutions and a beneficial-owner framework that every DPMS legal entity has to implement independently of its AML obligations.

Federal AML laws and executive regulations at a glance

Seven primary and secondary instruments that set the baseline AML/CFT/CPF obligations for every DPMS.

1. Federal Decree Law No. 10 of 2025

2. Federal Law No. 7 of 2014

3. Cabinet Resolution No. 134 of 2025

4. Cabinet Decision No. 74 of 2020

5. Cabinet Resolution No. 71 of 2024

6. Cabinet Decision No. 109 of 2023

7. Cabinet Resolution No. 132 of 2023

Federal Decree by Law No. (10) of 2025 Regarding Anti-Money Laundering, and Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation Financing

Federal Decree Law No. 10 of 2025 is the current primary AML/CFT/CPF statute in the UAE. It defines Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions as persons engaged in commercial or professional activities specified in the Executive Regulations, and makes those persons subject to the full suite of preventive obligations, including customer due diligence, record-keeping, suspicious transaction reporting, internal controls, training and cooperation with supervisory authorities.

Article 10 of the Decree Law (Chapter Four — Disclosure) confirms that every person entering or leaving the State must disclose the carriage of currencies, bearer negotiable instruments, precious metals or valuable stones in accordance with the disclosure system issued by the Federal Authority for Identity, Citizenship, Customs and Port Security in coordination with the Central Bank, which directly supports the precious-metals control environment within which DPMS operate.

The Decree Law establishes the UAEFIU, sets out criminal offences and sanctions, and empowers supervisory authorities to impose administrative penalties alongside judicial consequences. For the details of what each obligation means in practice, DPMS must read the Decree Law together with its Executive Regulations (Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025) and the MoET DNFBP Guidelines.

Federal Law No. (7) of 2014 Combating Terrorism Crimes

Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 defines terrorism offences, terrorist organisations and the financing of terrorism. It is the criminal-law backbone behind the AML/CFT regime: when a DPMS identifies suspected terrorism-financing activity, the predicate offence is located in this Law and the related UNSC-implementing Cabinet Resolution 74 of 2020. Article 1 of Decree Law 10 of 2025 expressly refers to Federal Law 7 of 2014 in defining terrorist acts, thereby anchoring the AML statute within the criminal framework.

Cabinet Resolution No. (134) of 2025 Concerning the Executive Regulations of Federal Decree Law No. (10) of 2025

Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 is the executive regulation for Decree Law 10 of 2025 and contains the operational details that DPMS apply daily. Article 3(3) brings DPMS inside the perimeter at the AED 55,000 cash-transaction threshold. Article 7 sets out the triggers for customer due diligence, commencement of a business relationship, suspicion of a crime, doubts about previously obtained data, and occasional transactions at or above the thresholds. Article 8 requires ongoing monitoring, and subsequent articles set out enhanced due diligence, PEP handling, reliance on third parties, record-keeping and reporting obligations.

Where previous guidance, circulars or notifications refer to Federal Decree Law 20 of 2018 or Cabinet Resolution 10 of 2019, they continue to apply to the extent they are not repealed or inconsistent with Decree Law 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025. DPMS should therefore read every circular issued prior to 2025 through the lens of the new federal law.

Cabinet Decision No. 74 of 2020 Regarding Terrorism Lists Regulation and Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions

Cabinet Decision No. 74 of 2020 regulates the UAE Local Terrorist List and the UAE’s implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions on the suppression of terrorism, terrorism financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It creates the legal basis on which DPMS must screen customers, beneficial owners and transaction counterparties against the UAE Local Terrorist List and the UN Consolidated List, apply freezing measures without delay, and report confirmed and partial name matches to the EOCN. The Cabinet Decision is enforced alongside circulars issued by MoET and EOCN that translate the obligations into reporting timelines.

Cabinet Resolution No. (71) of 2024 Regulating Violations and Administrative Penalties for DNFBPs Under the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Economy

Cabinet Resolution No. 71 of 2024 replaced Cabinet Resolution 16 of 2021 and sets out the unified list of AML/CFT violations and administrative fines for DNFBPs supervised by the Ministry of Economy (now MoET) and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). Article 3 authorises the Ministry to impose one of the administrative penalties in Article 14 of the Decree Law, or the administrative fines in the annexed schedule, or both.

The annexed schedule covers more than forty categories of violations. Failure to adopt internal policies and controls is fined between AED 100,000 and AED 200,000. Failure to identify, assess and update crime risks is fined between AED 50,000 and AED 500,000. Failure to apply customer due diligence before or during a transaction at or above AED 55,000 is fined between AED 50,000 and AED 200,000. Failure to promptly file suspicious-transaction reports with the UAEFIU is fined between AED 100,000 and AED 500,000. Failure to implement UN Security Council sanctions decisions, directly relevant to DPMS given typology exposure, is fined between AED 100,000 and AED 1,000,000. Article 4 gives the violator thirty working days to grieve the penalty, and Article 5 permits the Ministry to amend, uphold or cancel the fine on review.

Cabinet Decision No. (109) of 2023 on Regulating the Beneficial Owner Procedures

Cabinet Decision No. 109 of 2023 regulates the identification, verification and continuous maintenance of the real (ultimate) beneficial owners of companies established in the UAE. A DPMS operating as a corporate licensee must maintain a register of beneficial owners, notify the licensing authority of changes within fifteen days and keep information current. Customer due diligence on corporate clients under Article 9 of the AML Executive Regulations draws on the same beneficial-owner concept, so the two frameworks operate in parallel: Decision 109 governs the DPMS’s own legal-person transparency, and the AML rules govern beneficial-owner identification of the DPMS’s customers.

Cabinet Resolution No. (132) of 2023 on Administrative Penalties for Beneficial Owner Violations

Cabinet Resolution No. 132 of 2023 sets out the administrative penalties for breaches of Cabinet Decision 109 of 2023. A DPMS that fails to disclose, update or maintain accurate beneficial-ownership data is exposed to written warnings to the legal person and financial penalties that escalate with repetition of the violation. Under Article 3(2) of Cabinet Resolution 132 of 2023, for violations committed for the third time, the Registrar has the right to suspend the commercial licence and close the commercial store of the violating legal person until the fine is paid and the breach is rectified. The penalty schedule is enforced by the Ministry of Economy and Tourism as the beneficial-owner registrar for most DPMS legal persons.

DPMS policy templates aligned to Decree Law 10/2025 and Cabinet 134/2025

AML UAE maintains up-to-date internal policies, customer due diligence procedures, DPMSR workflows and beneficial-owner registers engineered for the precious metals and stones sector.

Overarching AML Guidance Applicable to DPMS in the UAE

Alongside the federal statute, a catalogue of cross-sector guidance binds DPMS into the national AML/CFT/CPF architecture. These instruments explain how to implement targeted financial sanctions, counter proliferation finance, file reports on goAML and grieve sanctions-related decisions. Where a circular or guideline refers to the old Federal Decree Law 20 of 2018 and its executive regulation, it remains valid to the extent consistent with Decree Law 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025.

Overarching AML guidance at a glance

Thirteen cross-sector instruments from the EOCN, UAEFIU and National Committee that frame DPMS sanctions, CPF and reporting obligations.

1. EOCN TFS Guideline (Jan 2021, last amended Jul 2025)

2. UAEFIU TF Strategic Analysis (May 2025)

3. TFS Strategic Review (Nov 2021)

4. PF Institutional Risk Assessment Guidance (Dec 2023)

5. TF and PF Red Flags Guidance (updated Dec 2023)

6. Unlicensed VASP Joint Guidance (2022)

7. Counter Proliferation Financing Guidance (Nov 2022)

8. Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory Practice Joint Guidance (Jun 2021)

9. Sanctions Circumvention Typologies (Mar 2021)

10. EOCN Grievance Procedures Guideline

11. Online Grievance System User Guide

12. Combating PF and Sanctions Evasion

13. EOCN NAS Subscription Simple Guide

1. Guideline on Targeted Financial Sanctions for Financial Institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs — Executive Office for Control and Non-Proliferation (EOCN), issued January 2021, last amended July 2025

The EOCN TFS Guideline is the authoritative reference for how DPMS implement UN-led and UAE-local sanctions obligations. It explains the scope of TFS measures, the concept of ‘funds or other assets’, the screening expectations on customers, beneficial owners and counterparties, and the freezing obligation that must be executed without delay. The Guideline also sets the five-business-day reporting window for Confirmed Name Match Reports (CNMRs) and Partial Name Match Reports (PNMRs) on goAML, and DPMS rely on it to calibrate screening frequency, to interpret partial-match handling and to build CNMR and PNMR workflows.

2. UAEFIU’s Strategic Analysis Report on Terrorist Financing Typologies and Facilitators — May 2025

This UAEFIU strategic analysis sets out the dominant terrorist-financing typologies observed in the UAE and the facilitators most frequently exploited. For DPMS, the relevance lies in the report’s analysis of how precious metals and cash movements intersect with TF networks, and in the red-flag indicators that should feed into the DPMS’s transaction-monitoring rules and staff training.

3. Strategic Review on Targeted Financial Sanctions Case Studies 2019-2021 (IEC-SR.01.22) — Executive Office, November 2021

The Strategic Review compiles sanitised case studies from 2019 to 2021 where UAE private-sector obligations to apply TFS were tested. DPMS use these case studies to benchmark their own sanctions screening, to understand which typologies should trigger enhanced due diligence and to test the strength of their freezing and reporting playbooks.

4. Proliferation Finance Institutional Risk Assessment Guidance for FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs — December 2023

This Guidance explains how an institutional proliferation-finance risk assessment should be structured. DPMS, because of their exposure to dual-use goods pathways and to jurisdictions subject to UNSC proliferation-related sanctions, must run a specific proliferation-finance assessment as part of their wider business-wide risk assessment, separate from the ML and TF analyses.

5. Terrorist and Proliferation Financing Red Flags Guidance — December 2023

This cross-sector red-flag bulletin lists concrete indicators that front-line DPMS staff should watch for in transactions involving gold, bullion, high-value stones and jewellery. Where one or more red flags are present, the DPMS must escalate and, if suspicion persists, file an STR with the UAEFIU without delay.

6. Joint Guidance on Combating the Use of Unlicensed Virtual Asset Service Providers in the UAE — Central Bank, SCA, VARA, DFSA, FSRA and Ministries of Justice and Economy (2022)

DPMS frequently encounter customers who wish to settle precious metals purchases through virtual assets. This Joint Guidance from the Central Bank, CMA, VARA and ADGM/DIFC regulators sets out the obligations to deal only with licensed VASPs, and the red flags that indicate a counterparty is operating without a UAE VASP licence. DPMS integrating virtual-asset settlement must apply these expectations alongside their own AML controls.

7. Guidance on Counter Proliferation Financing for FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs — November 2022

This is the authoritative cross-sector CPF guidance. It explains the definition of proliferation financing in UAE law, the institutional risk assessment framework, the specific red flags linked to dual-use goods and the interaction with UNSC resolutions 1718 (DPRK) and 1737/2231 (Iran). DPMS sourcing or selling bullion and stones in trade-finance-heavy structures use this Guidance to build their CPF controls.

8. Joint Guidance on Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory Practice — June 2021

This joint supervisors’ Guidance contrasts observed satisfactory practice against unsatisfactory practice across governance, risk assessment, CDD, record-keeping and reporting. It is the single most practical benchmarking document for DPMS that want to self-assess the maturity of their AML programme before an inspection.

9. Typologies on the Circumvention of Targeted Sanctions — March 2021

This typology paper walks through common techniques used to circumvent sanctions, including the use of front companies, intermediaries in jurisdictions with lighter controls, and trade-based disguise of value. DPMS face each of these typologies in their own market; the paper informs its enhanced due diligence expectations for trades involving high-risk jurisdictions.

10. Guideline on Grievance Procedures

This EOCN Guideline explains how a DPMS, a customer or a designated person requests de-listing, removal of a freezing measure or permission to use frozen funds. It sets out the information to include, the review process and the timelines. DPMS need it when handling a CNMR or PNMR that is subsequently contested.

11. Online Grievance System User Guide

The Online Grievance System is the digital channel for submitting grievances to the EOCN. The User Guide walks through account creation, grievance submission, document uploads and status checks. DPMS with dedicated compliance functions should register up-front so they are not delayed if a grievance becomes necessary.

12. Combating Proliferation Financing and Sanctions Evasion

This EOCN awareness document synthesises the CPF and sanctions-evasion obligations into a practitioner-oriented narrative. DPMS training curricula should map each module of this document to one or more of their internal controls, so staff can explain the underlying risk in the context of real-world gold and stone transactions.

13. Simple Guide to Subscribe to the EOCN Notification Alert System (NAS)

The NAS is the EOCN’s subscription channel for updates to the UAE Local Terrorist List, the UN Consolidated List and related designations. The Simple Guide explains the step-by-step subscription process. DPMS compliance officers must subscribe to the NAS so that screening lists are refreshed as soon as designations change.

NRA, SRA, and Other Important Guidelines Applicable to DPMS in the UAE

The UAE’s risk-based approach begins with the National Risk Assessment. For DPMS, the NRA sets the baseline expectation on how seriously to treat sector-inherent risks.

UAE ML/TF National Risk Assessment — 2024

The UAE Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment 2024 rates the inherent risk of the DPMS sector at medium-to-high, highlighting the combination of trade scale, cash intensity, international exposure and the persistent risk of conflict-affected or high-risk gold entering the supply chain. The NRA instructs DPMS to use these findings as a floor for their own business-wide risk assessment, and to apply enhanced due diligence where sectoral risk factors are present. The Practical Guide for DNFBPs, published alongside the NRA, translates the findings into operational actions for DPMS compliance officers.

Align your business-wide risk assessment with the UAE NRA 2024

AML UAE runs NRA-aligned business-wide risk assessments for DPMS, covering customer, geography, product, channel and delivery dimensions.

DNFBP Sector-Specific Guidance Applicable to DPMS in the UAE

MoET issues dedicated circulars and guidance for all DNFBPs under its supervision. These instruments are the everyday operating manual for DPMS compliance officers and are usually addressed to real estate brokers and agents, DPMS, auditors and accountants, and corporate service providers in parallel.

DNFBP sector-specific guidance at a glance

Ten MoET circulars and implementation guides that govern DPMS screening, CDD, risk-based approach and sanctions obligations

1. Circular No. 1 of 2026 — High-Risk Country Lists

2. AML/CFT DNFBP Guidelines (Sep 2025)

3. Circular No. 3 of 2025 — Sanctions and Terrorist List Screening

4. Circular No. 4 of 2025 — Understanding the NRA 2024

5. Circular No. 6 of 2025 — Risk-Based CDD

6. Circular No. 7 of 2025 — Re-Imposition of UN Sanctions on Iran

7. Circular No. 8 of 2025 — High-Risk Country Update

8. CRA Implementation Guide (Nov 2024)

9. CDD Implementation Guide (Nov 2024)

10. Circular No. 2 of 2022 — UNSCRs 1718 and 2231

1. Circular No. (1) of 2026 on Updating the Lists of High-Risk Countries, Countries Subject to Increased Monitoring, and Related Measures

Issued on 11 March 2026 as MOET/AML/001/2026, this Circular transposes National Committee Resolution No. 15 of 2025 into DNFBP practice. It reminds DPMS that the Resolution reaffirms existing obligations, updates country listings, and requires alignment of screening, enhanced due diligence and risk-based measures with the revised lists. The Circular cites Federal Decree Law 10 of 2025, Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 and Cabinet Decision 74 of 2020 as its legal basis.

2. AML/CFT Guidelines for Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions — September 2025

The Revised DNFBP Guidelines are the consolidated MoET rulebook for DNFBPs. Part I sets out the legal framework; Part II covers compliance administration; Part III sets out the identification and assessment of ML/TF/PF risks; Parts IV and V address mitigation controls, customer due diligence, reporting and record-keeping. The Guidelines name DPMS among the four supervised categories and incorporate the CNMR (Confirmed Name Match Report), PNMR, and DPMSR reporting typologies into the compliance officer’s remit.

3. Circular No. (3) of 2025 on Emphasising the Importance of Screening Sanctions and Terrorist Lists

Issued on 19 March 2025 as MOEC/AML/003/2025, this Circular is the clearest recent statement that DPMS must screen every customer, beneficial owner and transaction counterparty against sanctions and terrorist lists, irrespective of transaction value, payment method or whether the transaction crosses the AED 55,000 reporting threshold. Screening is not optional below the threshold; only the DPMSR reporting trigger is threshold-based.

4. Circular No. (4) of 2025 on the Importance of Understanding the UAE 2024 National Risk Assessment

This Circular directs DPMS to read the National Risk Assessment 2024 and to map its findings into their own business-wide risk assessment, customer risk matrix and transaction-monitoring rules. Where the NRA identifies a sectoral threat or typology, conflict-affected gold, trade-based money laundering, or shell companies, the DPMS is expected to demonstrate that the threat has been analysed and that mitigating controls are in place.

5. Circular No. (6) of 2025 on Emphasising the Implementation of Risk-Based Customer Due Diligence Measures

Issued on 5 August 2025 as MOET/AML/6/2025, this Circular reinforces the risk-based approach and clarifies the appropriate use of simplified due diligence (SDD). DPMS must apply enhanced due diligence to high-risk customers, standard CDD to medium-risk customers where no suspicion exists, and may apply SDD only to low-risk customers where no suspicion of ML, TF or PF exists. The Circular cross-references to the Customer Risk Assessment and CDD implementation guides issued by the Ministry.

6. Circular No. (7) of 2025 Regarding the Re-Imposition of United Nations Sanctions Related to Iran

Issued on 19 December 2025 as MOET/AML/007/2025, this Circular flags the re-imposition of UN sanctions under Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) and subsequent resolutions. DPMS must update screening systems to the latest UN Consolidated List, re-screen existing customers and counterparties, apply freezing measures without delay, and report confirmed name matches (CNMR) and partial name matches (PNMR) to the EOCN via goAML in accordance with the procedures in the EOCN TFS Guideline (which sets a five-business-day reporting window from the freeze or suspension measure).

7. Circular No. (8) of 2025 on Updating the Lists of High-Risk Countries, Countries Subject to Increased Monitoring, and Related Measures

Issued on 25 December 2025 as MOET/AML/008/2025, this Circular (later superseded by Circular 1 of 2026) updates the high-risk country lists in line with National Committee Resolution 15 of 2025 and the FATF country review. DPMS must monitor the FATF lists, align customer risk categorisation and transaction monitoring, and apply the measures required by the Ministry when a customer, beneficial owner or counterparty is connected to a listed jurisdiction.

8. Implementation Guide for DNFBPs on Customer Risk Assessment (CRA) — November 2024

The CRA Implementation Guide walks DPMS through the construction of a customer risk matrix, identifying customer, product, service, geography, channel and delivery risk factors; weighting them; and assigning a final risk rating that drives the intensity of CDD, monitoring and review frequency. DPMS use the guide to design their client-onboarding questionnaires and periodic-review templates.

9. Implementation Guide for DNFBPs on Customer Due Diligence (CDD) — November 2024

The CDD Implementation Guide is the operational companion to the CRA guide. It explains how to identify and verify customers and beneficial owners, when to apply simplified, standard or enhanced due diligence, how to approach politically exposed persons, and how to document decisions. DPMS staff handling threshold transactions reference this Guide when collecting identification under MoE Circular 08/AML/2021.

10. Circular No. (2) of 2022 on Implementation of Targeted Financial Sanctions under UNSCRs 1718 (2006) and 2231 (2015)

Issued on 31 March 2022, this Circular covers the implementation of TFS related to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran. It requires DPMS to screen every transaction party against the DPRK and Iran sanctions regimes, to apply enhanced due diligence to transactions linked to those jurisdictions, to verify cross-border transactions suspected of involving dual-use goods, and to file confirmed and partial name matches via goAML. The Circular has been superseded in part by later EOCN guidance, but its operational obligations continue to apply.

Build DPMS-ready screening and goAML reporting workflows

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Sector-Specific Guidelines Applicable to DPMS in the UAE

A final layer of guidance targets DPMS directly. These documents address gold sourcing, DPMSR reporting, compliance officer appointment and DPMS typologies. They sit on top of the federal and DNFBP layers and are the instruments regulators cite most often in DPMS inspections.

DPMS sector-specific guidelines at a glance

Eight directly applicable instruments covering gold sourcing, DPMSR reporting, compliance-officer appointment and precious-metals typologies.

1. UAEFIU Strategic Analysis Report on DPMS (Sep 2025)

2. Ministerial Decree No. 68 of 2024 — Gold Refineries

3. MoE Circular No. 2 of 2024 — Responsible Sourcing of Gold

4. Due Diligence Regulation for Responsible Sourcing of Gold

5. MoE Circular No. 2 of 2023 — DPMS Data Disclosure Notice

6. MoE Circular No. 08/AML/2021 — DPMSR Reporting

7. MoET Circular No. 2 of 2021 — DNFBP Obligations

8. Supplemental Guidance for DPMS (May 2019)

1. UAEFIU’s Strategic Analysis Report on Misuse of Precious Metals and Stones in Financial Crime — September 2025

This is the most recent UAEFIU strategic analysis covering the DPMS sector. It notes that UAE foreign trade in precious stones, metals and their articles grew from AED 497 billion in 2021 to more than AED 959 billion in 2024, and that 8,191 DPMS were registered on goAML as of 30 June 2025, an 81 per cent increase over June 2022. The report analyses 1,448,825 DPMSRs filed between July 2021 and June 2025, as well as around 700 STRs and SARs related to the sector. It identifies five dominant typologies: conflict-affected and high-risk gold; gold smuggling; use of front and shell entities; trade-based money laundering; and the use of precious metals and stones in terrorist financing. It concludes with thirty-two DPMS-specific red-flag indicators covering customer due diligence, trade activities and behavioural triggers.

2. Ministerial Decree No. (68) of 2024 Regarding Gold Refineries’ Adherence to the Policy of Due Diligence Regulations for Responsible Sourcing of Gold

Ministerial Decree 68 of 2024 was issued on 29 March 2024 by the Minister of Economy. Article One requires every entity engaged in refining gold or recycling its products, and every supply-chain stakeholder operating in the UAE (including commercial free zones under MoE supervision), to adhere to the attached Due Diligence Policy for Responsible Sourcing of Gold. Supply-chain participants and precious-metals dealers must establish strong management systems, assess gold-supply-chain risks and implement a management strategy to respond to identified risks. Refineries (and recyclers) must additionally appoint an independent third-party auditor and submit a due diligence report on the gold supply chain. Article Three confirms that administrative penalties apply to violations of the Decree and the attached Policy.

3. Circular No. (2) of 2024 regarding Due Diligence Regulation for Responsible Sourcing of Gold

MoE Circular No. 2 of 2024, dated 29 March 2024, directs every regulated entity with gold refineries as an activity in its licence operating in the UAE to undertake the 5-step framework of the Due Diligence Regulation for Responsible Sourcing of Gold. The Circular confirms that from 1 January 2023, gold refineries must conduct an independent third-party audit of their due diligence measures, with audits expected to be completed within 90 days of the effective date (that is, 90 days from 31 December 2023). The Ministry has a dedicated inbox at ResponsibleSourcing@economy.ae. Entities that fail to comply are subject to administrative actions under the AML/CFT framework.

4. The Due Diligence Regulation for Responsible Sourcing of Gold

The Due Diligence Regulation for Responsible Sourcing of Gold is the policy instrument annexed to the Ministerial Decree and referenced in Circular 2 of 2024. It is built around five steps: (1) establishing an effective governance framework, including a board-approved sourcing policy, management structures and a confidential grievance mechanism; (2) identification and assessment of supply-chain risk, including the use of red flags and enhanced due diligence for conflict-affected and high-risk areas (CAHRAs); (3) management of supply-chain risk through a risk-control plan, continuous monitoring and senior-management reporting; (4) an independent third-party audit of the due-diligence measures; and (5) annual reporting on management systems, risk assessment and risk management. The Regulation is the detailed implementation manual behind Ministerial Decree 68 of 2024.

5. Circular No. (2) of 2023 — Data Disclosure Notice for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones

MoE Circular No. (2) of 2023 instructed DPMS to display prominently in customer-facing premises a notice informing customers that the dealer will collect identification documents, and they should disclose their data.  

6. Ministry of Economy Circular No. (08/AML/2021) on the Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones Report

MoE Circular 08/AML/2021, dated 2 June 2021, is the DPMSR reporting foundation. Effective 12 June 2021, it requires DPMS to: (1) obtain Emirates ID or passport for resident individuals and ID or passport for non-resident individuals on any cash transaction at or above AED 55,000, and register the information in the UAEFIU’s goAML platform using the DPMSR form; (2) obtain trade licence and ID for corporate counterparties on transactions at or above AED 55,000 in cash or by wire transfer, and register the information in goAML as a DPMSR; and (3) keep records of every document and piece of information relating to the above transactions for a minimum of five years. The Circular refers queries to AML@economy.ae and continues in force under the new federal law.

7. MoET Circular No. (2) of 2021 on AML/CFT Obligations for DNFBPs

MoE Circular 2 of 2021, dated 4 February 2021, is the baseline DNFBP implementation circular. It confirms that MoE supervises real estate brokers and agents, dealers in precious metals and stones, account auditors and company services providers. It requires each supervised entity to appoint a compliance officer in accordance with Article 21 of the Executive Regulations, adopt internal policies, deliver staff training, register on goAML and cooperate with supervisory inspections. DPMS compliance officers cite this Circular when explaining the governance perimeter of their role.

8. Supplemental Guidance for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones — May 2019

The 2019 Supplemental Guidance is the most detailed sector-specific narrative issued for DPMS. It explains why precious metals and stones are inherently vulnerable to ML/TF: high intrinsic value in a compact form, ability to maintain or increase in value, ease of physical transport, cash-based and decentralised markets, difficulty in tracing specific items and low compliance-awareness among smaller participants. It walks through the AED 55,000 ‘covered transactions’ concept, introduces sector-specific red flags and sets out expectations for customer due diligence, record-keeping and reporting. It continues to serve as a training reference for DPMS compliance teams.

Conclusion

The AML regulations for DPMS in UAE are dense but internally coherent. Federal Decree Law 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 set the primary obligations; Cabinet Resolutions 71 of 2024, 109 of 2023 and 132 of 2023 govern penalties and beneficial ownership; a stack of EOCN and UAEFIU guidance operationalises targeted financial sanctions, proliferation-finance controls and reporting; the 2024 NRA sets the risk baseline; and a layer of MoET DNFBP and DPMS-specific circulars translates the regime into daily practice. On top of that, Ministerial Decree 68 of 2024 and Circular 2 of 2024 impose a 5-step responsible sourcing overlay on gold refiners and supply-chain participants.

A DPMS that wants to remain compliant must: submit DPMSR wherever applicable; screen every customer, beneficial owner and counterparty against the local terrorist list and the UN Consolidated List, regardless of transaction size; run a proliferation-finance assessment alongside the ML and TF assessments; integrate the five-step gold sourcing framework where applicable; and make sure that every circular, whether issued under the old Decree Law 20 of 2018 or the new Decree Law 10 of 2025, is understood through the lens of the current federal law.

Talk to AML UAE about your DPMS compliance programme

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FAQs

Who counts as a DPMS under UAE AML law?

Under Article 3(3) of Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025, a dealer in precious metals and stones is any person, natural or legal, trading in precious metals or precious stones in the course of business who carries out a single cash transaction, or several linked cash transactions, equal to or above AED 55,000. The definition covers gold retailers, jewellers, refineries, bullion wholesalers, diamond and coloured-stone traders and recyclers. Below AED 55,000, AML obligations still apply for screening, record-keeping and suspicion-based reporting, but no DPMSR is triggered.

MoE Circular 08/AML/2021 requires DPMS to file a Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones Report (DPMSR) on the UAEFIU’s goAML platform for every cash transaction at or above AED 55,000 with a resident or non-resident individual, and for every transaction at or above AED 55,000 with a legal entity, whether paid in cash or by wire transfer. Separately, any suspicion of ML, TF or proliferation financing, regardless of amount, must be filed as a Suspicious Transaction Report via goAML, and confirmed and partial name matches against sanctions lists must be filed as CNMR or PNMR within five business days of the freeze or suspension.

Yes. Under Ministerial Decree 68 of 2024 and MoET Circular 2 of 2024, entities that engage in refining or recycling gold must adhere to the 5-step Due Diligence Regulations for Responsible Sourcing of Gold and, additionally, appoint an independent third-party auditor and submit an annual due diligence report on the gold supply chain. The audit obligation has applied since 1 January 2023. Refineries remain subject to all the generic DPMS obligations under Decree Law 10 of 2025 and Cabinet Resolution 134 of 2025 in parallel.

The UAEFIU Strategic Analysis Report on DPMS (September 2025) lists thirty-two sector-specific indicators. The most common include: refusal to provide identification; inability to demonstrate funding sources; forged certificates of origin, refinery stamps or fake invoices; supply chains transiting conflict-affected or high-risk jurisdictions; large or frequent cash transactions inconsistent with the customer’s profile; structuring through multiple visits or split invoices just below AED 55,000; payments via multiple third parties or offshore entities without clear commercial link; and repeated requests for duplicate invoices or refunds after cash purchases.

DPMS established in ADGM and DIFC are supervised by the AFDGM Registration Authority (RA) and the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA), respectively. Their rulebooks implement UAE federal AML/CFT law and the UAE’s international AML/CFT commitments, so the substantive obligations and the AED 55,000 threshold logic track federal law. The procedural touchpoints licensing, inspections, filings and enforcement are, however, with the financial free-zone regulator rather than MoET. DPMS in commercial free zones outside ADGM and DIFC remain under MoET supervision.

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About the Author

Pathik Shah

FCA, CAMS, CISA, CS, DISA (ICAI), FAFP (ICAI)

Pathik is an ACAMS-certified AML consultant specialising in governance, risk, and compliance for regulated entities in the UAE. He brings over 28 years of experience, with 1,000+ hours of AML training and 200+ advisory engagements across DNFBPs, VASPs, and FIs. He supports businesses in aligning with AML/CFT requirements from the CBUAE, DFSA, MoET, MoJ, VARA, CMA, FSRA, and FATF. Known for translating complex regulations into audit-ready procedures, Pathik enables operational clarity and compliance readiness.

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